From c777362a387350e7d78c99fd4c77eff6e0189a68 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Adel I. Mirzazhanov" Date: Thu, 22 Feb 2001 17:00:10 +0600 Subject: [PATCH] APG v1.2.12 --- CHANGES | 67 ++ COPYING | 27 + INSTALL | 91 ++ INSTALL.CYGWIN | 43 + Makefile | 85 ++ README | 28 + README.CYGWIN | 11 + THANKS | 10 + TODO | 20 + apg.c | 562 +++++++++++ cast/cast.c | 239 +++++ cast/cast.h | 24 + cast/cast_sboxes.h | 543 +++++++++++ doc/man/apg.1 | 227 +++++ doc/man/apgd.8 | 229 +++++ doc/rfc0972.txt | 114 +++ doc/rfc1750.txt | 1683 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ errors.c | 102 ++ errs.h | 40 + install-sh | 251 +++++ mkinstalldirs | 40 + owntypes.h | 43 + perl/apgcli.pl | 10 + pronpass.c | 2293 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ pronpass.h | 86 ++ randpass.c | 110 +++ randpass.h | 49 + restrict.c | 66 ++ restrict.h | 41 + rnd.c | 117 +++ rnd.h | 47 + 31 files changed, 7298 insertions(+) create mode 100644 CHANGES create mode 100644 COPYING create mode 100644 INSTALL create mode 100644 INSTALL.CYGWIN create mode 100644 Makefile create mode 100644 README create mode 100644 README.CYGWIN create mode 100644 THANKS create mode 100644 TODO create mode 100644 apg.c create mode 100644 cast/cast.c create mode 100644 cast/cast.h create mode 100644 cast/cast_sboxes.h create mode 100644 doc/man/apg.1 create mode 100644 doc/man/apgd.8 create mode 100644 doc/rfc0972.txt create mode 100644 doc/rfc1750.txt create mode 100644 errors.c create mode 100644 errs.h create mode 100755 install-sh create mode 100755 mkinstalldirs create mode 100644 owntypes.h create mode 100755 perl/apgcli.pl create mode 100644 pronpass.c create mode 100644 pronpass.h create mode 100644 randpass.c create mode 100644 randpass.h create mode 100644 restrict.c create mode 100644 restrict.h create mode 100644 rnd.c create mode 100644 rnd.h diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6a73815 --- /dev/null +++ b/CHANGES @@ -0,0 +1,67 @@ +apg-1.2.12 + Added support for AIX, and some compatibility reports + +apg-1.2.11 + Changed default owner of apg and apgd (now it is root). + Some cosmetic changes. + +apg-1.2.1 + Changed -R option. Changed documentation. + +apg-1.2.1b + Changed impementation of -y option. Now you can disable it + before compilation. + Added option -M for new style password modes specification. + (see apg(1) apgd(8)). + Added support for IRIX + (Thanks to Andrew J. Caird ) + +apg-1.2.1a2 + Added option -y (see apg(1)). + (Thanks to Andrew J. Caird ) + Some minior fixes for APG for Solaris. + +apg-1.2.1alpha + Added option -R (see apg(1) and apgd(8)). + +apg-1.2.0 + Changed random character password generation algorithm. + Changed user random seed generation procedures. + +apg-1.1.61b + Fixed directory permissions (thanks to Adrian Ho ). + Fixed random segfault when run with the -s argument + (thanks to Peter Pentchev ) + +apg-1.1.6b + Fixed random number generation error. + (Thanks to Rainer Wichmann ) + Now RNG uses local time with precision of microseconds + as initial seed. + (Thanks to Rainer Wichmann ) + Fixed error that was the reason of random APG crashes. + Added support for /dev/random for seed generation. + +apg-1.1.5 + Fixed some compiler warnings + Fixed pronounceable password generation error with modes -C -N. But + there is another bug ;-( Sorry... + It is no more an error if min_pass_len > max_pass_len. + Changed installation procedure + Added option -d (see apg(1)). + +apg-1.1.4 + Modified pronounceable password generation algorithm. + Now support -N and -C options, but still pronounceable ;-) + +apg-1.0.4 + Added option -c (see apg(1)).Changed apg.c, apg.1 manpage. + +apg-1.0.3 + Fixed somecode style errors. Changed INSTALL, apgd.8 manpage. + +apg-1.0.2 + Improved event logging of apgd. Changed INSTALL. + +apg-1.0.1 + Fixed password length error diff --git a/COPYING b/COPYING new file mode 100644 index 0000000..87b115a --- /dev/null +++ b/COPYING @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001 +Adel I. Mirzazhanov. All rights reserved + +Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +are met: + + 1.Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, + this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + 2.Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + 3.The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + +THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS +OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED +WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE +ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY +DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL +DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE +GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS +INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, +WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING +NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS +SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/INSTALL b/INSTALL new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f7afd40 --- /dev/null +++ b/INSTALL @@ -0,0 +1,91 @@ +Installation + +There are 2 types of installation: (1) stand-alone, (2) client-server +(See README for details). You can use each type separetly or you can +use them together. + +The simplest way to install this package is: +1. untar the distribution and cd to the top: + + % gzip -d -c apg-1.X.XX.tar.gz | tar xf - + % cd apg-1.X.XX + +If you are reading this file, you probably have already done this! + +2. Edit the Makefile + +3. make the software: + + For stand-alone: + + % make standalone + + For client-server: + + % make cliserv + + For both: + + % make all + +4. install the binaries and man pages. You may need to be superuser +to do this (depending on where you are installing things): + + % su + # make install + +5. You can remove the program binaries and object files from the +source code directory by typing + + % make clean + +NOTE: THE REST IS FOR CLIENT-SERVER INSTALLATION ONLY !!! + +6. Modify your /etc/inetd.conf file to contain the line below. +You may have to modify it to support your version of the file. + + pwdgen stream tcp nowait nobody /usr/local/sbin/apgd apgd [options] + +or + pwdgen stream tcp nowait nobody /usr/sbin/tcpd /usr/local/sbin/apgd [options] + +if you use tcp_wrapers. (for options see apgd(8) manpage) + +For all OS versions you must modify, your /etc/services file needs +to include the following line: + + pwdgen 129/tcp # PWDGEN service + +7. Restart inetd with a + + # kill -HUP inetdpid + +8. Configure your syslogd daemon to handle events `daemon.info' and +`daemon.debug' see syslogd(8) and syslog.conf(5) + +9. Check that apgd is working + + % telnet your.host.name 129 + +or + + % telnet your.host.name pwdgen + +10. Customize your apgcli.pl - APG client +Edit apgcli.pl file that can be found in src/perl directory of +source distribution tree + +----------------------------------> src/perl/apgcli.pl +#!/usr/bin/perl -w # Put here the real location of perl +$host = "localhost"; # Put here the name of your APG server +use IO::Socket; +$remote = IO::Socket::INET->new( + Proto => "tcp", + PeerAddr => $host, + PeerPort => "pwdgen(129)", + ) + or die "cannot connect to pwdgen port at $host"; +while ( <$remote> ) { print } +----------------------------------> src/perl/apgcli.pl + +END diff --git a/INSTALL.CYGWIN b/INSTALL.CYGWIN new file mode 100644 index 0000000..95bb135 --- /dev/null +++ b/INSTALL.CYGWIN @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +Installation of APG toolkit for CYGWIN + +Generaly there are 2 types of installation: +(1) standalone +(2) client-server +but only standalone installation implemented for CYGWIN yet. + +The instruction below IS FOR STANDALONE INSTALLATION ONLY + +The simplest way to install this package is: +1. untar the distribution and cd to the top: + + % gzip -d -c apg-1.X.XX.tar.gz | tar xf - + % cd apg-1.X.XX + +If you are reading this file, you probably have already done this! + +2. Edit the Makefile + +3. make the software: + + For standalone: + + % make cygwin + +4. install the binaries and man pages. +There are some problems with install for CYGWIN. +Sorry... But you have to do it manualy + + % make install-cygwin + +5. You can remove the program binaries and object files from the +source code directory by typing + + % make clean + +NOTE: You can use APG without CYGWIN, you need only cygwin*.dll. +Copy APG.EXE to the directory you want and copy CYGWIN*.DLL +in the same directory. Now you can run APG.EXE in the MS-DOS Prompt +or just cliking on it. + +Adel I. Mirzazhanov +a-del@iname.com diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3b9bbb3 --- /dev/null +++ b/Makefile @@ -0,0 +1,85 @@ +# You can modify CC variable if you have compiler other than GCC +# But the code was designed and tested with GCC +CC = gcc + +# compilation flags +# You should comment the line below for AIX+native cc +FLAGS = -Wall + +# libraries +LIBS = -lcrypt + +# DO NOT EDIT THE LINE BELOW !!! +CRYPTED_PASS = APG_DONOTUSE_CRYPT +# Coment this if you do not want to use crypted passwords output +CRYPTED_PASS = APG_USE_CRYPT + +# Install dirs +INSTALL_PREFIX = /usr/local +APG_BIN_DIR = /bin +APG_MAN_DIR = /man/man1 +APGD_BIN_DIR = /sbin +APGD_MAN_DIR = /man/man8 + +# Find group ID for user root +FIND_GROUP = `grep '^root:' /etc/passwd | awk -F: '{ print $$4 }'` + +#################################################################### +# If you plan to install APG daemon you should look at lines below # +#################################################################### + +# Uncoment NOTHING for FreeBSD +# + +# Uncoment line below for LINUX +#CS_LIBS = -lnsl + +# Uncoment line below for Solaris +#CS_LIBS = -lnsl -lsocket + +# ====== YOU DO NOT NEED TO MODIFY ANYTHING BELOW THIS LINE ====== + +PROGNAME = apg +CS_PROGNAME = apgd +SOURCES = rnd.c ./cast/cast.c pronpass.c randpass.c restrict.c errors.c apg.c +HEADERS = owntypes.h pronpass.h randpass.h restrict.h errs.h rnd.h ./cast/cast.h ./cast/cast_sboxes.h +OBJECTS = rnd.o ./cast/cast.o pronpass.o randpass.o restrict.o apg.o errors.o + +all: cliserv standalone + +cygwin: standalone + +cliserv: ${SOURCES} ${HEADERS} + ${CC} ${FLAGS} ${CS_LIBS} -DCLISERV -o ${CS_PROGNAME} ${SOURCES} + +standalone: ${SOURCES} ${HEADERS} + ${CC} ${FLAGS} ${LIBS} -D${CRYPTED_PASS} -o ${PROGNAME} ${SOURCES} + +strip: + strip ${PROGNAME} + strip ${CS_PROGNAME} + +install: + if test -x ./apg; then \ +./mkinstalldirs ${INSTALL_PREFIX}${APG_BIN_DIR}; \ +./mkinstalldirs ${INSTALL_PREFIX}${APG_MAN_DIR}; \ +./install-sh -c -m 0755 -o root -g ${FIND_GROUP} ./apg ${INSTALL_PREFIX}${APG_BIN_DIR}; \ +./install-sh -c -m 0444 ./doc/man/apg.1 ${INSTALL_PREFIX}${APG_MAN_DIR}; \ +fi + if test -x ./apgd; then \ +./mkinstalldirs ${INSTALL_PREFIX}${APGD_BIN_DIR}; \ +./mkinstalldirs ${INSTALL_PREFIX}${APGD_MAN_DIR}; \ +./install-sh -c -m 0755 -o root -g ${FIND_GROUP} ./apgd ${INSTALL_PREFIX}${APGD_BIN_DIR}; \ +./install-sh -c -m 0444 ./doc/man/apgd.8 ${INSTALL_PREFIX}${APGD_MAN_DIR}; \ +fi + +install-cygwin: + if test -x ./apg.exe; then \ +./mkinstalldirs ${INSTALL_PREFIX}${APG_BIN_DIR}; \ +./mkinstalldirs ${INSTALL_PREFIX}${APG_MAN_DIR}; \ +./install-sh -c -m 0755 ./apg.exe ${INSTALL_PREFIX}${APG_BIN_DIR}; \ +./install-sh -c -m 0444 ./doc/man/apg.1 ${INSTALL_PREFIX}${APG_MAN_DIR}; \ +fi + +clean: + rm -f ${CS_PROGNAME} ${PROGNAME} ${OBJECTS} core* diff --git a/README b/README new file mode 100644 index 0000000..10ea634 --- /dev/null +++ b/README @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +APG v1.2.12 was tested and found working on: + + i386 FreeBSD 4.0-RELEASE + i386 Linux-Mandrake 6.0 + i386 Linux-Redhat 7.0 + i386 Linux-Mandrake 7.2 (reported by Andrew J. Caird ) + Intel Solaris 8 gcc-2.95.2 + SPARC Solaris 8 gcc-2.95.2 + Intel Windows 2000+CYGWIN v1.1.4 + HP-UX 10.20 HP ANSI C Compilier (reported by Alexander J Pierce ) + HP-UX 11.00 HP ANSI C Compilier (reported by Alexander J Pierce ) + HP-UX 11.00 gcc-2.95.2 (reported by Andrew J. Caird ) + IRIX 6.5.8 gcc-2.95.2 (reported by Andrew J. Caird ) + AIX 4.3.3+native cc (reported by Philip Le Riche ) + AIX 4.3.3+gcc (reported by Philip Le Riche ) + +Any compatibility reports are welcom + + * For installation instructions see INSTALL + * For usage instructions see manpages + * For copying information see COPYING + +See also APG Homepage at: http://www.adel.nursat.kz/apg/ + +ANY PATCHES OR SUGGESTIONS ARE WELCOME + +Adel I. Mirzazhanov +E-mail: a-del@iname.com diff --git a/README.CYGWIN b/README.CYGWIN new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d646fe8 --- /dev/null +++ b/README.CYGWIN @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +APG is now supports CYGWIN +(thanks to Graham Bloice ) + + * For installation instructions see INSTALL.CYGWIN + * For usage instructions see manpages + * For copying information see COPYING + +See also APG Homepage at: http://www.adel.nursat.kz/apg/ + +Adel I. Mirzazhanov +E-mail: a-del@iname.com \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/THANKS b/THANKS new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8f318d8 --- /dev/null +++ b/THANKS @@ -0,0 +1,10 @@ +Graham Bloice +Rainer Wichmann +Andreas Ehliar +Chris Foote +Robert Kovacs +Peter Pentchev +Adrian Ho +Andrew J. Caird +Alexander J Pierce +Philip Le Riche \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/TODO b/TODO new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8e90992 --- /dev/null +++ b/TODO @@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ +TODO +---- + +Priority Hi: + +* Fix some code style or other errors if any. + +* Make some kind of configuration file to avoid command + line parameter typing. + +Priority Medium: + +* Include support for some other random number generation + algorithms (Blum-Blum-Shub, FIPS 186-3) + +* Make some interfase for plug-in language modules + for pronounceable password generation. + +* Make some interface ( language ) to describe + restriction rules for passwords. diff --git a/apg.c b/apg.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..52fd4e7 --- /dev/null +++ b/apg.c @@ -0,0 +1,562 @@ +/* +** Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001 +** Adel I. Mirzazhanov. All rights reserved +** +** Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +** modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +** are met: +** +** 1.Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, +** this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +** 2.Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +** notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +** documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +** 3.The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products +** derived from this software without specific prior written permission. +** +** THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS +** OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED +** WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE +** ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY +** DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL +** DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE +** GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS +** INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, +** WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING +** NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS +** SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. +*/ + +/* +** Main Module of apg programm +*/ +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#define MAX_MODE_LENGTH 5 + +#ifndef _XOPEN_SOURCE +#define _XOPEN_SOURCE +#endif + +#include +/*#include */ +#ifdef __CYGWIN__ +#include +#undef APG_USE_CRYPT +#endif /* __CYGWIN__ */ + +#ifdef CLISERV +# include +# include +# include +# include +# define MAXSOCKADDDR 128 +#endif /* CLISERV */ + +#include "owntypes.h" +#include "pronpass.h" +#include "randpass.h" +#include "restrict.h" +#include "rnd.h" +#include "errs.h" + +#ifndef CLISERV +UINT32 get_user_seq (void); +UINT32 com_line_user_seq (char * seq); +char *crypt_passstring (const char *p); /*!!*/ +void print_help (void); +#endif /* CLISERV */ + +int main (int argc, char *argv[]); +void checkopt(char *opt); +unsigned int construct_mode(char *str_mode); + +int +main (int argc, char *argv[]) +{ + int i = 0; + int restrict_res = 0; + + char *pass_string; + char *hyph_pass_string; + time_t tme; + + + int option = 0; /* programm option */ + + int algorithm = 0; /* algorithm for generation */ + int restrictions_present = FALSE; /* restrictions flag */ + char *restrictions_file; /* dictionary file name */ + unsigned int pass_mode = 0; /* password generation mode */ + unsigned int pass_mode_present = FALSE; /* password generation mode flag */ + USHORT min_pass_length = 6; /* min password length */ + USHORT max_pass_length = 8; /* max password length */ + int number_of_pass = 6; /* number of passwords to generate */ + UINT32 user_defined_seed = 0L; /* user defined random seed */ + int user_defined_seed_present = FALSE; /* user defined random seed flag */ + char *str_mode; /* string mode pointer */ +#ifndef CLISERV + char *com_line_seq; + unsigned int delimiter_flag_present = FALSE; +#ifdef APG_USE_CRYPT + char *crypt_string; + unsigned int show_crypt_text = FALSE; /* display crypt(3)'d text flag */ +#endif /* APG_USE_CRYPT */ +#endif /* CLISERV */ +#ifdef CLISERV +#ifdef sgi /* Thanks to Andrew J. Caird */ + typedef unsigned int socklen_t; +#endif + socklen_t len; + struct sockaddr_in *cliaddr; + char delim[2]={0x0d,0x0a}; + char *out_pass; + char *peer_ip_unknown = "UNKNOWN"; + char *peer_ip; + + openlog(argv[0], LOG_PID, LOG_DAEMON); + cliaddr = (struct sockaddr_in *)calloc(1,MAXSOCKADDDR); + len = MAXSOCKADDDR; + if( getpeername(0, (struct sockaddr *)cliaddr, &len) != 0) + { + err_sys("getpeername"); + peer_ip = peer_ip_unknown; + } + else + { + peer_ip = inet_ntoa(cliaddr->sin_addr); + } + syslog (LOG_INFO, "password generation request from %s.%d\n", peer_ip, htons(cliaddr->sin_port)); +#endif /* CLISERV */ + + /* + ** Analize options + */ +#ifndef CLISERV +#ifdef APG_USE_CRYPT + while ((option = getopt (argc, argv, "SNCLRM:a:r:sdc:n:m:x:hvy")) != -1) +#else /* APG_USE_CRYPT */ + while ((option = getopt (argc, argv, "SNCLRM:a:r:sdc:n:m:x:hv")) != -1) +#endif /* APG_USE_CRYPT */ +#else /* CLISERV */ + while ((option = getopt (argc, argv, "SNCLRM:a:r:n:m:x:v")) != -1) +#endif /* CLISERV */ + { + switch (option) + { + case 'S': /* special symbols required */ + pass_mode = pass_mode | S_SS; + pass_mode_present = TRUE; + break; + case 'R': /* special symbols required */ + pass_mode = pass_mode | S_SS; + pass_mode = pass_mode | S_RS; + pass_mode_present = TRUE; + break; + case 'N': /* numbers required */ + pass_mode = pass_mode | S_NB; + pass_mode_present = TRUE; + break; + case 'C': /* capital letters required */ + pass_mode = pass_mode | S_CL; + pass_mode_present = TRUE; + break; + case 'L': /* small letters required */ + pass_mode = pass_mode | S_SL; + pass_mode_present = TRUE; + break; + case 'M': + str_mode = optarg; + if( (pass_mode = construct_mode(str_mode)) == 0xFFFF) + err_app_fatal("construct_mode","wrong parameter"); + pass_mode_present = TRUE; + break; + case 'a': /* algorithm specification */ + checkopt(optarg); + algorithm = atoi (optarg); + break; + case 'r': /* restrictions */ + restrictions_present = TRUE; + restrictions_file = optarg; + break; +#ifndef CLISERV + case 's': /* user random seed required */ + user_defined_seed = get_user_seq (); + user_defined_seed_present = TRUE; + break; + case 'c': /* user random seed given in command line */ + com_line_seq = optarg; + user_defined_seed = com_line_user_seq (com_line_seq); + user_defined_seed_present = TRUE; + break; + case 'd': /* No delinmiters option */ + delimiter_flag_present = TRUE; + break; +#ifdef APG_USE_CRYPT + case 'y': /* display crypt(3)'d text next to passwords */ /*!!*/ + show_crypt_text = TRUE; + break; +#endif /* APG_USE_CRYPT */ +#endif /* CLISERV */ + case 'n': /* number of password specification */ + checkopt(optarg); + number_of_pass = atoi (optarg); + break; + case 'm': /* min password length */ + checkopt(optarg); + min_pass_length = (USHORT) atoi (optarg); + break; + case 'x': /* max password length */ + checkopt(optarg); + max_pass_length = (USHORT) atoi (optarg); + break; +#ifndef CLISERV + case 'h': /* print help */ + print_help (); + return (0); +#endif /* CLISERV */ + case 'v': /* print version */ + printf ("APG (Automated Password Generator)"); + printf ("\nversion 1.2.11"); + printf ("\nCopyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001 Adel I. Mirzazhanov\n"); + return (0); + default: /* print help end exit */ +#ifndef CLISERV + print_help (); +#endif /* CLISERV */ + exit (-1); + } + } + if (pass_mode_present != TRUE) + pass_mode = S_SS | S_NB | S_CL | S_SL; + if( (tme = time(NULL)) == ( (time_t)-1)) + err_sys("time"); + if (user_defined_seed_present != TRUE) + x917cast_setseed ( (UINT32)tme); + else + x917cast_setseed (user_defined_seed ^ (UINT32)tme); + if (min_pass_length > max_pass_length) + max_pass_length = min_pass_length; + /* main code section */ + + /* + ** reserv space for password and hyphenated password and report of errors + */ + if ( (pass_string = (char *)calloc (1, (size_t)(max_pass_length + 1)))==NULL || + (hyph_pass_string = (char *)calloc (1, (size_t)(max_pass_length*2)))==NULL) + err_sys_fatal("calloc"); +#ifndef CLISERV +#ifdef APG_USE_CRYPT + if (show_crypt_text == TRUE) + if ((crypt_string = (char *)calloc (1, 255))==NULL) + err_sys_fatal("calloc"); +#endif /* APG_USE_CRYPT */ +#endif /* CLISERV */ +#ifdef CLISERV + if ( (out_pass = (char *)calloc(1, (size_t)(max_pass_length*3 + 4))) == NULL) + err_sys_fatal("calloc"); +#endif /* CLISERV */ + /* + ** generate required amount of passwords using specified algorithm + ** and check for restrictions if specified with command line parameters + */ + while (i < number_of_pass) + { + if (algorithm == 0) + { + if (gen_pron_pass(pass_string, hyph_pass_string, + min_pass_length, max_pass_length, pass_mode) == -1) + err_app_fatal("apg","wrong password length parameter"); +#ifndef CLISERV +#ifdef APG_USE_CRYPT + if (show_crypt_text == TRUE) + bcopy ((void *)crypt_passstring (pass_string), + (void *)crypt_string, 255); +#endif /* APG_USE_CRYPT */ +#endif /* CLISERV */ + if (restrictions_present == 1) + { + restrict_res = check_pass(pass_string, restrictions_file); + switch (restrict_res) + { + case 0: +#ifndef CLISERV +#ifdef APG_USE_CRYPT + if (show_crypt_text == TRUE) + fprintf (stdout, "%s (%s) %s", pass_string, hyph_pass_string, + crypt_string); + else +#endif /* APG_USE_CRYPT */ + fprintf (stdout, "%s (%s)", pass_string, hyph_pass_string); + if ( delimiter_flag_present == FALSE ) + fprintf (stdout, "\n"); + fflush (stdout); +#else /* CLISERV */ + snprintf(out_pass, max_pass_length*3 + 4, + "%s (%s)", pass_string, hyph_pass_string); + write (0, (void*) out_pass, strlen(out_pass)); + write (0, (void*)&delim[0],2); +#endif /* CLISERV */ + i++; + break; + case 1: + break; + case -1: + err_sys_fatal ("check_pass"); + default: + break; + } /* switch */ + } + else /* if (restrictions_present == 0) */ + { +#ifndef CLISERV +#ifdef APG_USE_CRYPT + if (show_crypt_text == TRUE) + fprintf (stdout, "%s (%s) %s", pass_string, hyph_pass_string, + crypt_string); + else +#endif /* APG_USE_CRYPT */ + fprintf (stdout, "%s (%s)", pass_string, hyph_pass_string); + if ( delimiter_flag_present == FALSE ) + fprintf (stdout, "\n"); + fflush (stdout); +#else /* CLISERV */ + snprintf(out_pass, max_pass_length*3 + 4, + "%s (%s)", pass_string, hyph_pass_string); + write (0, (void*) out_pass, strlen(out_pass)); + write (0, (void*)&delim[0],2); +#endif /* CLISERV */ + i++; + } + } /* end of if (algorithm == 0) */ + else if (algorithm == 1) + { + if (gen_rand_pass(pass_string, min_pass_length, + max_pass_length, pass_mode) == -1) + err_app_fatal("apg","wrong password length parameter"); +#ifndef CLISERV +#ifdef APG_USE_CRYPT + if (show_crypt_text == TRUE) + bcopy ((void *)crypt_passstring(pass_string), + (void *)crypt_string, 255); +#endif /* APG_USE_CRYPT */ +#endif /* CLISERV */ + if (restrictions_present == 1) + { + restrict_res = check_pass(pass_string, restrictions_file); + switch (restrict_res) + { + case 0: +#ifndef CLISERV +#ifdef APG_USE_CRYPT + if (show_crypt_text==TRUE) + fprintf (stdout, "%s %s", pass_string, crypt_string); + else +#endif /* APG_USE_CRYPT */ + fprintf (stdout, "%s", pass_string); + if ( delimiter_flag_present == FALSE ) + fprintf (stdout, "\n"); + fflush (stdout); +#else /* CLISERV */ + write (0, (void*)pass_string, strlen(pass_string)); + write (0, (void*)&delim[0],2); +#endif /* CLISERV */ + i++; + break; + case 1: + break; + case -1: + err_sys_fatal ("check_pass"); + default: + break; + } /* switch */ + } + else /* if (restrictions_present == 0) */ + { +#ifndef CLISERV +#ifdef APG_USE_CRYPT + if (show_crypt_text==TRUE) + fprintf (stdout, "%s %s", pass_string, crypt_string); + else +#endif /* APG_USE_CRYPT */ + fprintf (stdout, "%s", pass_string); + if ( delimiter_flag_present == FALSE ) + fprintf (stdout, "\n"); + fflush (stdout); +#else /* CLISERV */ + write (0, (void*)pass_string, strlen(pass_string)); + write (0, (void*)&delim[0],2); +#endif /* CLISERV */ + i++; + } + } /* end of if (algorithm == 1) */ + else + err_app_fatal ("apg","wrong algorithm type"); + + restrict_res = 0; + } /* end of while (i <= number_of_pass) */ + free((void*)pass_string); + free((void*)hyph_pass_string); +#ifndef CLISERV +#ifdef APG_USE_CRYPT + if (show_crypt_text==TRUE) + free((void*)crypt_string); +#endif /* APG_USE_CRYPT */ +#endif /* CLISERV */ +#ifdef CLISERV + free ((void *)out_pass); + free ((void *)cliaddr); + close (0); + closelog(); +#endif /* CLISERV */ + return(0); +} /* end of main */ + +#ifndef CLISERV +/* +** Routine that gets user random sequense and generates +** sutable random seed according to it +*/ +UINT32 +get_user_seq (void) +{ + char * seq; + UINT32 prom[2] = { 0L, 0L }; + UINT32 sdres = 0L; + printf ("\nPlease enter some random data (only first %d are significant)\n", sizeof(prom)); + seq = (char *)getpass("(eg. your old password):>"); + if (strlen(seq) < sizeof(prom)) + bcopy((void *)seq, (void *)&prom[0], (int)strlen(seq)); + else + bcopy((void *)seq, (void *)&prom[0], sizeof(prom)); + sdres = prom[0]^prom[1]; + return (sdres); +} + +/* +** Routine that gets user random sequense from command line and generates +** sutable random seed according to it +*/ +UINT32 +com_line_user_seq (char * seq) +{ + UINT32 prom[2] = { 0L, 0L }; + UINT32 sdres = 0L; + if (strlen(seq) < sizeof (prom)) + bcopy((void *)seq, (void *)&prom[0], (int)strlen(seq)); + else + bcopy((void *)seq, (void *)&prom[0], sizeof(prom)); + sdres = prom[0]^prom[1]; + return (sdres); +} + +void +print_help (void) +{ + printf ("\napg Automated Password Generator\n"); + printf (" Copyright (c) Adel I. Mirzazhanov\n"); + printf ("\napg [-a algorithm] [-r file] [-S] [-C] [-L] [-R]\n"); + printf (" [-N] [-M mode] [-n num_of_pass] [-m min_pass_len]\n"); + printf (" [-x max_pass_len] [-c cl_seed] [-d] [-s] [-h] [-y]\n"); + printf ("\n-S -N -C -L -R password modes\n"); + printf ("-M mode new style pasword modes\n"); + printf ("-r file apply dictionary check against file\n"); + printf ("-a algorithm choose algorithm\n"); + printf (" 1 - random password generation according to\n"); + printf (" password modes\n"); + printf (" 0 - pronounceable password generation\n"); + printf ("-n num_of_pass generate num_of_pass passwords\n"); + printf ("-m min_pass_len minimum password length\n"); + printf ("-x max_pass_len maximum password length\n"); + printf ("-s ask user for a random seed for password\n"); + printf (" generation\n"); + printf ("-c cl_seed use cl_seed as a random seed for password\n"); + printf ("-d do NOT use any delimiters between generated passwords\n"); +#ifdef APG_USE_CRYPT + printf ("-y print crypted passwords\n"); +#endif /* APG_USE_CRYPT */ + printf ("-h print this help screen\n"); + printf ("-v print version information\n"); +} + +#ifdef APG_USE_CRYPT +char * crypt_passstring (const char *p) +{ + char salt[10]; + gen_rand_pass (salt, 10, 10, S_SL|S_CL|S_NB); + return (crypt(p, salt)); +} +#endif /* APG_USE_CRYPT */ +#endif /* CLISERV */ + +void +checkopt(char *opt) +{ + int i; + + for(i=0; i < strlen(opt);i++) + if(opt[i] != '0' && opt[i] != '1' && opt[i] != '2' && opt[i] != '3' && + opt[i] != '4' && opt[i] != '5' && opt[i] != '6' && opt[i] != '7' && + opt[i] != '8' && opt[i] != '9') + err_app_fatal ("checkopt", "wrong option format"); +} + +unsigned int construct_mode(char *s_mode) +{ + unsigned int mode = 0; + int ch = 0; + int i = 0; + int str_length = 0; + + str_length = strlen(s_mode); + + if (str_length > MAX_MODE_LENGTH) + return(0xFFFF); + for (i=0; i < str_length; i++) + { + ch = (int)*s_mode; + switch(ch) + { + case 'S': + mode = mode | S_SS; + break; + case 'N': + mode = mode | S_NB; + break; + case 'C': + mode = mode | S_CL; + break; + case 'L': + mode = mode | S_SL; + break; + case 'R': + mode = mode | S_SS; + mode = mode | S_RS; + break; + case 's': + mode = mode | S_SS; + break; + case 'n': + mode = mode | S_NB; + break; + case 'c': + mode = mode | S_CL; + break; + case 'l': + mode = mode | S_SL; + break; + case 'r': + mode = mode | S_SS; + mode = mode | S_RS; + break; + default: + mode = mode | 0xFFFF; + break; + } + s_mode++; + } + return (mode); +} diff --git a/cast/cast.c b/cast/cast.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0159cb8 --- /dev/null +++ b/cast/cast.c @@ -0,0 +1,239 @@ +/* + * CAST-128 in C + * Written by Steve Reid + * 100% Public Domain - no warranty + * Released 1997.10.11 + */ + +#include "cast.h" +#include "cast_sboxes.h" + +/* Macros to access 8-bit bytes out of a 32-bit word */ +#define U8a(x) ( (u8) (x>>24) ) +#define U8b(x) ( (u8) ((x>>16)&255) ) +#define U8c(x) ( (u8) ((x>>8)&255) ) +#define U8d(x) ( (u8) ((x)&255) ) + +/* Circular left shift */ +#define ROL(x, n) ( ((x)<<(n)) | ((x)>>(32-(n))) ) + +/* CAST-128 uses three different round functions */ +#define F1(l, r, i) \ + t = ROL(key->xkey[i] + r, key->xkey[i+16]); \ + l ^= ((cast_sbox1[U8a(t)] ^ cast_sbox2[U8b(t)]) - \ + cast_sbox3[U8c(t)]) + cast_sbox4[U8d(t)]; +#define F2(l, r, i) \ + t = ROL(key->xkey[i] ^ r, key->xkey[i+16]); \ + l ^= ((cast_sbox1[U8a(t)] - cast_sbox2[U8b(t)]) + \ + cast_sbox3[U8c(t)]) ^ cast_sbox4[U8d(t)]; +#define F3(l, r, i) \ + t = ROL(key->xkey[i] - r, key->xkey[i+16]); \ + l ^= ((cast_sbox1[U8a(t)] + cast_sbox2[U8b(t)]) ^ \ + cast_sbox3[U8c(t)]) - cast_sbox4[U8d(t)]; + + +/***** Encryption Function *****/ + +void cast_encrypt(cast_key* key, u8* inblock, u8* outblock) +{ +u32 t, l, r; + + /* Get inblock into l,r */ + l = ((u32)inblock[0] << 24) | ((u32)inblock[1] << 16) | + ((u32)inblock[2] << 8) | (u32)inblock[3]; + r = ((u32)inblock[4] << 24) | ((u32)inblock[5] << 16) | + ((u32)inblock[6] << 8) | (u32)inblock[7]; + /* Do the work */ + F1(l, r, 0); + F2(r, l, 1); + F3(l, r, 2); + F1(r, l, 3); + F2(l, r, 4); + F3(r, l, 5); + F1(l, r, 6); + F2(r, l, 7); + F3(l, r, 8); + F1(r, l, 9); + F2(l, r, 10); + F3(r, l, 11); + /* Only do full 16 rounds if key length > 80 bits */ + if (key->rounds > 12) { + F1(l, r, 12); + F2(r, l, 13); + F3(l, r, 14); + F1(r, l, 15); + } + /* Put l,r into outblock */ + outblock[0] = U8a(r); + outblock[1] = U8b(r); + outblock[2] = U8c(r); + outblock[3] = U8d(r); + outblock[4] = U8a(l); + outblock[5] = U8b(l); + outblock[6] = U8c(l); + outblock[7] = U8d(l); + /* Wipe clean */ + t = l = r = 0; +} + + +/***** Decryption Function *****/ + +void cast_decrypt(cast_key* key, u8* inblock, u8* outblock) +{ +u32 t, l, r; + + /* Get inblock into l,r */ + r = ((u32)inblock[0] << 24) | ((u32)inblock[1] << 16) | + ((u32)inblock[2] << 8) | (u32)inblock[3]; + l = ((u32)inblock[4] << 24) | ((u32)inblock[5] << 16) | + ((u32)inblock[6] << 8) | (u32)inblock[7]; + /* Do the work */ + /* Only do full 16 rounds if key length > 80 bits */ + if (key->rounds > 12) { + F1(r, l, 15); + F3(l, r, 14); + F2(r, l, 13); + F1(l, r, 12); + } + F3(r, l, 11); + F2(l, r, 10); + F1(r, l, 9); + F3(l, r, 8); + F2(r, l, 7); + F1(l, r, 6); + F3(r, l, 5); + F2(l, r, 4); + F1(r, l, 3); + F3(l, r, 2); + F2(r, l, 1); + F1(l, r, 0); + /* Put l,r into outblock */ + outblock[0] = U8a(l); + outblock[1] = U8b(l); + outblock[2] = U8c(l); + outblock[3] = U8d(l); + outblock[4] = U8a(r); + outblock[5] = U8b(r); + outblock[6] = U8c(r); + outblock[7] = U8d(r); + /* Wipe clean */ + t = l = r = 0; +} + + +/***** Key Schedual *****/ + +void cast_setkey(cast_key* key, u8* rawkey, int keybytes) +{ +u32 t[4], z[4], x[4]; +int i; + + /* Set number of rounds to 12 or 16, depending on key length */ + key->rounds = (keybytes <= 10 ? 12 : 16); + + /* Copy key to workspace x */ + for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) { + x[i] = 0; + if ((i*4+0) < keybytes) x[i] = (u32)rawkey[i*4+0] << 24; + if ((i*4+1) < keybytes) x[i] |= (u32)rawkey[i*4+1] << 16; + if ((i*4+2) < keybytes) x[i] |= (u32)rawkey[i*4+2] << 8; + if ((i*4+3) < keybytes) x[i] |= (u32)rawkey[i*4+3]; + } + /* Generate 32 subkeys, four at a time */ + for (i = 0; i < 32; i+=4) { + switch (i & 4) { + case 0: + t[0] = z[0] = x[0] ^ cast_sbox5[U8b(x[3])] ^ + cast_sbox6[U8d(x[3])] ^ cast_sbox7[U8a(x[3])] ^ + cast_sbox8[U8c(x[3])] ^ cast_sbox7[U8a(x[2])]; + t[1] = z[1] = x[2] ^ cast_sbox5[U8a(z[0])] ^ + cast_sbox6[U8c(z[0])] ^ cast_sbox7[U8b(z[0])] ^ + cast_sbox8[U8d(z[0])] ^ cast_sbox8[U8c(x[2])]; + t[2] = z[2] = x[3] ^ cast_sbox5[U8d(z[1])] ^ + cast_sbox6[U8c(z[1])] ^ cast_sbox7[U8b(z[1])] ^ + cast_sbox8[U8a(z[1])] ^ cast_sbox5[U8b(x[2])]; + t[3] = z[3] = x[1] ^ cast_sbox5[U8c(z[2])] ^ + cast_sbox6[U8b(z[2])] ^ cast_sbox7[U8d(z[2])] ^ + cast_sbox8[U8a(z[2])] ^ cast_sbox6[U8d(x[2])]; + break; + case 4: + t[0] = x[0] = z[2] ^ cast_sbox5[U8b(z[1])] ^ + cast_sbox6[U8d(z[1])] ^ cast_sbox7[U8a(z[1])] ^ + cast_sbox8[U8c(z[1])] ^ cast_sbox7[U8a(z[0])]; + t[1] = x[1] = z[0] ^ cast_sbox5[U8a(x[0])] ^ + cast_sbox6[U8c(x[0])] ^ cast_sbox7[U8b(x[0])] ^ + cast_sbox8[U8d(x[0])] ^ cast_sbox8[U8c(z[0])]; + t[2] = x[2] = z[1] ^ cast_sbox5[U8d(x[1])] ^ + cast_sbox6[U8c(x[1])] ^ cast_sbox7[U8b(x[1])] ^ + cast_sbox8[U8a(x[1])] ^ cast_sbox5[U8b(z[0])]; + t[3] = x[3] = z[3] ^ cast_sbox5[U8c(x[2])] ^ + cast_sbox6[U8b(x[2])] ^ cast_sbox7[U8d(x[2])] ^ + cast_sbox8[U8a(x[2])] ^ cast_sbox6[U8d(z[0])]; + break; + } + switch (i & 12) { + case 0: + case 12: + key->xkey[i+0] = cast_sbox5[U8a(t[2])] ^ cast_sbox6[U8b(t[2])] ^ + cast_sbox7[U8d(t[1])] ^ cast_sbox8[U8c(t[1])]; + key->xkey[i+1] = cast_sbox5[U8c(t[2])] ^ cast_sbox6[U8d(t[2])] ^ + cast_sbox7[U8b(t[1])] ^ cast_sbox8[U8a(t[1])]; + key->xkey[i+2] = cast_sbox5[U8a(t[3])] ^ cast_sbox6[U8b(t[3])] ^ + cast_sbox7[U8d(t[0])] ^ cast_sbox8[U8c(t[0])]; + key->xkey[i+3] = cast_sbox5[U8c(t[3])] ^ cast_sbox6[U8d(t[3])] ^ + cast_sbox7[U8b(t[0])] ^ cast_sbox8[U8a(t[0])]; + break; + case 4: + case 8: + key->xkey[i+0] = cast_sbox5[U8d(t[0])] ^ cast_sbox6[U8c(t[0])] ^ + cast_sbox7[U8a(t[3])] ^ cast_sbox8[U8b(t[3])]; + key->xkey[i+1] = cast_sbox5[U8b(t[0])] ^ cast_sbox6[U8a(t[0])] ^ + cast_sbox7[U8c(t[3])] ^ cast_sbox8[U8d(t[3])]; + key->xkey[i+2] = cast_sbox5[U8d(t[1])] ^ cast_sbox6[U8c(t[1])] ^ + cast_sbox7[U8a(t[2])] ^ cast_sbox8[U8b(t[2])]; + key->xkey[i+3] = cast_sbox5[U8b(t[1])] ^ cast_sbox6[U8a(t[1])] ^ + cast_sbox7[U8c(t[2])] ^ cast_sbox8[U8d(t[2])]; + break; + } + switch (i & 12) { + case 0: + key->xkey[i+0] ^= cast_sbox5[U8c(z[0])]; + key->xkey[i+1] ^= cast_sbox6[U8c(z[1])]; + key->xkey[i+2] ^= cast_sbox7[U8b(z[2])]; + key->xkey[i+3] ^= cast_sbox8[U8a(z[3])]; + break; + case 4: + key->xkey[i+0] ^= cast_sbox5[U8a(x[2])]; + key->xkey[i+1] ^= cast_sbox6[U8b(x[3])]; + key->xkey[i+2] ^= cast_sbox7[U8d(x[0])]; + key->xkey[i+3] ^= cast_sbox8[U8d(x[1])]; + break; + case 8: + key->xkey[i+0] ^= cast_sbox5[U8b(z[2])]; + key->xkey[i+1] ^= cast_sbox6[U8a(z[3])]; + key->xkey[i+2] ^= cast_sbox7[U8c(z[0])]; + key->xkey[i+3] ^= cast_sbox8[U8c(z[1])]; + break; + case 12: + key->xkey[i+0] ^= cast_sbox5[U8d(x[0])]; + key->xkey[i+1] ^= cast_sbox6[U8d(x[1])]; + key->xkey[i+2] ^= cast_sbox7[U8a(x[2])]; + key->xkey[i+3] ^= cast_sbox8[U8b(x[3])]; + break; + } + if (i >= 16) { + key->xkey[i+0] &= 31; + key->xkey[i+1] &= 31; + key->xkey[i+2] &= 31; + key->xkey[i+3] &= 31; + } + } + /* Wipe clean */ + for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) { + t[i] = x[i] = z[i] = 0; + } +} + +/* Made in Canada */ + diff --git a/cast/cast.h b/cast/cast.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..328f38a --- /dev/null +++ b/cast/cast.h @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +/* + * CAST-128 in C + * Written by Steve Reid + * 100% Public Domain - no warranty + * Released 1997.10.11 + */ + +#ifndef _CAST_H_ +#define _CAST_H_ + +typedef unsigned char u8; /* 8-bit unsigned */ +typedef unsigned long u32; /* 32-bit unsigned */ + +typedef struct { + u32 xkey[32]; /* Key, after expansion */ + int rounds; /* Number of rounds to use, 12 or 16 */ +} cast_key; + +void cast_setkey(cast_key* key, u8* rawkey, int keybytes); +void cast_encrypt(cast_key* key, u8* inblock, u8* outblock); +void cast_decrypt(cast_key* key, u8* inblock, u8* outblock); + +#endif /* ifndef _CAST_H_ */ + diff --git a/cast/cast_sboxes.h b/cast/cast_sboxes.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..24908a3 --- /dev/null +++ b/cast/cast_sboxes.h @@ -0,0 +1,543 @@ +/* + * CAST-128 in C + * Written by Steve Reid + * 100% Public Domain - no warranty + * Released 1997.10.11 + */ + +static const u32 cast_sbox1[256] = { + 0x30FB40D4, 0x9FA0FF0B, 0x6BECCD2F, 0x3F258C7A, + 0x1E213F2F, 0x9C004DD3, 0x6003E540, 0xCF9FC949, + 0xBFD4AF27, 0x88BBBDB5, 0xE2034090, 0x98D09675, + 0x6E63A0E0, 0x15C361D2, 0xC2E7661D, 0x22D4FF8E, + 0x28683B6F, 0xC07FD059, 0xFF2379C8, 0x775F50E2, + 0x43C340D3, 0xDF2F8656, 0x887CA41A, 0xA2D2BD2D, + 0xA1C9E0D6, 0x346C4819, 0x61B76D87, 0x22540F2F, + 0x2ABE32E1, 0xAA54166B, 0x22568E3A, 0xA2D341D0, + 0x66DB40C8, 0xA784392F, 0x004DFF2F, 0x2DB9D2DE, + 0x97943FAC, 0x4A97C1D8, 0x527644B7, 0xB5F437A7, + 0xB82CBAEF, 0xD751D159, 0x6FF7F0ED, 0x5A097A1F, + 0x827B68D0, 0x90ECF52E, 0x22B0C054, 0xBC8E5935, + 0x4B6D2F7F, 0x50BB64A2, 0xD2664910, 0xBEE5812D, + 0xB7332290, 0xE93B159F, 0xB48EE411, 0x4BFF345D, + 0xFD45C240, 0xAD31973F, 0xC4F6D02E, 0x55FC8165, + 0xD5B1CAAD, 0xA1AC2DAE, 0xA2D4B76D, 0xC19B0C50, + 0x882240F2, 0x0C6E4F38, 0xA4E4BFD7, 0x4F5BA272, + 0x564C1D2F, 0xC59C5319, 0xB949E354, 0xB04669FE, + 0xB1B6AB8A, 0xC71358DD, 0x6385C545, 0x110F935D, + 0x57538AD5, 0x6A390493, 0xE63D37E0, 0x2A54F6B3, + 0x3A787D5F, 0x6276A0B5, 0x19A6FCDF, 0x7A42206A, + 0x29F9D4D5, 0xF61B1891, 0xBB72275E, 0xAA508167, + 0x38901091, 0xC6B505EB, 0x84C7CB8C, 0x2AD75A0F, + 0x874A1427, 0xA2D1936B, 0x2AD286AF, 0xAA56D291, + 0xD7894360, 0x425C750D, 0x93B39E26, 0x187184C9, + 0x6C00B32D, 0x73E2BB14, 0xA0BEBC3C, 0x54623779, + 0x64459EAB, 0x3F328B82, 0x7718CF82, 0x59A2CEA6, + 0x04EE002E, 0x89FE78E6, 0x3FAB0950, 0x325FF6C2, + 0x81383F05, 0x6963C5C8, 0x76CB5AD6, 0xD49974C9, + 0xCA180DCF, 0x380782D5, 0xC7FA5CF6, 0x8AC31511, + 0x35E79E13, 0x47DA91D0, 0xF40F9086, 0xA7E2419E, + 0x31366241, 0x051EF495, 0xAA573B04, 0x4A805D8D, + 0x548300D0, 0x00322A3C, 0xBF64CDDF, 0xBA57A68E, + 0x75C6372B, 0x50AFD341, 0xA7C13275, 0x915A0BF5, + 0x6B54BFAB, 0x2B0B1426, 0xAB4CC9D7, 0x449CCD82, + 0xF7FBF265, 0xAB85C5F3, 0x1B55DB94, 0xAAD4E324, + 0xCFA4BD3F, 0x2DEAA3E2, 0x9E204D02, 0xC8BD25AC, + 0xEADF55B3, 0xD5BD9E98, 0xE31231B2, 0x2AD5AD6C, + 0x954329DE, 0xADBE4528, 0xD8710F69, 0xAA51C90F, + 0xAA786BF6, 0x22513F1E, 0xAA51A79B, 0x2AD344CC, + 0x7B5A41F0, 0xD37CFBAD, 0x1B069505, 0x41ECE491, + 0xB4C332E6, 0x032268D4, 0xC9600ACC, 0xCE387E6D, + 0xBF6BB16C, 0x6A70FB78, 0x0D03D9C9, 0xD4DF39DE, + 0xE01063DA, 0x4736F464, 0x5AD328D8, 0xB347CC96, + 0x75BB0FC3, 0x98511BFB, 0x4FFBCC35, 0xB58BCF6A, + 0xE11F0ABC, 0xBFC5FE4A, 0xA70AEC10, 0xAC39570A, + 0x3F04442F, 0x6188B153, 0xE0397A2E, 0x5727CB79, + 0x9CEB418F, 0x1CACD68D, 0x2AD37C96, 0x0175CB9D, + 0xC69DFF09, 0xC75B65F0, 0xD9DB40D8, 0xEC0E7779, + 0x4744EAD4, 0xB11C3274, 0xDD24CB9E, 0x7E1C54BD, + 0xF01144F9, 0xD2240EB1, 0x9675B3FD, 0xA3AC3755, + 0xD47C27AF, 0x51C85F4D, 0x56907596, 0xA5BB15E6, + 0x580304F0, 0xCA042CF1, 0x011A37EA, 0x8DBFAADB, + 0x35BA3E4A, 0x3526FFA0, 0xC37B4D09, 0xBC306ED9, + 0x98A52666, 0x5648F725, 0xFF5E569D, 0x0CED63D0, + 0x7C63B2CF, 0x700B45E1, 0xD5EA50F1, 0x85A92872, + 0xAF1FBDA7, 0xD4234870, 0xA7870BF3, 0x2D3B4D79, + 0x42E04198, 0x0CD0EDE7, 0x26470DB8, 0xF881814C, + 0x474D6AD7, 0x7C0C5E5C, 0xD1231959, 0x381B7298, + 0xF5D2F4DB, 0xAB838653, 0x6E2F1E23, 0x83719C9E, + 0xBD91E046, 0x9A56456E, 0xDC39200C, 0x20C8C571, + 0x962BDA1C, 0xE1E696FF, 0xB141AB08, 0x7CCA89B9, + 0x1A69E783, 0x02CC4843, 0xA2F7C579, 0x429EF47D, + 0x427B169C, 0x5AC9F049, 0xDD8F0F00, 0x5C8165BF +}; + +static const u32 cast_sbox2[256] = { + 0x1F201094, 0xEF0BA75B, 0x69E3CF7E, 0x393F4380, + 0xFE61CF7A, 0xEEC5207A, 0x55889C94, 0x72FC0651, + 0xADA7EF79, 0x4E1D7235, 0xD55A63CE, 0xDE0436BA, + 0x99C430EF, 0x5F0C0794, 0x18DCDB7D, 0xA1D6EFF3, + 0xA0B52F7B, 0x59E83605, 0xEE15B094, 0xE9FFD909, + 0xDC440086, 0xEF944459, 0xBA83CCB3, 0xE0C3CDFB, + 0xD1DA4181, 0x3B092AB1, 0xF997F1C1, 0xA5E6CF7B, + 0x01420DDB, 0xE4E7EF5B, 0x25A1FF41, 0xE180F806, + 0x1FC41080, 0x179BEE7A, 0xD37AC6A9, 0xFE5830A4, + 0x98DE8B7F, 0x77E83F4E, 0x79929269, 0x24FA9F7B, + 0xE113C85B, 0xACC40083, 0xD7503525, 0xF7EA615F, + 0x62143154, 0x0D554B63, 0x5D681121, 0xC866C359, + 0x3D63CF73, 0xCEE234C0, 0xD4D87E87, 0x5C672B21, + 0x071F6181, 0x39F7627F, 0x361E3084, 0xE4EB573B, + 0x602F64A4, 0xD63ACD9C, 0x1BBC4635, 0x9E81032D, + 0x2701F50C, 0x99847AB4, 0xA0E3DF79, 0xBA6CF38C, + 0x10843094, 0x2537A95E, 0xF46F6FFE, 0xA1FF3B1F, + 0x208CFB6A, 0x8F458C74, 0xD9E0A227, 0x4EC73A34, + 0xFC884F69, 0x3E4DE8DF, 0xEF0E0088, 0x3559648D, + 0x8A45388C, 0x1D804366, 0x721D9BFD, 0xA58684BB, + 0xE8256333, 0x844E8212, 0x128D8098, 0xFED33FB4, + 0xCE280AE1, 0x27E19BA5, 0xD5A6C252, 0xE49754BD, + 0xC5D655DD, 0xEB667064, 0x77840B4D, 0xA1B6A801, + 0x84DB26A9, 0xE0B56714, 0x21F043B7, 0xE5D05860, + 0x54F03084, 0x066FF472, 0xA31AA153, 0xDADC4755, + 0xB5625DBF, 0x68561BE6, 0x83CA6B94, 0x2D6ED23B, + 0xECCF01DB, 0xA6D3D0BA, 0xB6803D5C, 0xAF77A709, + 0x33B4A34C, 0x397BC8D6, 0x5EE22B95, 0x5F0E5304, + 0x81ED6F61, 0x20E74364, 0xB45E1378, 0xDE18639B, + 0x881CA122, 0xB96726D1, 0x8049A7E8, 0x22B7DA7B, + 0x5E552D25, 0x5272D237, 0x79D2951C, 0xC60D894C, + 0x488CB402, 0x1BA4FE5B, 0xA4B09F6B, 0x1CA815CF, + 0xA20C3005, 0x8871DF63, 0xB9DE2FCB, 0x0CC6C9E9, + 0x0BEEFF53, 0xE3214517, 0xB4542835, 0x9F63293C, + 0xEE41E729, 0x6E1D2D7C, 0x50045286, 0x1E6685F3, + 0xF33401C6, 0x30A22C95, 0x31A70850, 0x60930F13, + 0x73F98417, 0xA1269859, 0xEC645C44, 0x52C877A9, + 0xCDFF33A6, 0xA02B1741, 0x7CBAD9A2, 0x2180036F, + 0x50D99C08, 0xCB3F4861, 0xC26BD765, 0x64A3F6AB, + 0x80342676, 0x25A75E7B, 0xE4E6D1FC, 0x20C710E6, + 0xCDF0B680, 0x17844D3B, 0x31EEF84D, 0x7E0824E4, + 0x2CCB49EB, 0x846A3BAE, 0x8FF77888, 0xEE5D60F6, + 0x7AF75673, 0x2FDD5CDB, 0xA11631C1, 0x30F66F43, + 0xB3FAEC54, 0x157FD7FA, 0xEF8579CC, 0xD152DE58, + 0xDB2FFD5E, 0x8F32CE19, 0x306AF97A, 0x02F03EF8, + 0x99319AD5, 0xC242FA0F, 0xA7E3EBB0, 0xC68E4906, + 0xB8DA230C, 0x80823028, 0xDCDEF3C8, 0xD35FB171, + 0x088A1BC8, 0xBEC0C560, 0x61A3C9E8, 0xBCA8F54D, + 0xC72FEFFA, 0x22822E99, 0x82C570B4, 0xD8D94E89, + 0x8B1C34BC, 0x301E16E6, 0x273BE979, 0xB0FFEAA6, + 0x61D9B8C6, 0x00B24869, 0xB7FFCE3F, 0x08DC283B, + 0x43DAF65A, 0xF7E19798, 0x7619B72F, 0x8F1C9BA4, + 0xDC8637A0, 0x16A7D3B1, 0x9FC393B7, 0xA7136EEB, + 0xC6BCC63E, 0x1A513742, 0xEF6828BC, 0x520365D6, + 0x2D6A77AB, 0x3527ED4B, 0x821FD216, 0x095C6E2E, + 0xDB92F2FB, 0x5EEA29CB, 0x145892F5, 0x91584F7F, + 0x5483697B, 0x2667A8CC, 0x85196048, 0x8C4BACEA, + 0x833860D4, 0x0D23E0F9, 0x6C387E8A, 0x0AE6D249, + 0xB284600C, 0xD835731D, 0xDCB1C647, 0xAC4C56EA, + 0x3EBD81B3, 0x230EABB0, 0x6438BC87, 0xF0B5B1FA, + 0x8F5EA2B3, 0xFC184642, 0x0A036B7A, 0x4FB089BD, + 0x649DA589, 0xA345415E, 0x5C038323, 0x3E5D3BB9, + 0x43D79572, 0x7E6DD07C, 0x06DFDF1E, 0x6C6CC4EF, + 0x7160A539, 0x73BFBE70, 0x83877605, 0x4523ECF1 +}; + +static const u32 cast_sbox3[256] = { + 0x8DEFC240, 0x25FA5D9F, 0xEB903DBF, 0xE810C907, + 0x47607FFF, 0x369FE44B, 0x8C1FC644, 0xAECECA90, + 0xBEB1F9BF, 0xEEFBCAEA, 0xE8CF1950, 0x51DF07AE, + 0x920E8806, 0xF0AD0548, 0xE13C8D83, 0x927010D5, + 0x11107D9F, 0x07647DB9, 0xB2E3E4D4, 0x3D4F285E, + 0xB9AFA820, 0xFADE82E0, 0xA067268B, 0x8272792E, + 0x553FB2C0, 0x489AE22B, 0xD4EF9794, 0x125E3FBC, + 0x21FFFCEE, 0x825B1BFD, 0x9255C5ED, 0x1257A240, + 0x4E1A8302, 0xBAE07FFF, 0x528246E7, 0x8E57140E, + 0x3373F7BF, 0x8C9F8188, 0xA6FC4EE8, 0xC982B5A5, + 0xA8C01DB7, 0x579FC264, 0x67094F31, 0xF2BD3F5F, + 0x40FFF7C1, 0x1FB78DFC, 0x8E6BD2C1, 0x437BE59B, + 0x99B03DBF, 0xB5DBC64B, 0x638DC0E6, 0x55819D99, + 0xA197C81C, 0x4A012D6E, 0xC5884A28, 0xCCC36F71, + 0xB843C213, 0x6C0743F1, 0x8309893C, 0x0FEDDD5F, + 0x2F7FE850, 0xD7C07F7E, 0x02507FBF, 0x5AFB9A04, + 0xA747D2D0, 0x1651192E, 0xAF70BF3E, 0x58C31380, + 0x5F98302E, 0x727CC3C4, 0x0A0FB402, 0x0F7FEF82, + 0x8C96FDAD, 0x5D2C2AAE, 0x8EE99A49, 0x50DA88B8, + 0x8427F4A0, 0x1EAC5790, 0x796FB449, 0x8252DC15, + 0xEFBD7D9B, 0xA672597D, 0xADA840D8, 0x45F54504, + 0xFA5D7403, 0xE83EC305, 0x4F91751A, 0x925669C2, + 0x23EFE941, 0xA903F12E, 0x60270DF2, 0x0276E4B6, + 0x94FD6574, 0x927985B2, 0x8276DBCB, 0x02778176, + 0xF8AF918D, 0x4E48F79E, 0x8F616DDF, 0xE29D840E, + 0x842F7D83, 0x340CE5C8, 0x96BBB682, 0x93B4B148, + 0xEF303CAB, 0x984FAF28, 0x779FAF9B, 0x92DC560D, + 0x224D1E20, 0x8437AA88, 0x7D29DC96, 0x2756D3DC, + 0x8B907CEE, 0xB51FD240, 0xE7C07CE3, 0xE566B4A1, + 0xC3E9615E, 0x3CF8209D, 0x6094D1E3, 0xCD9CA341, + 0x5C76460E, 0x00EA983B, 0xD4D67881, 0xFD47572C, + 0xF76CEDD9, 0xBDA8229C, 0x127DADAA, 0x438A074E, + 0x1F97C090, 0x081BDB8A, 0x93A07EBE, 0xB938CA15, + 0x97B03CFF, 0x3DC2C0F8, 0x8D1AB2EC, 0x64380E51, + 0x68CC7BFB, 0xD90F2788, 0x12490181, 0x5DE5FFD4, + 0xDD7EF86A, 0x76A2E214, 0xB9A40368, 0x925D958F, + 0x4B39FFFA, 0xBA39AEE9, 0xA4FFD30B, 0xFAF7933B, + 0x6D498623, 0x193CBCFA, 0x27627545, 0x825CF47A, + 0x61BD8BA0, 0xD11E42D1, 0xCEAD04F4, 0x127EA392, + 0x10428DB7, 0x8272A972, 0x9270C4A8, 0x127DE50B, + 0x285BA1C8, 0x3C62F44F, 0x35C0EAA5, 0xE805D231, + 0x428929FB, 0xB4FCDF82, 0x4FB66A53, 0x0E7DC15B, + 0x1F081FAB, 0x108618AE, 0xFCFD086D, 0xF9FF2889, + 0x694BCC11, 0x236A5CAE, 0x12DECA4D, 0x2C3F8CC5, + 0xD2D02DFE, 0xF8EF5896, 0xE4CF52DA, 0x95155B67, + 0x494A488C, 0xB9B6A80C, 0x5C8F82BC, 0x89D36B45, + 0x3A609437, 0xEC00C9A9, 0x44715253, 0x0A874B49, + 0xD773BC40, 0x7C34671C, 0x02717EF6, 0x4FEB5536, + 0xA2D02FFF, 0xD2BF60C4, 0xD43F03C0, 0x50B4EF6D, + 0x07478CD1, 0x006E1888, 0xA2E53F55, 0xB9E6D4BC, + 0xA2048016, 0x97573833, 0xD7207D67, 0xDE0F8F3D, + 0x72F87B33, 0xABCC4F33, 0x7688C55D, 0x7B00A6B0, + 0x947B0001, 0x570075D2, 0xF9BB88F8, 0x8942019E, + 0x4264A5FF, 0x856302E0, 0x72DBD92B, 0xEE971B69, + 0x6EA22FDE, 0x5F08AE2B, 0xAF7A616D, 0xE5C98767, + 0xCF1FEBD2, 0x61EFC8C2, 0xF1AC2571, 0xCC8239C2, + 0x67214CB8, 0xB1E583D1, 0xB7DC3E62, 0x7F10BDCE, + 0xF90A5C38, 0x0FF0443D, 0x606E6DC6, 0x60543A49, + 0x5727C148, 0x2BE98A1D, 0x8AB41738, 0x20E1BE24, + 0xAF96DA0F, 0x68458425, 0x99833BE5, 0x600D457D, + 0x282F9350, 0x8334B362, 0xD91D1120, 0x2B6D8DA0, + 0x642B1E31, 0x9C305A00, 0x52BCE688, 0x1B03588A, + 0xF7BAEFD5, 0x4142ED9C, 0xA4315C11, 0x83323EC5, + 0xDFEF4636, 0xA133C501, 0xE9D3531C, 0xEE353783 +}; + +static const u32 cast_sbox4[256] = { + 0x9DB30420, 0x1FB6E9DE, 0xA7BE7BEF, 0xD273A298, + 0x4A4F7BDB, 0x64AD8C57, 0x85510443, 0xFA020ED1, + 0x7E287AFF, 0xE60FB663, 0x095F35A1, 0x79EBF120, + 0xFD059D43, 0x6497B7B1, 0xF3641F63, 0x241E4ADF, + 0x28147F5F, 0x4FA2B8CD, 0xC9430040, 0x0CC32220, + 0xFDD30B30, 0xC0A5374F, 0x1D2D00D9, 0x24147B15, + 0xEE4D111A, 0x0FCA5167, 0x71FF904C, 0x2D195FFE, + 0x1A05645F, 0x0C13FEFE, 0x081B08CA, 0x05170121, + 0x80530100, 0xE83E5EFE, 0xAC9AF4F8, 0x7FE72701, + 0xD2B8EE5F, 0x06DF4261, 0xBB9E9B8A, 0x7293EA25, + 0xCE84FFDF, 0xF5718801, 0x3DD64B04, 0xA26F263B, + 0x7ED48400, 0x547EEBE6, 0x446D4CA0, 0x6CF3D6F5, + 0x2649ABDF, 0xAEA0C7F5, 0x36338CC1, 0x503F7E93, + 0xD3772061, 0x11B638E1, 0x72500E03, 0xF80EB2BB, + 0xABE0502E, 0xEC8D77DE, 0x57971E81, 0xE14F6746, + 0xC9335400, 0x6920318F, 0x081DBB99, 0xFFC304A5, + 0x4D351805, 0x7F3D5CE3, 0xA6C866C6, 0x5D5BCCA9, + 0xDAEC6FEA, 0x9F926F91, 0x9F46222F, 0x3991467D, + 0xA5BF6D8E, 0x1143C44F, 0x43958302, 0xD0214EEB, + 0x022083B8, 0x3FB6180C, 0x18F8931E, 0x281658E6, + 0x26486E3E, 0x8BD78A70, 0x7477E4C1, 0xB506E07C, + 0xF32D0A25, 0x79098B02, 0xE4EABB81, 0x28123B23, + 0x69DEAD38, 0x1574CA16, 0xDF871B62, 0x211C40B7, + 0xA51A9EF9, 0x0014377B, 0x041E8AC8, 0x09114003, + 0xBD59E4D2, 0xE3D156D5, 0x4FE876D5, 0x2F91A340, + 0x557BE8DE, 0x00EAE4A7, 0x0CE5C2EC, 0x4DB4BBA6, + 0xE756BDFF, 0xDD3369AC, 0xEC17B035, 0x06572327, + 0x99AFC8B0, 0x56C8C391, 0x6B65811C, 0x5E146119, + 0x6E85CB75, 0xBE07C002, 0xC2325577, 0x893FF4EC, + 0x5BBFC92D, 0xD0EC3B25, 0xB7801AB7, 0x8D6D3B24, + 0x20C763EF, 0xC366A5FC, 0x9C382880, 0x0ACE3205, + 0xAAC9548A, 0xECA1D7C7, 0x041AFA32, 0x1D16625A, + 0x6701902C, 0x9B757A54, 0x31D477F7, 0x9126B031, + 0x36CC6FDB, 0xC70B8B46, 0xD9E66A48, 0x56E55A79, + 0x026A4CEB, 0x52437EFF, 0x2F8F76B4, 0x0DF980A5, + 0x8674CDE3, 0xEDDA04EB, 0x17A9BE04, 0x2C18F4DF, + 0xB7747F9D, 0xAB2AF7B4, 0xEFC34D20, 0x2E096B7C, + 0x1741A254, 0xE5B6A035, 0x213D42F6, 0x2C1C7C26, + 0x61C2F50F, 0x6552DAF9, 0xD2C231F8, 0x25130F69, + 0xD8167FA2, 0x0418F2C8, 0x001A96A6, 0x0D1526AB, + 0x63315C21, 0x5E0A72EC, 0x49BAFEFD, 0x187908D9, + 0x8D0DBD86, 0x311170A7, 0x3E9B640C, 0xCC3E10D7, + 0xD5CAD3B6, 0x0CAEC388, 0xF73001E1, 0x6C728AFF, + 0x71EAE2A1, 0x1F9AF36E, 0xCFCBD12F, 0xC1DE8417, + 0xAC07BE6B, 0xCB44A1D8, 0x8B9B0F56, 0x013988C3, + 0xB1C52FCA, 0xB4BE31CD, 0xD8782806, 0x12A3A4E2, + 0x6F7DE532, 0x58FD7EB6, 0xD01EE900, 0x24ADFFC2, + 0xF4990FC5, 0x9711AAC5, 0x001D7B95, 0x82E5E7D2, + 0x109873F6, 0x00613096, 0xC32D9521, 0xADA121FF, + 0x29908415, 0x7FBB977F, 0xAF9EB3DB, 0x29C9ED2A, + 0x5CE2A465, 0xA730F32C, 0xD0AA3FE8, 0x8A5CC091, + 0xD49E2CE7, 0x0CE454A9, 0xD60ACD86, 0x015F1919, + 0x77079103, 0xDEA03AF6, 0x78A8565E, 0xDEE356DF, + 0x21F05CBE, 0x8B75E387, 0xB3C50651, 0xB8A5C3EF, + 0xD8EEB6D2, 0xE523BE77, 0xC2154529, 0x2F69EFDF, + 0xAFE67AFB, 0xF470C4B2, 0xF3E0EB5B, 0xD6CC9876, + 0x39E4460C, 0x1FDA8538, 0x1987832F, 0xCA007367, + 0xA99144F8, 0x296B299E, 0x492FC295, 0x9266BEAB, + 0xB5676E69, 0x9BD3DDDA, 0xDF7E052F, 0xDB25701C, + 0x1B5E51EE, 0xF65324E6, 0x6AFCE36C, 0x0316CC04, + 0x8644213E, 0xB7DC59D0, 0x7965291F, 0xCCD6FD43, + 0x41823979, 0x932BCDF6, 0xB657C34D, 0x4EDFD282, + 0x7AE5290C, 0x3CB9536B, 0x851E20FE, 0x9833557E, + 0x13ECF0B0, 0xD3FFB372, 0x3F85C5C1, 0x0AEF7ED2 +}; + +static const u32 cast_sbox5[256] = { + 0x7EC90C04, 0x2C6E74B9, 0x9B0E66DF, 0xA6337911, + 0xB86A7FFF, 0x1DD358F5, 0x44DD9D44, 0x1731167F, + 0x08FBF1FA, 0xE7F511CC, 0xD2051B00, 0x735ABA00, + 0x2AB722D8, 0x386381CB, 0xACF6243A, 0x69BEFD7A, + 0xE6A2E77F, 0xF0C720CD, 0xC4494816, 0xCCF5C180, + 0x38851640, 0x15B0A848, 0xE68B18CB, 0x4CAADEFF, + 0x5F480A01, 0x0412B2AA, 0x259814FC, 0x41D0EFE2, + 0x4E40B48D, 0x248EB6FB, 0x8DBA1CFE, 0x41A99B02, + 0x1A550A04, 0xBA8F65CB, 0x7251F4E7, 0x95A51725, + 0xC106ECD7, 0x97A5980A, 0xC539B9AA, 0x4D79FE6A, + 0xF2F3F763, 0x68AF8040, 0xED0C9E56, 0x11B4958B, + 0xE1EB5A88, 0x8709E6B0, 0xD7E07156, 0x4E29FEA7, + 0x6366E52D, 0x02D1C000, 0xC4AC8E05, 0x9377F571, + 0x0C05372A, 0x578535F2, 0x2261BE02, 0xD642A0C9, + 0xDF13A280, 0x74B55BD2, 0x682199C0, 0xD421E5EC, + 0x53FB3CE8, 0xC8ADEDB3, 0x28A87FC9, 0x3D959981, + 0x5C1FF900, 0xFE38D399, 0x0C4EFF0B, 0x062407EA, + 0xAA2F4FB1, 0x4FB96976, 0x90C79505, 0xB0A8A774, + 0xEF55A1FF, 0xE59CA2C2, 0xA6B62D27, 0xE66A4263, + 0xDF65001F, 0x0EC50966, 0xDFDD55BC, 0x29DE0655, + 0x911E739A, 0x17AF8975, 0x32C7911C, 0x89F89468, + 0x0D01E980, 0x524755F4, 0x03B63CC9, 0x0CC844B2, + 0xBCF3F0AA, 0x87AC36E9, 0xE53A7426, 0x01B3D82B, + 0x1A9E7449, 0x64EE2D7E, 0xCDDBB1DA, 0x01C94910, + 0xB868BF80, 0x0D26F3FD, 0x9342EDE7, 0x04A5C284, + 0x636737B6, 0x50F5B616, 0xF24766E3, 0x8ECA36C1, + 0x136E05DB, 0xFEF18391, 0xFB887A37, 0xD6E7F7D4, + 0xC7FB7DC9, 0x3063FCDF, 0xB6F589DE, 0xEC2941DA, + 0x26E46695, 0xB7566419, 0xF654EFC5, 0xD08D58B7, + 0x48925401, 0xC1BACB7F, 0xE5FF550F, 0xB6083049, + 0x5BB5D0E8, 0x87D72E5A, 0xAB6A6EE1, 0x223A66CE, + 0xC62BF3CD, 0x9E0885F9, 0x68CB3E47, 0x086C010F, + 0xA21DE820, 0xD18B69DE, 0xF3F65777, 0xFA02C3F6, + 0x407EDAC3, 0xCBB3D550, 0x1793084D, 0xB0D70EBA, + 0x0AB378D5, 0xD951FB0C, 0xDED7DA56, 0x4124BBE4, + 0x94CA0B56, 0x0F5755D1, 0xE0E1E56E, 0x6184B5BE, + 0x580A249F, 0x94F74BC0, 0xE327888E, 0x9F7B5561, + 0xC3DC0280, 0x05687715, 0x646C6BD7, 0x44904DB3, + 0x66B4F0A3, 0xC0F1648A, 0x697ED5AF, 0x49E92FF6, + 0x309E374F, 0x2CB6356A, 0x85808573, 0x4991F840, + 0x76F0AE02, 0x083BE84D, 0x28421C9A, 0x44489406, + 0x736E4CB8, 0xC1092910, 0x8BC95FC6, 0x7D869CF4, + 0x134F616F, 0x2E77118D, 0xB31B2BE1, 0xAA90B472, + 0x3CA5D717, 0x7D161BBA, 0x9CAD9010, 0xAF462BA2, + 0x9FE459D2, 0x45D34559, 0xD9F2DA13, 0xDBC65487, + 0xF3E4F94E, 0x176D486F, 0x097C13EA, 0x631DA5C7, + 0x445F7382, 0x175683F4, 0xCDC66A97, 0x70BE0288, + 0xB3CDCF72, 0x6E5DD2F3, 0x20936079, 0x459B80A5, + 0xBE60E2DB, 0xA9C23101, 0xEBA5315C, 0x224E42F2, + 0x1C5C1572, 0xF6721B2C, 0x1AD2FFF3, 0x8C25404E, + 0x324ED72F, 0x4067B7FD, 0x0523138E, 0x5CA3BC78, + 0xDC0FD66E, 0x75922283, 0x784D6B17, 0x58EBB16E, + 0x44094F85, 0x3F481D87, 0xFCFEAE7B, 0x77B5FF76, + 0x8C2302BF, 0xAAF47556, 0x5F46B02A, 0x2B092801, + 0x3D38F5F7, 0x0CA81F36, 0x52AF4A8A, 0x66D5E7C0, + 0xDF3B0874, 0x95055110, 0x1B5AD7A8, 0xF61ED5AD, + 0x6CF6E479, 0x20758184, 0xD0CEFA65, 0x88F7BE58, + 0x4A046826, 0x0FF6F8F3, 0xA09C7F70, 0x5346ABA0, + 0x5CE96C28, 0xE176EDA3, 0x6BAC307F, 0x376829D2, + 0x85360FA9, 0x17E3FE2A, 0x24B79767, 0xF5A96B20, + 0xD6CD2595, 0x68FF1EBF, 0x7555442C, 0xF19F06BE, + 0xF9E0659A, 0xEEB9491D, 0x34010718, 0xBB30CAB8, + 0xE822FE15, 0x88570983, 0x750E6249, 0xDA627E55, + 0x5E76FFA8, 0xB1534546, 0x6D47DE08, 0xEFE9E7D4 +}; + +static const u32 cast_sbox6[256] = { + 0xF6FA8F9D, 0x2CAC6CE1, 0x4CA34867, 0xE2337F7C, + 0x95DB08E7, 0x016843B4, 0xECED5CBC, 0x325553AC, + 0xBF9F0960, 0xDFA1E2ED, 0x83F0579D, 0x63ED86B9, + 0x1AB6A6B8, 0xDE5EBE39, 0xF38FF732, 0x8989B138, + 0x33F14961, 0xC01937BD, 0xF506C6DA, 0xE4625E7E, + 0xA308EA99, 0x4E23E33C, 0x79CBD7CC, 0x48A14367, + 0xA3149619, 0xFEC94BD5, 0xA114174A, 0xEAA01866, + 0xA084DB2D, 0x09A8486F, 0xA888614A, 0x2900AF98, + 0x01665991, 0xE1992863, 0xC8F30C60, 0x2E78EF3C, + 0xD0D51932, 0xCF0FEC14, 0xF7CA07D2, 0xD0A82072, + 0xFD41197E, 0x9305A6B0, 0xE86BE3DA, 0x74BED3CD, + 0x372DA53C, 0x4C7F4448, 0xDAB5D440, 0x6DBA0EC3, + 0x083919A7, 0x9FBAEED9, 0x49DBCFB0, 0x4E670C53, + 0x5C3D9C01, 0x64BDB941, 0x2C0E636A, 0xBA7DD9CD, + 0xEA6F7388, 0xE70BC762, 0x35F29ADB, 0x5C4CDD8D, + 0xF0D48D8C, 0xB88153E2, 0x08A19866, 0x1AE2EAC8, + 0x284CAF89, 0xAA928223, 0x9334BE53, 0x3B3A21BF, + 0x16434BE3, 0x9AEA3906, 0xEFE8C36E, 0xF890CDD9, + 0x80226DAE, 0xC340A4A3, 0xDF7E9C09, 0xA694A807, + 0x5B7C5ECC, 0x221DB3A6, 0x9A69A02F, 0x68818A54, + 0xCEB2296F, 0x53C0843A, 0xFE893655, 0x25BFE68A, + 0xB4628ABC, 0xCF222EBF, 0x25AC6F48, 0xA9A99387, + 0x53BDDB65, 0xE76FFBE7, 0xE967FD78, 0x0BA93563, + 0x8E342BC1, 0xE8A11BE9, 0x4980740D, 0xC8087DFC, + 0x8DE4BF99, 0xA11101A0, 0x7FD37975, 0xDA5A26C0, + 0xE81F994F, 0x9528CD89, 0xFD339FED, 0xB87834BF, + 0x5F04456D, 0x22258698, 0xC9C4C83B, 0x2DC156BE, + 0x4F628DAA, 0x57F55EC5, 0xE2220ABE, 0xD2916EBF, + 0x4EC75B95, 0x24F2C3C0, 0x42D15D99, 0xCD0D7FA0, + 0x7B6E27FF, 0xA8DC8AF0, 0x7345C106, 0xF41E232F, + 0x35162386, 0xE6EA8926, 0x3333B094, 0x157EC6F2, + 0x372B74AF, 0x692573E4, 0xE9A9D848, 0xF3160289, + 0x3A62EF1D, 0xA787E238, 0xF3A5F676, 0x74364853, + 0x20951063, 0x4576698D, 0xB6FAD407, 0x592AF950, + 0x36F73523, 0x4CFB6E87, 0x7DA4CEC0, 0x6C152DAA, + 0xCB0396A8, 0xC50DFE5D, 0xFCD707AB, 0x0921C42F, + 0x89DFF0BB, 0x5FE2BE78, 0x448F4F33, 0x754613C9, + 0x2B05D08D, 0x48B9D585, 0xDC049441, 0xC8098F9B, + 0x7DEDE786, 0xC39A3373, 0x42410005, 0x6A091751, + 0x0EF3C8A6, 0x890072D6, 0x28207682, 0xA9A9F7BE, + 0xBF32679D, 0xD45B5B75, 0xB353FD00, 0xCBB0E358, + 0x830F220A, 0x1F8FB214, 0xD372CF08, 0xCC3C4A13, + 0x8CF63166, 0x061C87BE, 0x88C98F88, 0x6062E397, + 0x47CF8E7A, 0xB6C85283, 0x3CC2ACFB, 0x3FC06976, + 0x4E8F0252, 0x64D8314D, 0xDA3870E3, 0x1E665459, + 0xC10908F0, 0x513021A5, 0x6C5B68B7, 0x822F8AA0, + 0x3007CD3E, 0x74719EEF, 0xDC872681, 0x073340D4, + 0x7E432FD9, 0x0C5EC241, 0x8809286C, 0xF592D891, + 0x08A930F6, 0x957EF305, 0xB7FBFFBD, 0xC266E96F, + 0x6FE4AC98, 0xB173ECC0, 0xBC60B42A, 0x953498DA, + 0xFBA1AE12, 0x2D4BD736, 0x0F25FAAB, 0xA4F3FCEB, + 0xE2969123, 0x257F0C3D, 0x9348AF49, 0x361400BC, + 0xE8816F4A, 0x3814F200, 0xA3F94043, 0x9C7A54C2, + 0xBC704F57, 0xDA41E7F9, 0xC25AD33A, 0x54F4A084, + 0xB17F5505, 0x59357CBE, 0xEDBD15C8, 0x7F97C5AB, + 0xBA5AC7B5, 0xB6F6DEAF, 0x3A479C3A, 0x5302DA25, + 0x653D7E6A, 0x54268D49, 0x51A477EA, 0x5017D55B, + 0xD7D25D88, 0x44136C76, 0x0404A8C8, 0xB8E5A121, + 0xB81A928A, 0x60ED5869, 0x97C55B96, 0xEAEC991B, + 0x29935913, 0x01FDB7F1, 0x088E8DFA, 0x9AB6F6F5, + 0x3B4CBF9F, 0x4A5DE3AB, 0xE6051D35, 0xA0E1D855, + 0xD36B4CF1, 0xF544EDEB, 0xB0E93524, 0xBEBB8FBD, + 0xA2D762CF, 0x49C92F54, 0x38B5F331, 0x7128A454, + 0x48392905, 0xA65B1DB8, 0x851C97BD, 0xD675CF2F +}; + +static const u32 cast_sbox7[256] = { + 0x85E04019, 0x332BF567, 0x662DBFFF, 0xCFC65693, + 0x2A8D7F6F, 0xAB9BC912, 0xDE6008A1, 0x2028DA1F, + 0x0227BCE7, 0x4D642916, 0x18FAC300, 0x50F18B82, + 0x2CB2CB11, 0xB232E75C, 0x4B3695F2, 0xB28707DE, + 0xA05FBCF6, 0xCD4181E9, 0xE150210C, 0xE24EF1BD, + 0xB168C381, 0xFDE4E789, 0x5C79B0D8, 0x1E8BFD43, + 0x4D495001, 0x38BE4341, 0x913CEE1D, 0x92A79C3F, + 0x089766BE, 0xBAEEADF4, 0x1286BECF, 0xB6EACB19, + 0x2660C200, 0x7565BDE4, 0x64241F7A, 0x8248DCA9, + 0xC3B3AD66, 0x28136086, 0x0BD8DFA8, 0x356D1CF2, + 0x107789BE, 0xB3B2E9CE, 0x0502AA8F, 0x0BC0351E, + 0x166BF52A, 0xEB12FF82, 0xE3486911, 0xD34D7516, + 0x4E7B3AFF, 0x5F43671B, 0x9CF6E037, 0x4981AC83, + 0x334266CE, 0x8C9341B7, 0xD0D854C0, 0xCB3A6C88, + 0x47BC2829, 0x4725BA37, 0xA66AD22B, 0x7AD61F1E, + 0x0C5CBAFA, 0x4437F107, 0xB6E79962, 0x42D2D816, + 0x0A961288, 0xE1A5C06E, 0x13749E67, 0x72FC081A, + 0xB1D139F7, 0xF9583745, 0xCF19DF58, 0xBEC3F756, + 0xC06EBA30, 0x07211B24, 0x45C28829, 0xC95E317F, + 0xBC8EC511, 0x38BC46E9, 0xC6E6FA14, 0xBAE8584A, + 0xAD4EBC46, 0x468F508B, 0x7829435F, 0xF124183B, + 0x821DBA9F, 0xAFF60FF4, 0xEA2C4E6D, 0x16E39264, + 0x92544A8B, 0x009B4FC3, 0xABA68CED, 0x9AC96F78, + 0x06A5B79A, 0xB2856E6E, 0x1AEC3CA9, 0xBE838688, + 0x0E0804E9, 0x55F1BE56, 0xE7E5363B, 0xB3A1F25D, + 0xF7DEBB85, 0x61FE033C, 0x16746233, 0x3C034C28, + 0xDA6D0C74, 0x79AAC56C, 0x3CE4E1AD, 0x51F0C802, + 0x98F8F35A, 0x1626A49F, 0xEED82B29, 0x1D382FE3, + 0x0C4FB99A, 0xBB325778, 0x3EC6D97B, 0x6E77A6A9, + 0xCB658B5C, 0xD45230C7, 0x2BD1408B, 0x60C03EB7, + 0xB9068D78, 0xA33754F4, 0xF430C87D, 0xC8A71302, + 0xB96D8C32, 0xEBD4E7BE, 0xBE8B9D2D, 0x7979FB06, + 0xE7225308, 0x8B75CF77, 0x11EF8DA4, 0xE083C858, + 0x8D6B786F, 0x5A6317A6, 0xFA5CF7A0, 0x5DDA0033, + 0xF28EBFB0, 0xF5B9C310, 0xA0EAC280, 0x08B9767A, + 0xA3D9D2B0, 0x79D34217, 0x021A718D, 0x9AC6336A, + 0x2711FD60, 0x438050E3, 0x069908A8, 0x3D7FEDC4, + 0x826D2BEF, 0x4EEB8476, 0x488DCF25, 0x36C9D566, + 0x28E74E41, 0xC2610ACA, 0x3D49A9CF, 0xBAE3B9DF, + 0xB65F8DE6, 0x92AEAF64, 0x3AC7D5E6, 0x9EA80509, + 0xF22B017D, 0xA4173F70, 0xDD1E16C3, 0x15E0D7F9, + 0x50B1B887, 0x2B9F4FD5, 0x625ABA82, 0x6A017962, + 0x2EC01B9C, 0x15488AA9, 0xD716E740, 0x40055A2C, + 0x93D29A22, 0xE32DBF9A, 0x058745B9, 0x3453DC1E, + 0xD699296E, 0x496CFF6F, 0x1C9F4986, 0xDFE2ED07, + 0xB87242D1, 0x19DE7EAE, 0x053E561A, 0x15AD6F8C, + 0x66626C1C, 0x7154C24C, 0xEA082B2A, 0x93EB2939, + 0x17DCB0F0, 0x58D4F2AE, 0x9EA294FB, 0x52CF564C, + 0x9883FE66, 0x2EC40581, 0x763953C3, 0x01D6692E, + 0xD3A0C108, 0xA1E7160E, 0xE4F2DFA6, 0x693ED285, + 0x74904698, 0x4C2B0EDD, 0x4F757656, 0x5D393378, + 0xA132234F, 0x3D321C5D, 0xC3F5E194, 0x4B269301, + 0xC79F022F, 0x3C997E7E, 0x5E4F9504, 0x3FFAFBBD, + 0x76F7AD0E, 0x296693F4, 0x3D1FCE6F, 0xC61E45BE, + 0xD3B5AB34, 0xF72BF9B7, 0x1B0434C0, 0x4E72B567, + 0x5592A33D, 0xB5229301, 0xCFD2A87F, 0x60AEB767, + 0x1814386B, 0x30BCC33D, 0x38A0C07D, 0xFD1606F2, + 0xC363519B, 0x589DD390, 0x5479F8E6, 0x1CB8D647, + 0x97FD61A9, 0xEA7759F4, 0x2D57539D, 0x569A58CF, + 0xE84E63AD, 0x462E1B78, 0x6580F87E, 0xF3817914, + 0x91DA55F4, 0x40A230F3, 0xD1988F35, 0xB6E318D2, + 0x3FFA50BC, 0x3D40F021, 0xC3C0BDAE, 0x4958C24C, + 0x518F36B2, 0x84B1D370, 0x0FEDCE83, 0x878DDADA, + 0xF2A279C7, 0x94E01BE8, 0x90716F4B, 0x954B8AA3 +}; + +static const u32 cast_sbox8[256] = { + 0xE216300D, 0xBBDDFFFC, 0xA7EBDABD, 0x35648095, + 0x7789F8B7, 0xE6C1121B, 0x0E241600, 0x052CE8B5, + 0x11A9CFB0, 0xE5952F11, 0xECE7990A, 0x9386D174, + 0x2A42931C, 0x76E38111, 0xB12DEF3A, 0x37DDDDFC, + 0xDE9ADEB1, 0x0A0CC32C, 0xBE197029, 0x84A00940, + 0xBB243A0F, 0xB4D137CF, 0xB44E79F0, 0x049EEDFD, + 0x0B15A15D, 0x480D3168, 0x8BBBDE5A, 0x669DED42, + 0xC7ECE831, 0x3F8F95E7, 0x72DF191B, 0x7580330D, + 0x94074251, 0x5C7DCDFA, 0xABBE6D63, 0xAA402164, + 0xB301D40A, 0x02E7D1CA, 0x53571DAE, 0x7A3182A2, + 0x12A8DDEC, 0xFDAA335D, 0x176F43E8, 0x71FB46D4, + 0x38129022, 0xCE949AD4, 0xB84769AD, 0x965BD862, + 0x82F3D055, 0x66FB9767, 0x15B80B4E, 0x1D5B47A0, + 0x4CFDE06F, 0xC28EC4B8, 0x57E8726E, 0x647A78FC, + 0x99865D44, 0x608BD593, 0x6C200E03, 0x39DC5FF6, + 0x5D0B00A3, 0xAE63AFF2, 0x7E8BD632, 0x70108C0C, + 0xBBD35049, 0x2998DF04, 0x980CF42A, 0x9B6DF491, + 0x9E7EDD53, 0x06918548, 0x58CB7E07, 0x3B74EF2E, + 0x522FFFB1, 0xD24708CC, 0x1C7E27CD, 0xA4EB215B, + 0x3CF1D2E2, 0x19B47A38, 0x424F7618, 0x35856039, + 0x9D17DEE7, 0x27EB35E6, 0xC9AFF67B, 0x36BAF5B8, + 0x09C467CD, 0xC18910B1, 0xE11DBF7B, 0x06CD1AF8, + 0x7170C608, 0x2D5E3354, 0xD4DE495A, 0x64C6D006, + 0xBCC0C62C, 0x3DD00DB3, 0x708F8F34, 0x77D51B42, + 0x264F620F, 0x24B8D2BF, 0x15C1B79E, 0x46A52564, + 0xF8D7E54E, 0x3E378160, 0x7895CDA5, 0x859C15A5, + 0xE6459788, 0xC37BC75F, 0xDB07BA0C, 0x0676A3AB, + 0x7F229B1E, 0x31842E7B, 0x24259FD7, 0xF8BEF472, + 0x835FFCB8, 0x6DF4C1F2, 0x96F5B195, 0xFD0AF0FC, + 0xB0FE134C, 0xE2506D3D, 0x4F9B12EA, 0xF215F225, + 0xA223736F, 0x9FB4C428, 0x25D04979, 0x34C713F8, + 0xC4618187, 0xEA7A6E98, 0x7CD16EFC, 0x1436876C, + 0xF1544107, 0xBEDEEE14, 0x56E9AF27, 0xA04AA441, + 0x3CF7C899, 0x92ECBAE6, 0xDD67016D, 0x151682EB, + 0xA842EEDF, 0xFDBA60B4, 0xF1907B75, 0x20E3030F, + 0x24D8C29E, 0xE139673B, 0xEFA63FB8, 0x71873054, + 0xB6F2CF3B, 0x9F326442, 0xCB15A4CC, 0xB01A4504, + 0xF1E47D8D, 0x844A1BE5, 0xBAE7DFDC, 0x42CBDA70, + 0xCD7DAE0A, 0x57E85B7A, 0xD53F5AF6, 0x20CF4D8C, + 0xCEA4D428, 0x79D130A4, 0x3486EBFB, 0x33D3CDDC, + 0x77853B53, 0x37EFFCB5, 0xC5068778, 0xE580B3E6, + 0x4E68B8F4, 0xC5C8B37E, 0x0D809EA2, 0x398FEB7C, + 0x132A4F94, 0x43B7950E, 0x2FEE7D1C, 0x223613BD, + 0xDD06CAA2, 0x37DF932B, 0xC4248289, 0xACF3EBC3, + 0x5715F6B7, 0xEF3478DD, 0xF267616F, 0xC148CBE4, + 0x9052815E, 0x5E410FAB, 0xB48A2465, 0x2EDA7FA4, + 0xE87B40E4, 0xE98EA084, 0x5889E9E1, 0xEFD390FC, + 0xDD07D35B, 0xDB485694, 0x38D7E5B2, 0x57720101, + 0x730EDEBC, 0x5B643113, 0x94917E4F, 0x503C2FBA, + 0x646F1282, 0x7523D24A, 0xE0779695, 0xF9C17A8F, + 0x7A5B2121, 0xD187B896, 0x29263A4D, 0xBA510CDF, + 0x81F47C9F, 0xAD1163ED, 0xEA7B5965, 0x1A00726E, + 0x11403092, 0x00DA6D77, 0x4A0CDD61, 0xAD1F4603, + 0x605BDFB0, 0x9EEDC364, 0x22EBE6A8, 0xCEE7D28A, + 0xA0E736A0, 0x5564A6B9, 0x10853209, 0xC7EB8F37, + 0x2DE705CA, 0x8951570F, 0xDF09822B, 0xBD691A6C, + 0xAA12E4F2, 0x87451C0F, 0xE0F6A27A, 0x3ADA4819, + 0x4CF1764F, 0x0D771C2B, 0x67CDB156, 0x350D8384, + 0x5938FA0F, 0x42399EF3, 0x36997B07, 0x0E84093D, + 0x4AA93E61, 0x8360D87B, 0x1FA98B0C, 0x1149382C, + 0xE97625A5, 0x0614D1B7, 0x0E25244B, 0x0C768347, + 0x589E8D82, 0x0D2059D1, 0xA466BB1E, 0xF8DA0A82, + 0x04F19130, 0xBA6E4EC0, 0x99265164, 0x1EE7230D, + 0x50B2AD80, 0xEAEE6801, 0x8DB2A283, 0xEA8BF59E +}; + diff --git a/doc/man/apg.1 b/doc/man/apg.1 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..133f71a --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/man/apg.1 @@ -0,0 +1,227 @@ +.\" Man page for apg. +.\" Licensed under BSD-like License. +.\" Created by Adel I. Mirzazhanov +.\" +.TH APG 1 "2001 Feb 13" "Automated Password Generator" "User Manual" +.SH NAME +apg +\- generates several random passwords + +.SH SYNOPSIS +.B apg +[\fB-r\fP \fIdictfile\fP] +[\fB-a algorithm\fP] [\fB-C\fP] [\fB-L\fP] [\fB-S\fP] [\fB-N\fP] [\fB-R\fP] +[\fB-M mode\fP] [\fB-m min_pass_len\fP] [\fB-x max_pass_len\fP] [\fB-n num_of_pass\fP] +[\fB-s\fP] [\fB-c cl_seed\fP] [\fB-d\fP] [\fB-y\fP] [\fB-h\fP] [\fB-v\fP] +.PP +.SH DESCRIPTION +.B apg +generates several random passwords. It uses several password generation +algorithms (currently two) and a built-in pseudo random number generator. +.PP +Default algorithm is pronounceable password generation algorithm +designed by +.B Morrie Gasser +and described in +.B "A Random Word Generator For Pronounceable Passwords" +.I National Technical Information Service (NTIS) +.B AD-A-017676. +The original paper is very old and had never been put online, +so I have to use +.I NIST +implementation described in +.B FIPS-181. +.PP +Another algorithm is simple random character generation algorithm, but it +uses four user-defined symbol sets to produce random password. It means that +user can choose type of symbols that should appear in password. Symbol sets +are: numeric symbol set +.I (0,...,9) +, capital letters symbol set +.I (A,...,Z) +, small letters symbol set +.I (a,...,z) +and special symbols symbol set +.I (#,@,!,...). +.PP +Built-in pseudo random number generator is an implementation of algorithm +described in +.B Appendix C of ANSI X9.17 +or +.B RFC1750 +with exception that it uses +.I CAST +instead of +.I Triple DES. +It uses local time with precision of microseconds (see +\fBgettimeofday\fP(2)) and \fI/dev/random\fP (if available) to produce +initial random seed. +.PP +.B apg +also have the ability to check generated password quality using +dictionary. You can use this ability if you specify command-line option +.B -r +.I dictfile +where \fIdictfile\fP is dictionary file name. In that dictionary you may place words +(one per line) that should not appear as generated passwords. For example: user names, +common words, etc. You even can use one of the dictionaries that come with +.I dictionary password crackers. +This check is case sensitive. For example, if you want to reject word 'root', +you should insert in \fIdictfile\fP words: root, Root, RoOt, ... , ROOT. +It is not the easiest way to check password quality, but +it is the most powerful way. In future releases I plan to implement some other +techniques to check passwords (like pattern check) just to make life easier. +.sp +.SH "OPTIONS" +.TP +.B -M mode +Use symbolsets specified with \fBmode\fP for password generation. +\fBmode\fP is a text string consisting of characters \fBS[s]\fP, \fBN[n]\fP, +\fBC[c]\fP, \fBL[l]\fP,\fBR[r]\fP. Where: +.RS +.TP +.B S[s] +use special symbol set (for random character password generation algorithm only). +.TP +.B N[n] +use numeral symbol set. +.TP +.B C[c] +use capital symbol set. +.TP +.B L[l] +use small letters symbol set (always present if pronounceable password +generation algorithm is used). +.TP +.B R[r] +the same as \fBS[s]\fP but it does not generate symbols \fB`\fP, \fB'\fP, +\fB"\fP, \fB|\fP, \fB$\fP, \fBbackslash\fP, \fB?\fP. Usefull for password generation in +a shell script. (For random character password generation algorithm only). +.RE +.RS +.br +\fBmode\fP can not be more then 5 characters in +length. +.PP +.B Examples: +.br +\fB-M sncl\fP or \fB-M SNCL\fP or \fB-M Cn\fP +.PP +\fB-M mode\fP is the new style password generation mode definition, but the old style +options(-C, -N, -S, -L, -R) are also supported. +.RE +.TP +.B -S +use special symbol set. For random character password generation algorithm only. +(old style - use \fB-M mode\fP instead). +.TP +.B -R +the same as \fB-S\fP but it does not generate symbols \fB`\fP, \fB'\fP, +\fB"\fP, \fB|\fP, \fB$\fP, \fBbackslash\fP, \fB?\fP. Usefull for password generation in +a shell script. For random character password generation algorithm only. +(old style - use \fB-M mode\fP instead). +.TP +.B -N +use numeral symbol set. +(old style - use \fB-M mode\fP instead). +.TP +.B -C +use capital symbol set. +(old style - use \fB-M mode\fP instead). +.TP +.B -L +use small letters symbol set. Always present if pronounceable password +generation algorithm is used. +(old style - use \fB-M mode\fP instead). +.TP +.B -a algorithm +use +.B algorithm +for password generation. +.RS +.B 0 +- (default) pronounceable password generation +.br +.B 1 +- random character password generation +.RE +.TP +.B -r \fIdictfile\fP +check generated passwords for their appearance in +.B dictfile +.TP +.B -s +ask user for random sequence for password generation +.TP +.B -c cl_seed +use +.B cl_seed +as a random seed for password generation. I use it when i have to generate +passwords in a shell script. +.TP +.B -d +do NOT use any delimiters between generated passwords. I use it when i have to generate +passwords in a shell script. +.TP +.B -n num_of_pass +generate +.B num_of_pass +number of passwords. Default is 6. +.TP +.B -m min_pass_len +generate password with minimum length +.B min_pass_len. +If \fBmin_pass_len > max_pass_len\fP then \fBmax_pass_len = min_pass_len\fP. +Default minimum password length is 6. +.TP +.B -x max_pass_len +generate password with maximum length +.B max_pass_len. +If \fBmin_pass_len > max_pass_len\fP then \fBmax_pass_len = min_pass_len\fP. +Default maximum password length is 8. +.TP +.B -y +print generated passwords and crypted passwords (see man \fBcrypt\fP(3)) +.TP +.B -h +print help information and exit +.TP +.B -v +print version information and exit +.SH "DEFAULT OPTIONS" +\fBapg -a 0 -N -C -L -n 6 -x 8 -m 6\fP (old style) +.br +\fBapg -a 0 -M NCL -n 6 -x 8 -m 6\fP (new style) +.PP +If you want to generate realy secure passwords, +you should use option \fB-s\fP. To simlify +.B apg +usage, you can write a small shell script. For example: +.br +\fB[begin]----> pwgen.sh\fP +.br +\fB#!/bin/sh\fP +.br +\fB/usr/local/bin/apg -m 8 -x 12 -s\fP +.br +\fB[ end ]----> pwgen.sh\fP +.SH "EXIT CODE" +On successful completion of its task, +.B apg +will complete with exit code 0. An exit code of -1 indicates an error +occurred. Textual errors are written to the standard error stream. +.SH "DIAGNOSTICS" +If \fI/dev/random\fP is not available, \fBapg\fP will display a +message about it. +.SH "FILES" +.B None. +.SH "BUGS" +.B None. +If you've found one, please send bug description to the author. +.SH "SEE ALSO" +.B apgd +(8) +.SH "AUTHOR" +Adel I. Mirzazhanov, +.br +Project home page: http://www.adel.nursat.kz/apg/ diff --git a/doc/man/apgd.8 b/doc/man/apgd.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1b9710a --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/man/apgd.8 @@ -0,0 +1,229 @@ +.\" Man page for apgd. +.\" Licensed under BSD-like License. +.\" Created by Adel I. Mirzazhanov +.\" +.TH APGD 8 "2001 Jan 8" "Automated Password Generator" "User Manual" +.SH NAME +apgd +\- server that generates several random passwords + +.SH SYNOPSIS +.B apgd +[\fB-r\fP \fIdictfile\fP] +[\fB-a algorithm\fP] [\fB-C\fP] [\fB-L\fP] [\fB-S\fP] [\fB-N\fP] +[\fB-m min_pass_len\fP] [\fB-x max_pass_len\fP] [\fB-n num_of_pass\fP] +.PP +.SH DESCRIPTION +.B apgd +program is a server that supports +.B "Password Generation Protocol" +described in +.B RFC972. +It uses several password generation algorithms (currently two) and a built-in +pseudo random number generator. +.PP +.B apgd +is normally invoked by the Internet superserver (see +.B inetd +(8)) for requests to connect to the pwdgen port (pwdgen port is 129 according to +.B RFC1700 +) as indicated by the +.I /etc/services +file (see +.B services +(5)). +.PP +Default algorithm is pronounceable password generation algorithm +designed by +.B Morrie Gasser +and described in +.B """A Random Word Generator For Pronounceable Passwords""" +.I National Technical Information Service (NTIS) +.B AD-A-017676. +The original paper is very old and had never been put online, +so I have to use +.I NIST +implementation described in +.B FIPS-181. +.PP +Another algorithm is simple random character generation algorithm, but it +uses four user-defined symbol sets to produce random password. It means that +user can choose type of symbols that should appear in password. Symbol sets +are: numeric symbol set +.I (0,...,9) +, capital letters symbol set +.I (A,...,Z) +, small letters symbol set +.I (a,...,z) +and special symbols symbol set +.I (#,@,!,...). +.PP +Built-in pseudo random number generator is an implementation of algorithm +described in +.B Appendix C of ANSI X9.17 +or +.B RFC1750 +with exception that it uses +.I CAST +instead of +.I Triple DES. +It uses local time with precision of microseconds (see +\fBgettimeofday\fP(2)) and \fI/dev/random\fP (if available) to produce +initial random seed. +.PP +.B apgd +also have the ability to check generated password quality using +dictionary. You can use this ability if you specify command-line option +.B -r +.I dictfile +where \fIdictfile\fP is dictionary file name. In that dictionary you may place words +(one per line) that should not appear as generated passwords. For example: user names +common words, etc. You even can use one of the dictionaries that come with +.I dictionary password crackers. +This check is case sensitive. For example, if you want to reject word 'root', +you should insert in \fIdictfile\fP words: root, Root, RoOt, ... , ROOT. +It is not the easiest way to check password quality, but +it is the most powerful way. In future releases I plan to implement some other +techniques to check passwords just to make life easier. +.PP +.B apgd +has the ability log user password generation activity and internal debug information. It does this +using +.br +.I facility += +.I daemon +.RS +.br +.I priority += +.I info +for user password generation activity logging +.br +.I priority += +.I debug +for internal debug information +.br +.RE +See the \fBsyslogd\fP(8) and \fBsyslog.conf\fP(5) man pages for information on how to configure your syslog daemon. +.sp +.SH "OPTIONS" +.TP +.B -M mode +Use symbolsets specified with \fBmode\fP for password generation. +\fBmode\fP is a text string consisting of characters \fBS[s]\fP, \fBN[n]\fP, +\fBC[c]\fP, \fBL[l]\fP,\fBR[r]\fP. Where: +.RS +.TP +.B S[s] +use special symbol set (for random character password generation algorithm only). +.TP +.B N[n] +use numeral symbol set. +.TP +.B C[c] +use capital symbol set. +.TP +.B L[l] +use small letters symbol set (always present if pronounceable password +generation algorithm is used). +.TP +.B R[r] +the same as \fBS[s]\fP but it does not generate symbols \fB`\fP, \fB'\fP, +\fB"\fP, \fB|\fP, \fB$\fP, \fBbackslash\fP, \fB?\fP. Usefull for password generation in +a shell script. (For random character password generation algorithm only). +.RE +.RS +.br +\fBmode\fP can not be more then 5 characters in +length. +.PP +.B Examples: +.br +\fB-M sncl\fP or \fB-M SNCL\fP or \fB-M Cn\fP +.PP +\fB-M mode\fP is the new style password generation mode definition, but the old style +options(-C, -N, -S, -L, -R) are also supported. +.RE +.TP +.B -S +use special symbol set. For random character password generation algorithm only. +(old style - use \fB-M mode\fP instead). +.TP +.B -R +the same as \fB-S\fP but it does not generate symbols \fB`\fP, \fB'\fP, +\fB"\fP, \fB|\fP, \fB$\fP, \fBbackslash\fP, \fB?\fP. Usefull for password generation in +a shell script. For random character password generation algorithm only. +(old style - use \fB-M mode\fP instead). +.TP +.B -N +use numeral symbol set. +(old style - use \fB-M mode\fP instead). +.TP +.B -C +use capital symbol set. +(old style - use \fB-M mode\fP instead). +.TP +.B -L +use small letters symbol set. Always present if pronounceable password +generation algorithm is used. +(old style - use \fB-M mode\fP instead). +.TP +.B -a algorithm +use +.B algorithm +for password generation. +.RS +.B 0 +- (default) pronounceable password generation +.br +.B 1 +- random character password generation +.RE +.TP +.B -r \fIdictfile\fP +check generated passwords for their appearance in +.B dictfile +.TP +.B -n num_of_pass +generate +.B num_of_pass +number of passwords. Default is 6. +.TP +.B -m min_pass_len +generate password with minimum length +.B min_pass_len. +If \fBmin_pass_len > max_pass_len\fP then \fBmax_pass_len = min_pass_len\fP. +Default minimum password length is 6. +.TP +.B -x max_pass_len +generate password with maximum length +.B max_pass_len +If \fBmin_pass_len > max_pass_len\fP then \fBmax_pass_len = min_pass_len\fP. +Default maximum password length is 8. +.SH "DEFAULT OPTIONS" +\fBapgd -a 0 -N -C -L -n 6 -m 6 -x 8\fP (old style) +.br +\fBapgd -a 0 -M NCL -n 6 -x 8 -m 6\fP (new style) +.SH "EXIT CODE" +On successful completion of its task, +.B apgd +will complete with exit code 0. An exit code of -1 indicates an error +occurred. Textual errors are written to the +.B syslogd +(8). +.SH "DIAGNOSTICS" +All textual info is written to the +\fBsyslogd\fP(8). +.SH "FILES" +.B None. +.SH "BUGS" +.B None. +If you've found one, please send bug description to the author. +.SH "SEE ALSO" +\fBapg\fP(1) +.SH "AUTHOR" +Adel I. Mirzazhanov, +.br +Project home page: http://www.adel.nursat.kz/apg/ diff --git a/doc/rfc0972.txt b/doc/rfc0972.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7ab2bb8 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/rfc0972.txt @@ -0,0 +1,114 @@ + + +Network Working Group F. Wancho +Request for Comments: 972 WSMR + January 1986 + + Password Generator Protocol + + +STATUS OF THIS MEMO + + This RFC specifies a standard for the ARPA Internet community. Hosts + on the ARPA Internet that choose to implement a Password Generator + Protocol (PWDGEN) are expected to adopt and implement this standard. + Distribution of this memo is unlimited. + +BACKGROUND + + Many security-conscious host administrators are becoming increasingly + aware that user-selected login passwords are too easy to guess for + even casual penetration attempts. Some sites have implemented + dictionary lookup techniques in their password programs to prevent + ordinary words from being used. Others have implemented some variant + of a randomly generated password with mixed success. The problem + arises from the fact that such passwords are difficult to remember + because they cannot be pronounced or are based on a relatively short + cycle pseudo-random number generator. + + A version of the PWDGEN algorithm briefly described below has been in + use for several years at a small number of sites in the Internet. + Interest has recently been expressed at porting this algorithm to + other sites. However, the relatively short cycle and the resulting + randomness of the pseudo-random number generator available on these + sites tends to interfere with the intended result of minimizing the + potential duplication of passwords both within a site and across + sites when a user has access to more than one site. + + The PWDGEN Service described herein provides a means for sites to + offer a list of possible passwords for the user to choose one from + the first set, or optionally select from another set. With more than + one site offering this service, it is then possible to randomly + select which site to use and have multiple fallback sites should that + site be unavailable. + + Description + + The PWDGEN Service provides a set of six randomly generated + eight-character CRLF-delimited "words" with a reasonable level of + pronounceability, using a multi-level algorithm. An + implementation of the algorithm is available in FORTRAN-77 for + examination and possible implementation by system administrators + only. + + + +Wancho [Page 1] + + + +RFC 972 January 1986 +Password Generator Protocol + + + The uniqueness of the generated words is highly dependent on the + randomness of the initial seed value used. The availability of a + single system-wide seed, updated after each access is highly + desireable. Seeds based on a time-of-day clock are unacceptable. + Seed values should be stored as values in excess of 32 bits for + best performance. + + TCP Based PWDGEN Service + + One PWDGEN service is defined as a connection based application on + TCP. A server listens for TCP connections on TCP port 129. Once + a connection is established, the six CRLF-delimited words are + generated and sent to the caller, and the connection is closed by + the server. No dialog is used or required. + + UDP Based PWDGEN Service + + Another possible PWDGEN service is defined as a datagram based + application on UDP. A server listens for UDP datagrams on UDP + port 129. When a datagram is received, the six CRLF-delimited + words are sent back in an answering datagram. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Wancho [Page 2] + diff --git a/doc/rfc1750.txt b/doc/rfc1750.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..56d478c --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/rfc1750.txt @@ -0,0 +1,1683 @@ + + + + + + +Network Working Group D. Eastlake, 3rd +Request for Comments: 1750 DEC +Category: Informational S. Crocker + Cybercash + J. Schiller + MIT + December 1994 + + + Randomness Recommendations for Security + +Status of this Memo + + This memo provides information for the Internet community. This memo + does not specify an Internet standard of any kind. Distribution of + this memo is unlimited. + +Abstract + + Security systems today are built on increasingly strong cryptographic + algorithms that foil pattern analysis attempts. However, the security + of these systems is dependent on generating secret quantities for + passwords, cryptographic keys, and similar quantities. The use of + pseudo-random processes to generate secret quantities can result in + pseudo-security. The sophisticated attacker of these security + systems may find it easier to reproduce the environment that produced + the secret quantities, searching the resulting small set of + possibilities, than to locate the quantities in the whole of the + number space. + + Choosing random quantities to foil a resourceful and motivated + adversary is surprisingly difficult. This paper points out many + pitfalls in using traditional pseudo-random number generation + techniques for choosing such quantities. It recommends the use of + truly random hardware techniques and shows that the existing hardware + on many systems can be used for this purpose. It provides + suggestions to ameliorate the problem when a hardware solution is not + available. And it gives examples of how large such quantities need + to be for some particular applications. + + + + + + + + + + + + +Eastlake, Crocker & Schiller [Page 1] + +RFC 1750 Randomness Recommendations for Security December 1994 + + +Acknowledgements + + Comments on this document that have been incorporated were received + from (in alphabetic order) the following: + + David M. Balenson (TIS) + Don Coppersmith (IBM) + Don T. Davis (consultant) + Carl Ellison (Stratus) + Marc Horowitz (MIT) + Christian Huitema (INRIA) + Charlie Kaufman (IRIS) + Steve Kent (BBN) + Hal Murray (DEC) + Neil Haller (Bellcore) + Richard Pitkin (DEC) + Tim Redmond (TIS) + Doug Tygar (CMU) + +Table of Contents + + 1. Introduction........................................... 3 + 2. Requirements........................................... 4 + 3. Traditional Pseudo-Random Sequences.................... 5 + 4. Unpredictability....................................... 7 + 4.1 Problems with Clocks and Serial Numbers............... 7 + 4.2 Timing and Content of External Events................ 8 + 4.3 The Fallacy of Complex Manipulation.................. 8 + 4.4 The Fallacy of Selection from a Large Database....... 9 + 5. Hardware for Randomness............................... 10 + 5.1 Volume Required...................................... 10 + 5.2 Sensitivity to Skew.................................. 10 + 5.2.1 Using Stream Parity to De-Skew..................... 11 + 5.2.2 Using Transition Mappings to De-Skew............... 12 + 5.2.3 Using FFT to De-Skew............................... 13 + 5.2.4 Using Compression to De-Skew....................... 13 + 5.3 Existing Hardware Can Be Used For Randomness......... 14 + 5.3.1 Using Existing Sound/Video Input................... 14 + 5.3.2 Using Existing Disk Drives......................... 14 + 6. Recommended Non-Hardware Strategy..................... 14 + 6.1 Mixing Functions..................................... 15 + 6.1.1 A Trivial Mixing Function.......................... 15 + 6.1.2 Stronger Mixing Functions.......................... 16 + 6.1.3 Diff-Hellman as a Mixing Function.................. 17 + 6.1.4 Using a Mixing Function to Stretch Random Bits..... 17 + 6.1.5 Other Factors in Choosing a Mixing Function........ 18 + 6.2 Non-Hardware Sources of Randomness................... 19 + 6.3 Cryptographically Strong Sequences................... 19 + + + +Eastlake, Crocker & Schiller [Page 2] + +RFC 1750 Randomness Recommendations for Security December 1994 + + + 6.3.1 Traditional Strong Sequences....................... 20 + 6.3.2 The Blum Blum Shub Sequence Generator.............. 21 + 7. Key Generation Standards.............................. 22 + 7.1 US DoD Recommendations for Password Generation....... 23 + 7.2 X9.17 Key Generation................................. 23 + 8. Examples of Randomness Required....................... 24 + 8.1 Password Generation................................. 24 + 8.2 A Very High Security Cryptographic Key............... 25 + 8.2.1 Effort per Key Trial............................... 25 + 8.2.2 Meet in the Middle Attacks......................... 26 + 8.2.3 Other Considerations............................... 26 + 9. Conclusion............................................ 27 + 10. Security Considerations.............................. 27 + References............................................... 28 + Authors' Addresses....................................... 30 + +1. Introduction + + Software cryptography is coming into wider use. Systems like + Kerberos, PEM, PGP, etc. are maturing and becoming a part of the + network landscape [PEM]. These systems provide substantial + protection against snooping and spoofing. However, there is a + potential flaw. At the heart of all cryptographic systems is the + generation of secret, unguessable (i.e., random) numbers. + + For the present, the lack of generally available facilities for + generating such unpredictable numbers is an open wound in the design + of cryptographic software. For the software developer who wants to + build a key or password generation procedure that runs on a wide + range of hardware, the only safe strategy so far has been to force + the local installation to supply a suitable routine to generate + random numbers. To say the least, this is an awkward, error-prone + and unpalatable solution. + + It is important to keep in mind that the requirement is for data that + an adversary has a very low probability of guessing or determining. + This will fail if pseudo-random data is used which only meets + traditional statistical tests for randomness or which is based on + limited range sources, such as clocks. Frequently such random + quantities are determinable by an adversary searching through an + embarrassingly small space of possibilities. + + This informational document suggests techniques for producing random + quantities that will be resistant to such attack. It recommends that + future systems include hardware random number generation or provide + access to existing hardware that can be used for this purpose. It + suggests methods for use if such hardware is not available. And it + gives some estimates of the number of random bits required for sample + + + +Eastlake, Crocker & Schiller [Page 3] + +RFC 1750 Randomness Recommendations for Security December 1994 + + + applications. + +2. Requirements + + Probably the most commonly encountered randomness requirement today + is the user password. This is usually a simple character string. + Obviously, if a password can be guessed, it does not provide + security. (For re-usable passwords, it is desirable that users be + able to remember the password. This may make it advisable to use + pronounceable character strings or phrases composed on ordinary + words. But this only affects the format of the password information, + not the requirement that the password be very hard to guess.) + + Many other requirements come from the cryptographic arena. + Cryptographic techniques can be used to provide a variety of services + including confidentiality and authentication. Such services are + based on quantities, traditionally called "keys", that are unknown to + and unguessable by an adversary. + + In some cases, such as the use of symmetric encryption with the one + time pads [CRYPTO*] or the US Data Encryption Standard [DES], the + parties who wish to communicate confidentially and/or with + authentication must all know the same secret key. In other cases, + using what are called asymmetric or "public key" cryptographic + techniques, keys come in pairs. One key of the pair is private and + must be kept secret by one party, the other is public and can be + published to the world. It is computationally infeasible to + determine the private key from the public key [ASYMMETRIC, CRYPTO*]. + + The frequency and volume of the requirement for random quantities + differs greatly for different cryptographic systems. Using pure RSA + [CRYPTO*], random quantities are required when the key pair is + generated, but thereafter any number of messages can be signed + without any further need for randomness. The public key Digital + Signature Algorithm that has been proposed by the US National + Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) requires good random + numbers for each signature. And encrypting with a one time pad, in + principle the strongest possible encryption technique, requires a + volume of randomness equal to all the messages to be processed. + + In most of these cases, an adversary can try to determine the + "secret" key by trial and error. (This is possible as long as the + key is enough smaller than the message that the correct key can be + uniquely identified.) The probability of an adversary succeeding at + this must be made acceptably low, depending on the particular + application. The size of the space the adversary must search is + related to the amount of key "information" present in the information + theoretic sense [SHANNON]. This depends on the number of different + + + +Eastlake, Crocker & Schiller [Page 4] + +RFC 1750 Randomness Recommendations for Security December 1994 + + + secret values possible and the probability of each value as follows: + + ----- + \ + Bits-of-info = \ - p * log ( p ) + / i 2 i + / + ----- + + where i varies from 1 to the number of possible secret values and p + sub i is the probability of the value numbered i. (Since p sub i is + less than one, the log will be negative so each term in the sum will + be non-negative.) + + If there are 2^n different values of equal probability, then n bits + of information are present and an adversary would, on the average, + have to try half of the values, or 2^(n-1) , before guessing the + secret quantity. If the probability of different values is unequal, + then there is less information present and fewer guesses will, on + average, be required by an adversary. In particular, any values that + the adversary can know are impossible, or are of low probability, can + be initially ignored by an adversary, who will search through the + more probable values first. + + For example, consider a cryptographic system that uses 56 bit keys. + If these 56 bit keys are derived by using a fixed pseudo-random + number generator that is seeded with an 8 bit seed, then an adversary + needs to search through only 256 keys (by running the pseudo-random + number generator with every possible seed), not the 2^56 keys that + may at first appear to be the case. Only 8 bits of "information" are + in these 56 bit keys. + +3. Traditional Pseudo-Random Sequences + + Most traditional sources of random numbers use deterministic sources + of "pseudo-random" numbers. These typically start with a "seed" + quantity and use numeric or logical operations to produce a sequence + of values. + + [KNUTH] has a classic exposition on pseudo-random numbers. + Applications he mentions are simulation of natural phenomena, + sampling, numerical analysis, testing computer programs, decision + making, and games. None of these have the same characteristics as + the sort of security uses we are talking about. Only in the last two + could there be an adversary trying to find the random quantity. + However, in these cases, the adversary normally has only a single + chance to use a guessed value. In guessing passwords or attempting + to break an encryption scheme, the adversary normally has many, + + + +Eastlake, Crocker & Schiller [Page 5] + +RFC 1750 Randomness Recommendations for Security December 1994 + + + perhaps unlimited, chances at guessing the correct value and should + be assumed to be aided by a computer. + + For testing the "randomness" of numbers, Knuth suggests a variety of + measures including statistical and spectral. These tests check + things like autocorrelation between different parts of a "random" + sequence or distribution of its values. They could be met by a + constant stored random sequence, such as the "random" sequence + printed in the CRC Standard Mathematical Tables [CRC]. + + A typical pseudo-random number generation technique, known as a + linear congruence pseudo-random number generator, is modular + arithmetic where the N+1th value is calculated from the Nth value by + + V = ( V * a + b )(Mod c) + N+1 N + + The above technique has a strong relationship to linear shift + register pseudo-random number generators, which are well understood + cryptographically [SHIFT*]. In such generators bits are introduced + at one end of a shift register as the Exclusive Or (binary sum + without carry) of bits from selected fixed taps into the register. + + For example: + + +----+ +----+ +----+ +----+ + | B | <-- | B | <-- | B | <-- . . . . . . <-- | B | <-+ + | 0 | | 1 | | 2 | | n | | + +----+ +----+ +----+ +----+ | + | | | | + | | V +-----+ + | V +----------------> | | + V +-----------------------------> | XOR | + +---------------------------------------------------> | | + +-----+ + + + V = ( ( V * 2 ) + B .xor. B ... )(Mod 2^n) + N+1 N 0 2 + + The goodness of traditional pseudo-random number generator algorithms + is measured by statistical tests on such sequences. Carefully chosen + values of the initial V and a, b, and c or the placement of shift + register tap in the above simple processes can produce excellent + statistics. + + + + + + +Eastlake, Crocker & Schiller [Page 6] + +RFC 1750 Randomness Recommendations for Security December 1994 + + + These sequences may be adequate in simulations (Monte Carlo + experiments) as long as the sequence is orthogonal to the structure + of the space being explored. Even there, subtle patterns may cause + problems. However, such sequences are clearly bad for use in + security applications. They are fully predictable if the initial + state is known. Depending on the form of the pseudo-random number + generator, the sequence may be determinable from observation of a + short portion of the sequence [CRYPTO*, STERN]. For example, with + the generators above, one can determine V(n+1) given knowledge of + V(n). In fact, it has been shown that with these techniques, even if + only one bit of the pseudo-random values is released, the seed can be + determined from short sequences. + + Not only have linear congruent generators been broken, but techniques + are now known for breaking all polynomial congruent generators + [KRAWCZYK]. + +4. Unpredictability + + Randomness in the traditional sense described in section 3 is NOT the + same as the unpredictability required for security use. + + For example, use of a widely available constant sequence, such as + that from the CRC tables, is very weak against an adversary. Once + they learn of or guess it, they can easily break all security, future + and past, based on the sequence [CRC]. Yet the statistical + properties of these tables are good. + + The following sections describe the limitations of some randomness + generation techniques and sources. + +4.1 Problems with Clocks and Serial Numbers + + Computer clocks, or similar operating system or hardware values, + provide significantly fewer real bits of unpredictability than might + appear from their specifications. + + Tests have been done on clocks on numerous systems and it was found + that their behavior can vary widely and in unexpected ways. One + version of an operating system running on one set of hardware may + actually provide, say, microsecond resolution in a clock while a + different configuration of the "same" system may always provide the + same lower bits and only count in the upper bits at much lower + resolution. This means that successive reads on the clock may + produce identical values even if enough time has passed that the + value "should" change based on the nominal clock resolution. There + are also cases where frequently reading a clock can produce + artificial sequential values because of extra code that checks for + + + +Eastlake, Crocker & Schiller [Page 7] + +RFC 1750 Randomness Recommendations for Security December 1994 + + + the clock being unchanged between two reads and increases it by one! + Designing portable application code to generate unpredictable numbers + based on such system clocks is particularly challenging because the + system designer does not always know the properties of the system + clocks that the code will execute on. + + Use of a hardware serial number such as an Ethernet address may also + provide fewer bits of uniqueness than one would guess. Such + quantities are usually heavily structured and subfields may have only + a limited range of possible values or values easily guessable based + on approximate date of manufacture or other data. For example, it is + likely that most of the Ethernet cards installed on Digital Equipment + Corporation (DEC) hardware within DEC were manufactured by DEC + itself, which significantly limits the range of built in addresses. + + Problems such as those described above related to clocks and serial + numbers make code to produce unpredictable quantities difficult if + the code is to be ported across a variety of computer platforms and + systems. + +4.2 Timing and Content of External Events + + It is possible to measure the timing and content of mouse movement, + key strokes, and similar user events. This is a reasonable source of + unguessable data with some qualifications. On some machines, inputs + such as key strokes are buffered. Even though the user's inter- + keystroke timing may have sufficient variation and unpredictability, + there might not be an easy way to access that variation. Another + problem is that no standard method exists to sample timing details. + This makes it hard to build standard software intended for + distribution to a large range of machines based on this technique. + + The amount of mouse movement or the keys actually hit are usually + easier to access than timings but may yield less unpredictability as + the user may provide highly repetitive input. + + Other external events, such as network packet arrival times, can also + be used with care. In particular, the possibility of manipulation of + such times by an adversary must be considered. + +4.3 The Fallacy of Complex Manipulation + + One strategy which may give a misleading appearance of + unpredictability is to take a very complex algorithm (or an excellent + traditional pseudo-random number generator with good statistical + properties) and calculate a cryptographic key by starting with the + current value of a computer system clock as the seed. An adversary + who knew roughly when the generator was started would have a + + + +Eastlake, Crocker & Schiller [Page 8] + +RFC 1750 Randomness Recommendations for Security December 1994 + + + relatively small number of seed values to test as they would know + likely values of the system clock. Large numbers of pseudo-random + bits could be generated but the search space an adversary would need + to check could be quite small. + + Thus very strong and/or complex manipulation of data will not help if + the adversary can learn what the manipulation is and there is not + enough unpredictability in the starting seed value. Even if they can + not learn what the manipulation is, they may be able to use the + limited number of results stemming from a limited number of seed + values to defeat security. + + Another serious strategy error is to assume that a very complex + pseudo-random number generation algorithm will produce strong random + numbers when there has been no theory behind or analysis of the + algorithm. There is a excellent example of this fallacy right near + the beginning of chapter 3 in [KNUTH] where the author describes a + complex algorithm. It was intended that the machine language program + corresponding to the algorithm would be so complicated that a person + trying to read the code without comments wouldn't know what the + program was doing. Unfortunately, actual use of this algorithm + showed that it almost immediately converged to a single repeated + value in one case and a small cycle of values in another case. + + Not only does complex manipulation not help you if you have a limited + range of seeds but blindly chosen complex manipulation can destroy + the randomness in a good seed! + +4.4 The Fallacy of Selection from a Large Database + + Another strategy that can give a misleading appearance of + unpredictability is selection of a quantity randomly from a database + and assume that its strength is related to the total number of bits + in the database. For example, typical USENET servers as of this date + process over 35 megabytes of information per day. Assume a random + quantity was selected by fetching 32 bytes of data from a random + starting point in this data. This does not yield 32*8 = 256 bits + worth of unguessability. Even after allowing that much of the data + is human language and probably has more like 2 or 3 bits of + information per byte, it doesn't yield 32*2.5 = 80 bits of + unguessability. For an adversary with access to the same 35 + megabytes the unguessability rests only on the starting point of the + selection. That is, at best, about 25 bits of unguessability in this + case. + + The same argument applies to selecting sequences from the data on a + CD ROM or Audio CD recording or any other large public database. If + the adversary has access to the same database, this "selection from a + + + +Eastlake, Crocker & Schiller [Page 9] + +RFC 1750 Randomness Recommendations for Security December 1994 + + + large volume of data" step buys very little. However, if a selection + can be made from data to which the adversary has no access, such as + system buffers on an active multi-user system, it may be of some + help. + +5. Hardware for Randomness + + Is there any hope for strong portable randomness in the future? + There might be. All that's needed is a physical source of + unpredictable numbers. + + A thermal noise or radioactive decay source and a fast, free-running + oscillator would do the trick directly [GIFFORD]. This is a trivial + amount of hardware, and could easily be included as a standard part + of a computer system's architecture. Furthermore, any system with a + spinning disk or the like has an adequate source of randomness + [DAVIS]. All that's needed is the common perception among computer + vendors that this small additional hardware and the software to + access it is necessary and useful. + +5.1 Volume Required + + How much unpredictability is needed? Is it possible to quantify the + requirement in, say, number of random bits per second? + + The answer is not very much is needed. For DES, the key is 56 bits + and, as we show in an example in Section 8, even the highest security + system is unlikely to require a keying material of over 200 bits. If + a series of keys are needed, it can be generated from a strong random + seed using a cryptographically strong sequence as explained in + Section 6.3. A few hundred random bits generated once a day would be + enough using such techniques. Even if the random bits are generated + as slowly as one per second and it is not possible to overlap the + generation process, it should be tolerable in high security + applications to wait 200 seconds occasionally. + + These numbers are trivial to achieve. It could be done by a person + repeatedly tossing a coin. Almost any hardware process is likely to + be much faster. + +5.2 Sensitivity to Skew + + Is there any specific requirement on the shape of the distribution of + the random numbers? The good news is the distribution need not be + uniform. All that is needed is a conservative estimate of how non- + uniform it is to bound performance. Two simple techniques to de-skew + the bit stream are given below and stronger techniques are mentioned + in Section 6.1.2 below. + + + +Eastlake, Crocker & Schiller [Page 10] + +RFC 1750 Randomness Recommendations for Security December 1994 + + +5.2.1 Using Stream Parity to De-Skew + + Consider taking a sufficiently long string of bits and map the string + to "zero" or "one". The mapping will not yield a perfectly uniform + distribution, but it can be as close as desired. One mapping that + serves the purpose is to take the parity of the string. This has the + advantages that it is robust across all degrees of skew up to the + estimated maximum skew and is absolutely trivial to implement in + hardware. + + The following analysis gives the number of bits that must be sampled: + + Suppose the ratio of ones to zeros is 0.5 + e : 0.5 - e, where e is + between 0 and 0.5 and is a measure of the "eccentricity" of the + distribution. Consider the distribution of the parity function of N + bit samples. The probabilities that the parity will be one or zero + will be the sum of the odd or even terms in the binomial expansion of + (p + q)^N, where p = 0.5 + e, the probability of a one, and q = 0.5 - + e, the probability of a zero. + + These sums can be computed easily as + + N N + 1/2 * ( ( p + q ) + ( p - q ) ) + and + N N + 1/2 * ( ( p + q ) - ( p - q ) ). + + (Which one corresponds to the probability the parity will be 1 + depends on whether N is odd or even.) + + Since p + q = 1 and p - q = 2e, these expressions reduce to + + N + 1/2 * [1 + (2e) ] + and + N + 1/2 * [1 - (2e) ]. + + Neither of these will ever be exactly 0.5 unless e is zero, but we + can bring them arbitrarily close to 0.5. If we want the + probabilities to be within some delta d of 0.5, i.e. then + + N + ( 0.5 + ( 0.5 * (2e) ) ) < 0.5 + d. + + + + + + +Eastlake, Crocker & Schiller [Page 11] + +RFC 1750 Randomness Recommendations for Security December 1994 + + + Solving for N yields N > log(2d)/log(2e). (Note that 2e is less than + 1, so its log is negative. Division by a negative number reverses + the sense of an inequality.) + + The following table gives the length of the string which must be + sampled for various degrees of skew in order to come within 0.001 of + a 50/50 distribution. + + +---------+--------+-------+ + | Prob(1) | e | N | + +---------+--------+-------+ + | 0.5 | 0.00 | 1 | + | 0.6 | 0.10 | 4 | + | 0.7 | 0.20 | 7 | + | 0.8 | 0.30 | 13 | + | 0.9 | 0.40 | 28 | + | 0.95 | 0.45 | 59 | + | 0.99 | 0.49 | 308 | + +---------+--------+-------+ + + The last entry shows that even if the distribution is skewed 99% in + favor of ones, the parity of a string of 308 samples will be within + 0.001 of a 50/50 distribution. + +5.2.2 Using Transition Mappings to De-Skew + + Another technique, originally due to von Neumann [VON NEUMANN], is to + examine a bit stream as a sequence of non-overlapping pairs. You + could then discard any 00 or 11 pairs found, interpret 01 as a 0 and + 10 as a 1. Assume the probability of a 1 is 0.5+e and the + probability of a 0 is 0.5-e where e is the eccentricity of the source + and described in the previous section. Then the probability of each + pair is as follows: + + +------+-----------------------------------------+ + | pair | probability | + +------+-----------------------------------------+ + | 00 | (0.5 - e)^2 = 0.25 - e + e^2 | + | 01 | (0.5 - e)*(0.5 + e) = 0.25 - e^2 | + | 10 | (0.5 + e)*(0.5 - e) = 0.25 - e^2 | + | 11 | (0.5 + e)^2 = 0.25 + e + e^2 | + +------+-----------------------------------------+ + + This technique will completely eliminate any bias but at the expense + of taking an indeterminate number of input bits for any particular + desired number of output bits. The probability of any particular + pair being discarded is 0.5 + 2e^2 so the expected number of input + bits to produce X output bits is X/(0.25 - e^2). + + + +Eastlake, Crocker & Schiller [Page 12] + +RFC 1750 Randomness Recommendations for Security December 1994 + + + This technique assumes that the bits are from a stream where each bit + has the same probability of being a 0 or 1 as any other bit in the + stream and that bits are not correlated, i.e., that the bits are + identical independent distributions. If alternate bits were from two + correlated sources, for example, the above analysis breaks down. + + The above technique also provides another illustration of how a + simple statistical analysis can mislead if one is not always on the + lookout for patterns that could be exploited by an adversary. If the + algorithm were mis-read slightly so that overlapping successive bits + pairs were used instead of non-overlapping pairs, the statistical + analysis given is the same; however, instead of provided an unbiased + uncorrelated series of random 1's and 0's, it instead produces a + totally predictable sequence of exactly alternating 1's and 0's. + +5.2.3 Using FFT to De-Skew + + When real world data consists of strongly biased or correlated bits, + it may still contain useful amounts of randomness. This randomness + can be extracted through use of the discrete Fourier transform or its + optimized variant, the FFT. + + Using the Fourier transform of the data, strong correlations can be + discarded. If adequate data is processed and remaining correlations + decay, spectral lines approaching statistical independence and + normally distributed randomness can be produced [BRILLINGER]. + +5.2.4 Using Compression to De-Skew + + Reversible compression techniques also provide a crude method of de- + skewing a skewed bit stream. This follows directly from the + definition of reversible compression and the formula in Section 2 + above for the amount of information in a sequence. Since the + compression is reversible, the same amount of information must be + present in the shorter output than was present in the longer input. + By the Shannon information equation, this is only possible if, on + average, the probabilities of the different shorter sequences are + more uniformly distributed than were the probabilities of the longer + sequences. Thus the shorter sequences are de-skewed relative to the + input. + + However, many compression techniques add a somewhat predicatable + preface to their output stream and may insert such a sequence again + periodically in their output or otherwise introduce subtle patterns + of their own. They should be considered only a rough technique + compared with those described above or in Section 6.1.2. At a + minimum, the beginning of the compressed sequence should be skipped + and only later bits used for applications requiring random bits. + + + +Eastlake, Crocker & Schiller [Page 13] + +RFC 1750 Randomness Recommendations for Security December 1994 + + +5.3 Existing Hardware Can Be Used For Randomness + + As described below, many computers come with hardware that can, with + care, be used to generate truly random quantities. + +5.3.1 Using Existing Sound/Video Input + + Increasingly computers are being built with inputs that digitize some + real world analog source, such as sound from a microphone or video + input from a camera. Under appropriate circumstances, such input can + provide reasonably high quality random bits. The "input" from a + sound digitizer with no source plugged in or a camera with the lens + cap on, if the system has enough gain to detect anything, is + essentially thermal noise. + + For example, on a SPARCstation, one can read from the /dev/audio + device with nothing plugged into the microphone jack. Such data is + essentially random noise although it should not be trusted without + some checking in case of hardware failure. It will, in any case, + need to be de-skewed as described elsewhere. + + Combining this with compression to de-skew one can, in UNIXese, + generate a huge amount of medium quality random data by doing + + cat /dev/audio | compress - >random-bits-file + +5.3.2 Using Existing Disk Drives + + Disk drives have small random fluctuations in their rotational speed + due to chaotic air turbulence [DAVIS]. By adding low level disk seek + time instrumentation to a system, a series of measurements can be + obtained that include this randomness. Such data is usually highly + correlated so that significant processing is needed, including FFT + (see section 5.2.3). Nevertheless experimentation has shown that, + with such processing, disk drives easily produce 100 bits a minute or + more of excellent random data. + + Partly offsetting this need for processing is the fact that disk + drive failure will normally be rapidly noticed. Thus, problems with + this method of random number generation due to hardware failure are + very unlikely. + +6. Recommended Non-Hardware Strategy + + What is the best overall strategy for meeting the requirement for + unguessable random numbers in the absence of a reliable hardware + source? It is to obtain random input from a large number of + uncorrelated sources and to mix them with a strong mixing function. + + + +Eastlake, Crocker & Schiller [Page 14] + +RFC 1750 Randomness Recommendations for Security December 1994 + + + Such a function will preserve the randomness present in any of the + sources even if other quantities being combined are fixed or easily + guessable. This may be advisable even with a good hardware source as + hardware can also fail, though this should be weighed against any + increase in the chance of overall failure due to added software + complexity. + +6.1 Mixing Functions + + A strong mixing function is one which combines two or more inputs and + produces an output where each output bit is a different complex non- + linear function of all the input bits. On average, changing any + input bit will change about half the output bits. But because the + relationship is complex and non-linear, no particular output bit is + guaranteed to change when any particular input bit is changed. + + Consider the problem of converting a stream of bits that is skewed + towards 0 or 1 to a shorter stream which is more random, as discussed + in Section 5.2 above. This is simply another case where a strong + mixing function is desired, mixing the input bits to produce a + smaller number of output bits. The technique given in Section 5.2.1 + of using the parity of a number of bits is simply the result of + successively Exclusive Or'ing them which is examined as a trivial + mixing function immediately below. Use of stronger mixing functions + to extract more of the randomness in a stream of skewed bits is + examined in Section 6.1.2. + +6.1.1 A Trivial Mixing Function + + A trivial example for single bit inputs is the Exclusive Or function, + which is equivalent to addition without carry, as show in the table + below. This is a degenerate case in which the one output bit always + changes for a change in either input bit. But, despite its + simplicity, it will still provide a useful illustration. + + +-----------+-----------+----------+ + | input 1 | input 2 | output | + +-----------+-----------+----------+ + | 0 | 0 | 0 | + | 0 | 1 | 1 | + | 1 | 0 | 1 | + | 1 | 1 | 0 | + +-----------+-----------+----------+ + + If inputs 1 and 2 are uncorrelated and combined in this fashion then + the output will be an even better (less skewed) random bit than the + inputs. If we assume an "eccentricity" e as defined in Section 5.2 + above, then the output eccentricity relates to the input eccentricity + + + +Eastlake, Crocker & Schiller [Page 15] + +RFC 1750 Randomness Recommendations for Security December 1994 + + + as follows: + + e = 2 * e * e + output input 1 input 2 + + Since e is never greater than 1/2, the eccentricity is always + improved except in the case where at least one input is a totally + skewed constant. This is illustrated in the following table where + the top and left side values are the two input eccentricities and the + entries are the output eccentricity: + + +--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+ + | e | 0.00 | 0.10 | 0.20 | 0.30 | 0.40 | 0.50 | + +--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+ + | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | + | 0.10 | 0.00 | 0.02 | 0.04 | 0.06 | 0.08 | 0.10 | + | 0.20 | 0.00 | 0.04 | 0.08 | 0.12 | 0.16 | 0.20 | + | 0.30 | 0.00 | 0.06 | 0.12 | 0.18 | 0.24 | 0.30 | + | 0.40 | 0.00 | 0.08 | 0.16 | 0.24 | 0.32 | 0.40 | + | 0.50 | 0.00 | 0.10 | 0.20 | 0.30 | 0.40 | 0.50 | + +--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+ + + However, keep in mind that the above calculations assume that the + inputs are not correlated. If the inputs were, say, the parity of + the number of minutes from midnight on two clocks accurate to a few + seconds, then each might appear random if sampled at random intervals + much longer than a minute. Yet if they were both sampled and + combined with xor, the result would be zero most of the time. + +6.1.2 Stronger Mixing Functions + + The US Government Data Encryption Standard [DES] is an example of a + strong mixing function for multiple bit quantities. It takes up to + 120 bits of input (64 bits of "data" and 56 bits of "key") and + produces 64 bits of output each of which is dependent on a complex + non-linear function of all input bits. Other strong encryption + functions with this characteristic can also be used by considering + them to mix all of their key and data input bits. + + Another good family of mixing functions are the "message digest" or + hashing functions such as The US Government Secure Hash Standard + [SHS] and the MD2, MD4, MD5 [MD2, MD4, MD5] series. These functions + all take an arbitrary amount of input and produce an output mixing + all the input bits. The MD* series produce 128 bits of output and SHS + produces 160 bits. + + + + + + +Eastlake, Crocker & Schiller [Page 16] + +RFC 1750 Randomness Recommendations for Security December 1994 + + + Although the message digest functions are designed for variable + amounts of input, DES and other encryption functions can also be used + to combine any number of inputs. If 64 bits of output is adequate, + the inputs can be packed into a 64 bit data quantity and successive + 56 bit keys, padding with zeros if needed, which are then used to + successively encrypt using DES in Electronic Codebook Mode [DES + MODES]. If more than 64 bits of output are needed, use more complex + mixing. For example, if inputs are packed into three quantities, A, + B, and C, use DES to encrypt A with B as a key and then with C as a + key to produce the 1st part of the output, then encrypt B with C and + then A for more output and, if necessary, encrypt C with A and then B + for yet more output. Still more output can be produced by reversing + the order of the keys given above to stretch things. The same can be + done with the hash functions by hashing various subsets of the input + data to produce multiple outputs. But keep in mind that it is + impossible to get more bits of "randomness" out than are put in. + + An example of using a strong mixing function would be to reconsider + the case of a string of 308 bits each of which is biased 99% towards + zero. The parity technique given in Section 5.2.1 above reduced this + to one bit with only a 1/1000 deviance from being equally likely a + zero or one. But, applying the equation for information given in + Section 2, this 308 bit sequence has 5 bits of information in it. + Thus hashing it with SHS or MD5 and taking the bottom 5 bits of the + result would yield 5 unbiased random bits as opposed to the single + bit given by calculating the parity of the string. + +6.1.3 Diffie-Hellman as a Mixing Function + + Diffie-Hellman exponential key exchange is a technique that yields a + shared secret between two parties that can be made computationally + infeasible for a third party to determine even if they can observe + all the messages between the two communicating parties. This shared + secret is a mixture of initial quantities generated by each of them + [D-H]. If these initial quantities are random, then the shared + secret contains the combined randomness of them both, assuming they + are uncorrelated. + +6.1.4 Using a Mixing Function to Stretch Random Bits + + While it is not necessary for a mixing function to produce the same + or fewer bits than its inputs, mixing bits cannot "stretch" the + amount of random unpredictability present in the inputs. Thus four + inputs of 32 bits each where there is 12 bits worth of + unpredicatability (such as 4,096 equally probable values) in each + input cannot produce more than 48 bits worth of unpredictable output. + The output can be expanded to hundreds or thousands of bits by, for + example, mixing with successive integers, but the clever adversary's + + + +Eastlake, Crocker & Schiller [Page 17] + +RFC 1750 Randomness Recommendations for Security December 1994 + + + search space is still 2^48 possibilities. Furthermore, mixing to + fewer bits than are input will tend to strengthen the randomness of + the output the way using Exclusive Or to produce one bit from two did + above. + + The last table in Section 6.1.1 shows that mixing a random bit with a + constant bit with Exclusive Or will produce a random bit. While this + is true, it does not provide a way to "stretch" one random bit into + more than one. If, for example, a random bit is mixed with a 0 and + then with a 1, this produces a two bit sequence but it will always be + either 01 or 10. Since there are only two possible values, there is + still only the one bit of original randomness. + +6.1.5 Other Factors in Choosing a Mixing Function + + For local use, DES has the advantages that it has been widely tested + for flaws, is widely documented, and is widely implemented with + hardware and software implementations available all over the world + including source code available by anonymous FTP. The SHS and MD* + family are younger algorithms which have been less tested but there + is no particular reason to believe they are flawed. Both MD5 and SHS + were derived from the earlier MD4 algorithm. They all have source + code available by anonymous FTP [SHS, MD2, MD4, MD5]. + + DES and SHS have been vouched for the the US National Security Agency + (NSA) on the basis of criteria that primarily remain secret. While + this is the cause of much speculation and doubt, investigation of DES + over the years has indicated that NSA involvement in modifications to + its design, which originated with IBM, was primarily to strengthen + it. No concealed or special weakness has been found in DES. It is + almost certain that the NSA modification to MD4 to produce the SHS + similarly strengthened the algorithm, possibly against threats not + yet known in the public cryptographic community. + + DES, SHS, MD4, and MD5 are royalty free for all purposes. MD2 has + been freely licensed only for non-profit use in connection with + Privacy Enhanced Mail [PEM]. Between the MD* algorithms, some people + believe that, as with "Goldilocks and the Three Bears", MD2 is strong + but too slow, MD4 is fast but too weak, and MD5 is just right. + + Another advantage of the MD* or similar hashing algorithms over + encryption algorithms is that they are not subject to the same + regulations imposed by the US Government prohibiting the unlicensed + export or import of encryption/decryption software and hardware. The + same should be true of DES rigged to produce an irreversible hash + code but most DES packages are oriented to reversible encryption. + + + + + +Eastlake, Crocker & Schiller [Page 18] + +RFC 1750 Randomness Recommendations for Security December 1994 + + +6.2 Non-Hardware Sources of Randomness + + The best source of input for mixing would be a hardware randomness + such as disk drive timing affected by air turbulence, audio input + with thermal noise, or radioactive decay. However, if that is not + available there are other possibilities. These include system + clocks, system or input/output buffers, user/system/hardware/network + serial numbers and/or addresses and timing, and user input. + Unfortunately, any of these sources can produce limited or + predicatable values under some circumstances. + + Some of the sources listed above would be quite strong on multi-user + systems where, in essence, each user of the system is a source of + randomness. However, on a small single user system, such as a + typical IBM PC or Apple Macintosh, it might be possible for an + adversary to assemble a similar configuration. This could give the + adversary inputs to the mixing process that were sufficiently + correlated to those used originally as to make exhaustive search + practical. + + The use of multiple random inputs with a strong mixing function is + recommended and can overcome weakness in any particular input. For + example, the timing and content of requested "random" user keystrokes + can yield hundreds of random bits but conservative assumptions need + to be made. For example, assuming a few bits of randomness if the + inter-keystroke interval is unique in the sequence up to that point + and a similar assumption if the key hit is unique but assuming that + no bits of randomness are present in the initial key value or if the + timing or key value duplicate previous values. The results of mixing + these timings and characters typed could be further combined with + clock values and other inputs. + + This strategy may make practical portable code to produce good random + numbers for security even if some of the inputs are very weak on some + of the target systems. However, it may still fail against a high + grade attack on small single user systems, especially if the + adversary has ever been able to observe the generation process in the + past. A hardware based random source is still preferable. + +6.3 Cryptographically Strong Sequences + + In cases where a series of random quantities must be generated, an + adversary may learn some values in the sequence. In general, they + should not be able to predict other values from the ones that they + know. + + + + + + +Eastlake, Crocker & Schiller [Page 19] + +RFC 1750 Randomness Recommendations for Security December 1994 + + + The correct technique is to start with a strong random seed, take + cryptographically strong steps from that seed [CRYPTO2, CRYPTO3], and + do not reveal the complete state of the generator in the sequence + elements. If each value in the sequence can be calculated in a fixed + way from the previous value, then when any value is compromised, all + future values can be determined. This would be the case, for + example, if each value were a constant function of the previously + used values, even if the function were a very strong, non-invertible + message digest function. + + It should be noted that if your technique for generating a sequence + of key values is fast enough, it can trivially be used as the basis + for a confidentiality system. If two parties use the same sequence + generating technique and start with the same seed material, they will + generate identical sequences. These could, for example, be xor'ed at + one end with data being send, encrypting it, and xor'ed with this + data as received, decrypting it due to the reversible properties of + the xor operation. + +6.3.1 Traditional Strong Sequences + + A traditional way to achieve a strong sequence has been to have the + values be produced by hashing the quantities produced by + concatenating the seed with successive integers or the like and then + mask the values obtained so as to limit the amount of generator state + available to the adversary. + + It may also be possible to use an "encryption" algorithm with a + random key and seed value to encrypt and feedback some or all of the + output encrypted value into the value to be encrypted for the next + iteration. Appropriate feedback techniques will usually be + recommended with the encryption algorithm. An example is shown below + where shifting and masking are used to combine the cypher output + feedback. This type of feedback is recommended by the US Government + in connection with DES [DES MODES]. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Eastlake, Crocker & Schiller [Page 20] + +RFC 1750 Randomness Recommendations for Security December 1994 + + + +---------------+ + | V | + | | n | + +--+------------+ + | | +---------+ + | +---------> | | +-----+ + +--+ | Encrypt | <--- | Key | + | +-------- | | +-----+ + | | +---------+ + V V + +------------+--+ + | V | | + | n+1 | + +---------------+ + + Note that if a shift of one is used, this is the same as the shift + register technique described in Section 3 above but with the all + important difference that the feedback is determined by a complex + non-linear function of all bits rather than a simple linear or + polynomial combination of output from a few bit position taps. + + It has been shown by Donald W. Davies that this sort of shifted + partial output feedback significantly weakens an algorithm compared + will feeding all of the output bits back as input. In particular, + for DES, repeated encrypting a full 64 bit quantity will give an + expected repeat in about 2^63 iterations. Feeding back anything less + than 64 (and more than 0) bits will give an expected repeat in + between 2**31 and 2**32 iterations! + + To predict values of a sequence from others when the sequence was + generated by these techniques is equivalent to breaking the + cryptosystem or inverting the "non-invertible" hashing involved with + only partial information available. The less information revealed + each iteration, the harder it will be for an adversary to predict the + sequence. Thus it is best to use only one bit from each value. It + has been shown that in some cases this makes it impossible to break a + system even when the cryptographic system is invertible and can be + broken if all of each generated value was revealed. + +6.3.2 The Blum Blum Shub Sequence Generator + + Currently the generator which has the strongest public proof of + strength is called the Blum Blum Shub generator after its inventors + [BBS]. It is also very simple and is based on quadratic residues. + It's only disadvantage is that is is computationally intensive + compared with the traditional techniques give in 6.3.1 above. This + is not a serious draw back if it is used for moderately infrequent + purposes, such as generating session keys. + + + +Eastlake, Crocker & Schiller [Page 21] + +RFC 1750 Randomness Recommendations for Security December 1994 + + + Simply choose two large prime numbers, say p and q, which both have + the property that you get a remainder of 3 if you divide them by 4. + Let n = p * q. Then you choose a random number x relatively prime to + n. The initial seed for the generator and the method for calculating + subsequent values are then + + 2 + s = ( x )(Mod n) + 0 + + 2 + s = ( s )(Mod n) + i+1 i + + You must be careful to use only a few bits from the bottom of each s. + It is always safe to use only the lowest order bit. If you use no + more than the + + log ( log ( s ) ) + 2 2 i + + low order bits, then predicting any additional bits from a sequence + generated in this manner is provable as hard as factoring n. As long + as the initial x is secret, you can even make n public if you want. + + An intersting characteristic of this generator is that you can + directly calculate any of the s values. In particular + + i + ( ( 2 )(Mod (( p - 1 ) * ( q - 1 )) ) ) + s = ( s )(Mod n) + i 0 + + This means that in applications where many keys are generated in this + fashion, it is not necessary to save them all. Each key can be + effectively indexed and recovered from that small index and the + initial s and n. + +7. Key Generation Standards + + Several public standards are now in place for the generation of keys. + Two of these are described below. Both use DES but any equally + strong or stronger mixing function could be substituted. + + + + + + + + +Eastlake, Crocker & Schiller [Page 22] + +RFC 1750 Randomness Recommendations for Security December 1994 + + +7.1 US DoD Recommendations for Password Generation + + The United States Department of Defense has specific recommendations + for password generation [DoD]. They suggest using the US Data + Encryption Standard [DES] in Output Feedback Mode [DES MODES] as + follows: + + use an initialization vector determined from + the system clock, + system ID, + user ID, and + date and time; + use a key determined from + system interrupt registers, + system status registers, and + system counters; and, + as plain text, use an external randomly generated 64 bit + quantity such as 8 characters typed in by a system + administrator. + + The password can then be calculated from the 64 bit "cipher text" + generated in 64-bit Output Feedback Mode. As many bits as are needed + can be taken from these 64 bits and expanded into a pronounceable + word, phrase, or other format if a human being needs to remember the + password. + +7.2 X9.17 Key Generation + + The American National Standards Institute has specified a method for + generating a sequence of keys as follows: + + s is the initial 64 bit seed + 0 + + g is the sequence of generated 64 bit key quantities + n + + k is a random key reserved for generating this key sequence + + t is the time at which a key is generated to as fine a resolution + as is available (up to 64 bits). + + DES ( K, Q ) is the DES encryption of quantity Q with key K + + + + + + + + +Eastlake, Crocker & Schiller [Page 23] + +RFC 1750 Randomness Recommendations for Security December 1994 + + + g = DES ( k, DES ( k, t ) .xor. s ) + n n + + s = DES ( k, DES ( k, t ) .xor. g ) + n+1 n + + If g sub n is to be used as a DES key, then every eighth bit should + be adjusted for parity for that use but the entire 64 bit unmodified + g should be used in calculating the next s. + +8. Examples of Randomness Required + + Below are two examples showing rough calculations of needed + randomness for security. The first is for moderate security + passwords while the second assumes a need for a very high security + cryptographic key. + +8.1 Password Generation + + Assume that user passwords change once a year and it is desired that + the probability that an adversary could guess the password for a + particular account be less than one in a thousand. Further assume + that sending a password to the system is the only way to try a + password. Then the crucial question is how often an adversary can + try possibilities. Assume that delays have been introduced into a + system so that, at most, an adversary can make one password try every + six seconds. That's 600 per hour or about 15,000 per day or about + 5,000,000 tries in a year. Assuming any sort of monitoring, it is + unlikely someone could actually try continuously for a year. In + fact, even if log files are only checked monthly, 500,000 tries is + more plausible before the attack is noticed and steps taken to change + passwords and make it harder to try more passwords. + + To have a one in a thousand chance of guessing the password in + 500,000 tries implies a universe of at least 500,000,000 passwords or + about 2^29. Thus 29 bits of randomness are needed. This can probably + be achieved using the US DoD recommended inputs for password + generation as it has 8 inputs which probably average over 5 bits of + randomness each (see section 7.1). Using a list of 1000 words, the + password could be expressed as a three word phrase (1,000,000,000 + possibilities) or, using case insensitive letters and digits, six + would suffice ((26+10)^6 = 2,176,782,336 possibilities). + + For a higher security password, the number of bits required goes up. + To decrease the probability by 1,000 requires increasing the universe + of passwords by the same factor which adds about 10 bits. Thus to + have only a one in a million chance of a password being guessed under + the above scenario would require 39 bits of randomness and a password + + + +Eastlake, Crocker & Schiller [Page 24] + +RFC 1750 Randomness Recommendations for Security December 1994 + + + that was a four word phrase from a 1000 word list or eight + letters/digits. To go to a one in 10^9 chance, 49 bits of randomness + are needed implying a five word phrase or ten letter/digit password. + + In a real system, of course, there are also other factors. For + example, the larger and harder to remember passwords are, the more + likely users are to write them down resulting in an additional risk + of compromise. + +8.2 A Very High Security Cryptographic Key + + Assume that a very high security key is needed for symmetric + encryption / decryption between two parties. Assume an adversary can + observe communications and knows the algorithm being used. Within + the field of random possibilities, the adversary can try key values + in hopes of finding the one in use. Assume further that brute force + trial of keys is the best the adversary can do. + +8.2.1 Effort per Key Trial + + How much effort will it take to try each key? For very high security + applications it is best to assume a low value of effort. Even if it + would clearly take tens of thousands of computer cycles or more to + try a single key, there may be some pattern that enables huge blocks + of key values to be tested with much less effort per key. Thus it is + probably best to assume no more than a couple hundred cycles per key. + (There is no clear lower bound on this as computers operate in + parallel on a number of bits and a poor encryption algorithm could + allow many keys or even groups of keys to be tested in parallel. + However, we need to assume some value and can hope that a reasonably + strong algorithm has been chosen for our hypothetical high security + task.) + + If the adversary can command a highly parallel processor or a large + network of work stations, 2*10^10 cycles per second is probably a + minimum assumption for availability today. Looking forward just a + couple years, there should be at least an order of magnitude + improvement. Thus assuming 10^9 keys could be checked per second or + 3.6*10^11 per hour or 6*10^13 per week or 2.4*10^14 per month is + reasonable. This implies a need for a minimum of 51 bits of + randomness in keys to be sure they cannot be found in a month. Even + then it is possible that, a few years from now, a highly determined + and resourceful adversary could break the key in 2 weeks (on average + they need try only half the keys). + + + + + + + +Eastlake, Crocker & Schiller [Page 25] + +RFC 1750 Randomness Recommendations for Security December 1994 + + +8.2.2 Meet in the Middle Attacks + + If chosen or known plain text and the resulting encrypted text are + available, a "meet in the middle" attack is possible if the structure + of the encryption algorithm allows it. (In a known plain text + attack, the adversary knows all or part of the messages being + encrypted, possibly some standard header or trailer fields. In a + chosen plain text attack, the adversary can force some chosen plain + text to be encrypted, possibly by "leaking" an exciting text that + would then be sent by the adversary over an encrypted channel.) + + An oversimplified explanation of the meet in the middle attack is as + follows: the adversary can half-encrypt the known or chosen plain + text with all possible first half-keys, sort the output, then half- + decrypt the encoded text with all the second half-keys. If a match + is found, the full key can be assembled from the halves and used to + decrypt other parts of the message or other messages. At its best, + this type of attack can halve the exponent of the work required by + the adversary while adding a large but roughly constant factor of + effort. To be assured of safety against this, a doubling of the + amount of randomness in the key to a minimum of 102 bits is required. + + The meet in the middle attack assumes that the cryptographic + algorithm can be decomposed in this way but we can not rule that out + without a deep knowledge of the algorithm. Even if a basic algorithm + is not subject to a meet in the middle attack, an attempt to produce + a stronger algorithm by applying the basic algorithm twice (or two + different algorithms sequentially) with different keys may gain less + added security than would be expected. Such a composite algorithm + would be subject to a meet in the middle attack. + + Enormous resources may be required to mount a meet in the middle + attack but they are probably within the range of the national + security services of a major nation. Essentially all nations spy on + other nations government traffic and several nations are believed to + spy on commercial traffic for economic advantage. + +8.2.3 Other Considerations + + Since we have not even considered the possibilities of special + purpose code breaking hardware or just how much of a safety margin we + want beyond our assumptions above, probably a good minimum for a very + high security cryptographic key is 128 bits of randomness which + implies a minimum key length of 128 bits. If the two parties agree + on a key by Diffie-Hellman exchange [D-H], then in principle only + half of this randomness would have to be supplied by each party. + However, there is probably some correlation between their random + inputs so it is probably best to assume that each party needs to + + + +Eastlake, Crocker & Schiller [Page 26] + +RFC 1750 Randomness Recommendations for Security December 1994 + + + provide at least 96 bits worth of randomness for very high security + if Diffie-Hellman is used. + + This amount of randomness is beyond the limit of that in the inputs + recommended by the US DoD for password generation and could require + user typing timing, hardware random number generation, or other + sources. + + It should be noted that key length calculations such at those above + are controversial and depend on various assumptions about the + cryptographic algorithms in use. In some cases, a professional with + a deep knowledge of code breaking techniques and of the strength of + the algorithm in use could be satisfied with less than half of the + key size derived above. + +9. Conclusion + + Generation of unguessable "random" secret quantities for security use + is an essential but difficult task. + + We have shown that hardware techniques to produce such randomness + would be relatively simple. In particular, the volume and quality + would not need to be high and existing computer hardware, such as + disk drives, can be used. Computational techniques are available to + process low quality random quantities from multiple sources or a + larger quantity of such low quality input from one source and produce + a smaller quantity of higher quality, less predictable key material. + In the absence of hardware sources of randomness, a variety of user + and software sources can frequently be used instead with care; + however, most modern systems already have hardware, such as disk + drives or audio input, that could be used to produce high quality + randomness. + + Once a sufficient quantity of high quality seed key material (a few + hundred bits) is available, strong computational techniques are + available to produce cryptographically strong sequences of + unpredicatable quantities from this seed material. + +10. Security Considerations + + The entirety of this document concerns techniques and recommendations + for generating unguessable "random" quantities for use as passwords, + cryptographic keys, and similar security uses. + + + + + + + + +Eastlake, Crocker & Schiller [Page 27] + +RFC 1750 Randomness Recommendations for Security December 1994 + + +References + + [ASYMMETRIC] - Secure Communications and Asymmetric Cryptosystems, + edited by Gustavus J. Simmons, AAAS Selected Symposium 69, Westview + Press, Inc. + + [BBS] - A Simple Unpredictable Pseudo-Random Number Generator, SIAM + Journal on Computing, v. 15, n. 2, 1986, L. Blum, M. Blum, & M. Shub. + + [BRILLINGER] - Time Series: Data Analysis and Theory, Holden-Day, + 1981, David Brillinger. + + [CRC] - C.R.C. Standard Mathematical Tables, Chemical Rubber + Publishing Company. + + [CRYPTO1] - Cryptography: A Primer, A Wiley-Interscience Publication, + John Wiley & Sons, 1981, Alan G. Konheim. + + [CRYPTO2] - Cryptography: A New Dimension in Computer Data Security, + A Wiley-Interscience Publication, John Wiley & Sons, 1982, Carl H. + Meyer & Stephen M. Matyas. + + [CRYPTO3] - Applied Cryptography: Protocols, Algorithms, and Source + Code in C, John Wiley & Sons, 1994, Bruce Schneier. + + [DAVIS] - Cryptographic Randomness from Air Turbulence in Disk + Drives, Advances in Cryptology - Crypto '94, Springer-Verlag Lecture + Notes in Computer Science #839, 1984, Don Davis, Ross Ihaka, and + Philip Fenstermacher. + + [DES] - Data Encryption Standard, United States of America, + Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and + Technology, Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 46-1. + - Data Encryption Algorithm, American National Standards Institute, + ANSI X3.92-1981. + (See also FIPS 112, Password Usage, which includes FORTRAN code for + performing DES.) + + [DES MODES] - DES Modes of Operation, United States of America, + Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and + Technology, Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 81. + - Data Encryption Algorithm - Modes of Operation, American National + Standards Institute, ANSI X3.106-1983. + + [D-H] - New Directions in Cryptography, IEEE Transactions on + Information Technology, November, 1976, Whitfield Diffie and Martin + E. Hellman. + + + + +Eastlake, Crocker & Schiller [Page 28] + +RFC 1750 Randomness Recommendations for Security December 1994 + + + [DoD] - Password Management Guideline, United States of America, + Department of Defense, Computer Security Center, CSC-STD-002-85. + (See also FIPS 112, Password Usage, which incorporates CSC-STD-002-85 + as one of its appendices.) + + [GIFFORD] - Natural Random Number, MIT/LCS/TM-371, September 1988, + David K. Gifford + + [KNUTH] - The Art of Computer Programming, Volume 2: Seminumerical + Algorithms, Chapter 3: Random Numbers. Addison Wesley Publishing + Company, Second Edition 1982, Donald E. Knuth. + + [KRAWCZYK] - How to Predict Congruential Generators, Journal of + Algorithms, V. 13, N. 4, December 1992, H. Krawczyk + + [MD2] - The MD2 Message-Digest Algorithm, RFC1319, April 1992, B. + Kaliski + [MD4] - The MD4 Message-Digest Algorithm, RFC1320, April 1992, R. + Rivest + [MD5] - The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm, RFC1321, April 1992, R. + Rivest + + [PEM] - RFCs 1421 through 1424: + - RFC 1424, Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail: Part + IV: Key Certification and Related Services, 02/10/1993, B. Kaliski + - RFC 1423, Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail: Part + III: Algorithms, Modes, and Identifiers, 02/10/1993, D. Balenson + - RFC 1422, Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail: Part + II: Certificate-Based Key Management, 02/10/1993, S. Kent + - RFC 1421, Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail: Part I: + Message Encryption and Authentication Procedures, 02/10/1993, J. Linn + + [SHANNON] - The Mathematical Theory of Communication, University of + Illinois Press, 1963, Claude E. Shannon. (originally from: Bell + System Technical Journal, July and October 1948) + + [SHIFT1] - Shift Register Sequences, Aegean Park Press, Revised + Edition 1982, Solomon W. Golomb. + + [SHIFT2] - Cryptanalysis of Shift-Register Generated Stream Cypher + Systems, Aegean Park Press, 1984, Wayne G. Barker. + + [SHS] - Secure Hash Standard, United States of American, National + Institute of Science and Technology, Federal Information Processing + Standard (FIPS) 180, April 1993. + + [STERN] - Secret Linear Congruential Generators are not + Cryptograhically Secure, Proceedings of IEEE STOC, 1987, J. Stern. + + + +Eastlake, Crocker & Schiller [Page 29] + +RFC 1750 Randomness Recommendations for Security December 1994 + + + [VON NEUMANN] - Various techniques used in connection with random + digits, von Neumann's Collected Works, Vol. 5, Pergamon Press, 1963, + J. von Neumann. + +Authors' Addresses + + Donald E. Eastlake 3rd + Digital Equipment Corporation + 550 King Street, LKG2-1/BB3 + Littleton, MA 01460 + + Phone: +1 508 486 6577(w) +1 508 287 4877(h) + EMail: dee@lkg.dec.com + + + Stephen D. Crocker + CyberCash Inc. + 2086 Hunters Crest Way + Vienna, VA 22181 + + Phone: +1 703-620-1222(w) +1 703-391-2651 (fax) + EMail: crocker@cybercash.com + + + Jeffrey I. Schiller + Massachusetts Institute of Technology + 77 Massachusetts Avenue + Cambridge, MA 02139 + + Phone: +1 617 253 0161(w) + EMail: jis@mit.edu + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Eastlake, Crocker & Schiller [Page 30] + diff --git a/errors.c b/errors.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e0e7a20 --- /dev/null +++ b/errors.c @@ -0,0 +1,102 @@ +/* +** Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001 +** Adel I. Mirzazhanov. All rights reserved +** +** Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +** modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +** are met: +** +** 1.Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, +** this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +** 2.Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +** notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +** documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +** 3.The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products +** derived from this software without specific prior written permission. +** +** THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS +** OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED +** WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE +** ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY +** DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL +** DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE +** GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS +** INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, +** WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING +** NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS +** SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. +*/ + +#include +#include +#include +#include "errs.h" + +#ifdef CLISERV +# include +#endif + +/* +** routine that handles non-fatal system errors like calloc, open, etc. +*/ +void +err_sys(const char *string) +{ + +#ifndef CLISERV + perror(string); +#else + syslog (LOG_DEBUG, "%s: %s",string, (char *)strerror(errno)); +#endif +} + +/* +** routine that handles fatal system errors like calloc, open, etc. +*/ +void +err_sys_fatal(const char *string) +{ + +#ifndef CLISERV + perror(string); +#else + syslog (LOG_DEBUG, "%s: %s", string, (char *)strerror(errno)); + closelog(); + close(0); +#endif + exit (-1); +} + +/* +** routine that handles non-fatal application errors. +*/ +void +err_app(const char *string, const char * err) +{ +#ifndef CLISERV + fprintf (stderr, "%s: ", string); + fprintf (stderr, "%s\n", err); + fflush (stderr); +#else + syslog (LOG_DEBUG, "%s: %s",string, err); +#endif +} + +/* +** routine that handles fatal application errors. +*/ +void +err_app_fatal(const char *string, const char *err) +{ + +#ifndef CLISERV + fprintf (stderr, "%s: ", string); + fprintf (stderr, "%s\n", err); + fflush (stderr); +#else + syslog (LOG_DEBUG, "%s: %s",string, err); + closelog(); + close(0); +#endif + exit (-1); +} diff --git a/errs.h b/errs.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ce857ca --- /dev/null +++ b/errs.h @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +/* +** Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001 +** Adel I. Mirzazhanov. All rights reserved +** +** Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +** modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +** are met: +** +** 1.Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, +** this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +** 2.Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +** notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +** documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +** 3.The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products +** derived from this software without specific prior written permission. +** +** THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS +** OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED +** WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE +** ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY +** DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL +** DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE +** GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS +** INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, +** WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING +** NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS +** SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. +*/ + +#ifndef ERRS_H +#define ERRS_H 1 + +#include + +extern void err_sys(const char *string); +extern void err_sys_fatal(const char *string); +extern void err_app(const char *string, const char *err); +extern void err_app_fatal(const char *string, const char *err); + +#endif /* ERRS_H */ diff --git a/install-sh b/install-sh new file mode 100755 index 0000000..e9de238 --- /dev/null +++ b/install-sh @@ -0,0 +1,251 @@ +#!/bin/sh +# +# install - install a program, script, or datafile +# This comes from X11R5 (mit/util/scripts/install.sh). +# +# Copyright 1991 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology +# +# Permission to use, copy, modify, distribute, and sell this software and its +# documentation for any purpose is hereby granted without fee, provided that +# the above copyright notice appear in all copies and that both that +# copyright notice and this permission notice appear in supporting +# documentation, and that the name of M.I.T. not be used in advertising or +# publicity pertaining to distribution of the software without specific, +# written prior permission. M.I.T. makes no representations about the +# suitability of this software for any purpose. It is provided "as is" +# without express or implied warranty. +# +# Calling this script install-sh is preferred over install.sh, to prevent +# `make' implicit rules from creating a file called install from it +# when there is no Makefile. +# +# This script is compatible with the BSD install script, but was written +# from scratch. It can only install one file at a time, a restriction +# shared with many OS's install programs. + + +# set DOITPROG to echo to test this script + +# Don't use :- since 4.3BSD and earlier shells don't like it. +doit="${DOITPROG-}" + + +# put in absolute paths if you don't have them in your path; or use env. vars. + +mvprog="${MVPROG-mv}" +cpprog="${CPPROG-cp}" +chmodprog="${CHMODPROG-chmod}" +chownprog="${CHOWNPROG-chown}" +chgrpprog="${CHGRPPROG-chgrp}" +stripprog="${STRIPPROG-strip}" +rmprog="${RMPROG-rm}" +mkdirprog="${MKDIRPROG-mkdir}" + +transformbasename="" +transform_arg="" +instcmd="$mvprog" +chmodcmd="$chmodprog 0755" +chowncmd="" +chgrpcmd="" +stripcmd="" +rmcmd="$rmprog -f" +mvcmd="$mvprog" +src="" +dst="" +dir_arg="" + +while [ x"$1" != x ]; do + case $1 in + -c) instcmd="$cpprog" + shift + continue;; + + -d) dir_arg=true + shift + continue;; + + -m) chmodcmd="$chmodprog $2" + shift + shift + continue;; + + -o) chowncmd="$chownprog $2" + shift + shift + continue;; + + -g) chgrpcmd="$chgrpprog $2" + shift + shift + continue;; + + -s) stripcmd="$stripprog" + shift + continue;; + + -t=*) transformarg=`echo $1 | sed 's/-t=//'` + shift + continue;; + + -b=*) transformbasename=`echo $1 | sed 's/-b=//'` + shift + continue;; + + *) if [ x"$src" = x ] + then + src=$1 + else + # this colon is to work around a 386BSD /bin/sh bug + : + dst=$1 + fi + shift + continue;; + esac +done + +if [ x"$src" = x ] +then + echo "install: no input file specified" + exit 1 +else + true +fi + +if [ x"$dir_arg" != x ]; then + dst=$src + src="" + + if [ -d $dst ]; then + instcmd=: + chmodcmd="" + else + instcmd=mkdir + fi +else + +# Waiting for this to be detected by the "$instcmd $src $dsttmp" command +# might cause directories to be created, which would be especially bad +# if $src (and thus $dsttmp) contains '*'. + + if [ -f $src -o -d $src ] + then + true + else + echo "install: $src does not exist" + exit 1 + fi + + if [ x"$dst" = x ] + then + echo "install: no destination specified" + exit 1 + else + true + fi + +# If destination is a directory, append the input filename; if your system +# does not like double slashes in filenames, you may need to add some logic + + if [ -d $dst ] + then + dst="$dst"/`basename $src` + else + true + fi +fi + +## this sed command emulates the dirname command +dstdir=`echo $dst | sed -e 's,[^/]*$,,;s,/$,,;s,^$,.,'` + +# Make sure that the destination directory exists. +# this part is taken from Noah Friedman's mkinstalldirs script + +# Skip lots of stat calls in the usual case. +if [ ! -d "$dstdir" ]; then +defaultIFS=' +' +IFS="${IFS-${defaultIFS}}" + +oIFS="${IFS}" +# Some sh's can't handle IFS=/ for some reason. +IFS='%' +set - `echo ${dstdir} | sed -e 's@/@%@g' -e 's@^%@/@'` +IFS="${oIFS}" + +pathcomp='' + +while [ $# -ne 0 ] ; do + pathcomp="${pathcomp}${1}" + shift + + if [ ! -d "${pathcomp}" ] ; + then + $mkdirprog "${pathcomp}" + else + true + fi + + pathcomp="${pathcomp}/" +done +fi + +if [ x"$dir_arg" != x ] +then + $doit $instcmd $dst && + + if [ x"$chowncmd" != x ]; then $doit $chowncmd $dst; else true ; fi && + if [ x"$chgrpcmd" != x ]; then $doit $chgrpcmd $dst; else true ; fi && + if [ x"$stripcmd" != x ]; then $doit $stripcmd $dst; else true ; fi && + if [ x"$chmodcmd" != x ]; then $doit $chmodcmd $dst; else true ; fi +else + +# If we're going to rename the final executable, determine the name now. + + if [ x"$transformarg" = x ] + then + dstfile=`basename $dst` + else + dstfile=`basename $dst $transformbasename | + sed $transformarg`$transformbasename + fi + +# don't allow the sed command to completely eliminate the filename + + if [ x"$dstfile" = x ] + then + dstfile=`basename $dst` + else + true + fi + +# Make a temp file name in the proper directory. + + dsttmp=$dstdir/#inst.$$# + +# Move or copy the file name to the temp name + + $doit $instcmd $src $dsttmp && + + trap "rm -f ${dsttmp}" 0 && + +# and set any options; do chmod last to preserve setuid bits + +# If any of these fail, we abort the whole thing. If we want to +# ignore errors from any of these, just make sure not to ignore +# errors from the above "$doit $instcmd $src $dsttmp" command. + + if [ x"$chowncmd" != x ]; then $doit $chowncmd $dsttmp; else true;fi && + if [ x"$chgrpcmd" != x ]; then $doit $chgrpcmd $dsttmp; else true;fi && + if [ x"$stripcmd" != x ]; then $doit $stripcmd $dsttmp; else true;fi && + if [ x"$chmodcmd" != x ]; then $doit $chmodcmd $dsttmp; else true;fi && + +# Now rename the file to the real destination. + + $doit $rmcmd -f $dstdir/$dstfile && + $doit $mvcmd $dsttmp $dstdir/$dstfile + +fi && + + +exit 0 diff --git a/mkinstalldirs b/mkinstalldirs new file mode 100755 index 0000000..4f58503 --- /dev/null +++ b/mkinstalldirs @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +#! /bin/sh +# mkinstalldirs --- make directory hierarchy +# Author: Noah Friedman +# Created: 1993-05-16 +# Public domain + +# $Id: mkinstalldirs,v 1.13 1999/01/05 03:18:55 bje Exp $ + +errstatus=0 + +for file +do + set fnord `echo ":$file" | sed -ne 's/^:\//#/;s/^://;s/\// /g;s/^#/\//;p'` + shift + + pathcomp= + for d + do + pathcomp="$pathcomp$d" + case "$pathcomp" in + -* ) pathcomp=./$pathcomp ;; + esac + + if test ! -d "$pathcomp"; then + echo "mkdir $pathcomp" + + mkdir "$pathcomp" || lasterr=$? + + if test ! -d "$pathcomp"; then + errstatus=$lasterr + fi + fi + + pathcomp="$pathcomp/" + done +done + +exit $errstatus + +# mkinstalldirs ends here diff --git a/owntypes.h b/owntypes.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ee28646 --- /dev/null +++ b/owntypes.h @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +/* +** Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001 +** Adel I. Mirzazhanov. All rights reserved +** +** Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +** modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +** are met: +** +** 1.Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, +** this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +** 2.Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +** notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +** documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +** 3.The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products +** derived from this software without specific prior written permission. +** +** THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS +** OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED +** WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE +** ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY +** DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL +** DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE +** GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS +** INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, +** WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING +** NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS +** SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. +*/ + +#ifndef OWN_TYPES_H +#define OWN_TYPES_H 1 + +typedef unsigned char BYTE; +typedef unsigned int UINT; +typedef unsigned short USHORT; +typedef short int SHORT; +typedef int boolean; +typedef unsigned long int UINT32; + +#define TRUE 1 +#define FALSE 0 + +#endif /* OWN_TYPES_H */ diff --git a/perl/apgcli.pl b/perl/apgcli.pl new file mode 100755 index 0000000..4a10b98 --- /dev/null +++ b/perl/apgcli.pl @@ -0,0 +1,10 @@ +#!/usr/bin/perl -w +$host = "localhost"; +use IO::Socket; +$remote = IO::Socket::INET->new( + Proto => "tcp", + PeerAddr => $host, + PeerPort => "pwdgen(129)", + ) + or die "cannot connect to pwdgen port at $host"; +while ( <$remote> ) { print } diff --git a/pronpass.c b/pronpass.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5d02020 --- /dev/null +++ b/pronpass.c @@ -0,0 +1,2293 @@ +/* +** This module uses code from the NIST implementation of FIPS-181, +** but the algorythm is CHANGED and I think that I CAN +** copyright it. See copiright notes below. +*/ + +/* +** Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001 +** Adel I. Mirzazhanov. All rights reserved +** +** Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +** modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +** are met: +** +** 1.Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, +** this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +** 2.Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +** notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +** documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +** 3.The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products +** derived from this software without specific prior written permission. +** +** THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS +** OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED +** WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE +** ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY +** DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL +** DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE +** GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS +** INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, +** WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING +** NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS +** SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. +*/ + + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include "pronpass.h" +#include "randpass.h" +#include "errs.h" + +struct unit +{ + char unit_code[5]; + USHORT flags; +}; + +static struct unit rules[] = +{ {"a", VOWEL}, + {"b", NO_SPECIAL_RULE}, + {"c", NO_SPECIAL_RULE}, + {"d", NO_SPECIAL_RULE}, + {"e", NO_FINAL_SPLIT | VOWEL}, + {"f", NO_SPECIAL_RULE}, + {"g", NO_SPECIAL_RULE}, + {"h", NO_SPECIAL_RULE}, + {"i", VOWEL}, + {"j", NO_SPECIAL_RULE}, + {"k", NO_SPECIAL_RULE}, + {"l", NO_SPECIAL_RULE}, + {"m", NO_SPECIAL_RULE}, + {"n", NO_SPECIAL_RULE}, + {"o", VOWEL}, + {"p", NO_SPECIAL_RULE}, + {"r", NO_SPECIAL_RULE}, + {"s", NO_SPECIAL_RULE}, + {"t", NO_SPECIAL_RULE}, + {"u", VOWEL}, + {"v", NO_SPECIAL_RULE}, + {"w", NO_SPECIAL_RULE}, + {"x", NOT_BEGIN_SYLLABLE}, + {"y", ALTERNATE_VOWEL | VOWEL}, + {"z", NO_SPECIAL_RULE}, + {"ch", NO_SPECIAL_RULE}, + {"gh", NO_SPECIAL_RULE}, + {"ph", NO_SPECIAL_RULE}, + {"rh", NO_SPECIAL_RULE}, + {"sh", NO_SPECIAL_RULE}, + {"th", NO_SPECIAL_RULE}, + {"wh", NO_SPECIAL_RULE}, + {"qu", NO_SPECIAL_RULE}, + {"ck", NOT_BEGIN_SYLLABLE} +}; + +static int digram[][RULE_SIZE] = +{ + /* aa */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* ab */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* ac */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* ad */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* ae */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* af */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* ag */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* ah */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* ai */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* aj */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* ak */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* al */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* am */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* an */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* ao */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* ap */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* ar */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* as */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* at */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* au */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* av */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* aw */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* ax */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* ay */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* az */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* ach */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* agh */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* aph */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* arh */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* ash */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* ath */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* awh */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* aqu */ BREAK | NOT_END, + /* ack */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* ba */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* bb */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* bc */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* bd */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* be */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* bf */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* bg */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* bh */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* bi */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* bj */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* bk */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* bl */ BEGIN | SUFFIX | NOT_END, + /* bm */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* bn */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* bo */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* bp */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* br */ BEGIN | END, + /* bs */ NOT_BEGIN, + /* bt */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* bu */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* bv */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* bw */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* bx */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* by */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* bz */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* bch */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* bgh */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* bph */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* brh */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* bsh */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* bth */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* bwh */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* bqu */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* bck */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* ca */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* cb */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* cc */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* cd */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* ce */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* cf */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* cg */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* ch */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* ci */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* cj */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* ck */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* cl */ SUFFIX | NOT_END, + /* cm */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* cn */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* co */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* cp */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* cr */ NOT_END, + /* cs */ NOT_BEGIN | END, + /* ct */ NOT_BEGIN | PREFIX, + /* cu */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* cv */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* cw */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* cx */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* cy */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* cz */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* cch */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* cgh */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* cph */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* crh */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* csh */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* cth */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* cwh */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* cqu */ NOT_BEGIN | SUFFIX | NOT_END, + /* cck */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* da */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* db */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* dc */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* dd */ NOT_BEGIN, + /* de */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* df */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* dg */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* dh */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* di */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* dj */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* dk */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* dl */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* dm */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* dn */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* do */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* dp */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* dr */ BEGIN | NOT_END, + /* ds */ NOT_BEGIN | END, + /* dt */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* du */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* dv */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* dw */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* dx */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* dy */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* dz */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* dch */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* dgh */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* dph */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* drh */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* dsh */ NOT_BEGIN | NOT_END, + /* dth */ NOT_BEGIN | PREFIX, + /* dwh */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* dqu */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* dck */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* ea */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* eb */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* ec */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* ed */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* ee */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* ef */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* eg */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* eh */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* ei */ NOT_END, + /* ej */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* ek */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* el */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* em */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* en */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* eo */ BREAK, + /* ep */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* er */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* es */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* et */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* eu */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* ev */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* ew */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* ex */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* ey */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* ez */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* ech */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* egh */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* eph */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* erh */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* esh */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* eth */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* ewh */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* equ */ BREAK | NOT_END, + /* eck */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* fa */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* fb */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* fc */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* fd */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* fe */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* ff */ NOT_BEGIN, + /* fg */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* fh */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* fi */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* fj */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* fk */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* fl */ BEGIN | SUFFIX | NOT_END, + /* fm */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* fn */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* fo */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* fp */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* fr */ BEGIN | NOT_END, + /* fs */ NOT_BEGIN, + /* ft */ NOT_BEGIN, + /* fu */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* fv */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* fw */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* fx */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* fy */ NOT_BEGIN, + /* fz */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* fch */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* fgh */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* fph */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* frh */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* fsh */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* fth */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* fwh */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* fqu */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* fck */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* ga */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* gb */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* gc */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* gd */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* ge */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* gf */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* gg */ NOT_BEGIN, + /* gh */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* gi */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* gj */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* gk */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* gl */ BEGIN | SUFFIX | NOT_END, + /* gm */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* gn */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* go */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* gp */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* gr */ BEGIN | NOT_END, + /* gs */ NOT_BEGIN | END, + /* gt */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* gu */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* gv */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* gw */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* gx */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* gy */ NOT_BEGIN, + /* gz */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* gch */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* ggh */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* gph */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* grh */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* gsh */ NOT_BEGIN, + /* gth */ NOT_BEGIN, + /* gwh */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* gqu */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* gck */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* ha */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* hb */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* hc */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* hd */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* he */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* hf */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* hg */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* hh */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* hi */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* hj */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* hk */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* hl */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* hm */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* hn */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* ho */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* hp */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* hr */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* hs */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* ht */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* hu */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* hv */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* hw */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* hx */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* hy */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* hz */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* hch */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* hgh */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* hph */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* hrh */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* hsh */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* hth */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* hwh */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* hqu */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* hck */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* ia */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* ib */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* ic */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* id */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* ie */ NOT_BEGIN, + /* if */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* ig */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* ih */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* ii */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* ij */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* ik */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* il */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* im */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* in */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* io */ BREAK, + /* ip */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* ir */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* is */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* it */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* iu */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* iv */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* iw */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* ix */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* iy */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* iz */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* ich */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* igh */ NOT_BEGIN, + /* iph */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* irh */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* ish */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* ith */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* iwh */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* iqu */ BREAK | NOT_END, + /* ick */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* ja */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* jb */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* jc */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* jd */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* je */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* jf */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* jg */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* jh */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* ji */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* jj */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* jk */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* jl */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* jm */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* jn */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* jo */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* jp */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* jr */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* js */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* jt */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* ju */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* jv */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* jw */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* jx */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* jy */ NOT_BEGIN, + /* jz */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* jch */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* jgh */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* jph */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* jrh */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* jsh */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* jth */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* jwh */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* jqu */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* jck */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* ka */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* kb */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* kc */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* kd */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* ke */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* kf */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* kg */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* kh */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* ki */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* kj */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* kk */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* kl */ SUFFIX | NOT_END, + /* km */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* kn */ BEGIN | SUFFIX | NOT_END, + /* ko */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* kp */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* kr */ SUFFIX | NOT_END, + /* ks */ NOT_BEGIN | END, + /* kt */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* ku */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* kv */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* kw */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* kx */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* ky */ NOT_BEGIN, + /* kz */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* kch */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* kgh */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* kph */ NOT_BEGIN | PREFIX, + /* krh */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* ksh */ NOT_BEGIN, + /* kth */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* kwh */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* kqu */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* kck */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* la */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* lb */ NOT_BEGIN | PREFIX, + /* lc */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* ld */ NOT_BEGIN | PREFIX, + /* le */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* lf */ NOT_BEGIN | PREFIX, + /* lg */ NOT_BEGIN | PREFIX, + /* lh */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* li */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* lj */ NOT_BEGIN | PREFIX, + /* lk */ NOT_BEGIN | PREFIX, + /* ll */ NOT_BEGIN | PREFIX, + /* lm */ NOT_BEGIN | PREFIX, + /* ln */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* lo */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* lp */ NOT_BEGIN | PREFIX, + /* lr */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* ls */ NOT_BEGIN, + /* lt */ NOT_BEGIN | PREFIX, + /* lu */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* lv */ NOT_BEGIN | PREFIX, + /* lw */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* lx */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* ly */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* lz */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* lch */ NOT_BEGIN | PREFIX, + /* lgh */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* lph */ NOT_BEGIN | PREFIX, + /* lrh */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* lsh */ NOT_BEGIN | PREFIX, + /* lth */ NOT_BEGIN | PREFIX, + /* lwh */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* lqu */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* lck */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* ma */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* mb */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* mc */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* md */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* me */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* mf */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* mg */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* mh */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* mi */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* mj */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* mk */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* ml */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* mm */ NOT_BEGIN, + /* mn */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* mo */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* mp */ NOT_BEGIN, + /* mr */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* ms */ NOT_BEGIN, + /* mt */ NOT_BEGIN, + /* mu */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* mv */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* mw */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* mx */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* my */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* mz */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* mch */ NOT_BEGIN | PREFIX, + /* mgh */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* mph */ NOT_BEGIN, + /* mrh */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* msh */ NOT_BEGIN, + /* mth */ NOT_BEGIN, + /* mwh */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* mqu */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* mck */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* na */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* nb */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* nc */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* nd */ NOT_BEGIN, + /* ne */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* nf */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* ng */ NOT_BEGIN | PREFIX, + /* nh */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* ni */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* nj */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* nk */ NOT_BEGIN | PREFIX, + /* nl */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* nm */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* nn */ NOT_BEGIN, + /* no */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* np */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* nr */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* ns */ NOT_BEGIN, + /* nt */ NOT_BEGIN, + /* nu */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* nv */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* nw */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* nx */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* ny */ NOT_BEGIN, + /* nz */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* nch */ NOT_BEGIN | PREFIX, + /* ngh */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* nph */ NOT_BEGIN | PREFIX, + /* nrh */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* nsh */ NOT_BEGIN, + /* nth */ NOT_BEGIN, + /* nwh */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* nqu */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* nck */ NOT_BEGIN | PREFIX, + /* oa */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* ob */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* oc */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* od */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* oe */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* of */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* og */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* oh */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* oi */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* oj */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* ok */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* ol */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* om */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* on */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* oo */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* op */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* or */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* os */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* ot */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* ou */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* ov */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* ow */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* ox */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* oy */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* oz */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* och */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* ogh */ NOT_BEGIN, + /* oph */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* orh */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* osh */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* oth */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* owh */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* oqu */ BREAK | NOT_END, + /* ock */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* pa */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* pb */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* pc */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* pd */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* pe */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* pf */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* pg */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* ph */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* pi */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* pj */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* pk */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* pl */ SUFFIX | NOT_END, + /* pm */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* pn */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* po */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* pp */ NOT_BEGIN | PREFIX, + /* pr */ NOT_END, + /* ps */ NOT_BEGIN | END, + /* pt */ NOT_BEGIN | END, + /* pu */ NOT_BEGIN | END, + /* pv */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* pw */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* px */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* py */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* pz */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* pch */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* pgh */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* pph */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* prh */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* psh */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* pth */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* pwh */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* pqu */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* pck */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* ra */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* rb */ NOT_BEGIN | PREFIX, + /* rc */ NOT_BEGIN | PREFIX, + /* rd */ NOT_BEGIN | PREFIX, + /* re */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* rf */ NOT_BEGIN | PREFIX, + /* rg */ NOT_BEGIN | PREFIX, + /* rh */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* ri */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* rj */ NOT_BEGIN | PREFIX, + /* rk */ NOT_BEGIN | PREFIX, + /* rl */ NOT_BEGIN | PREFIX, + /* rm */ NOT_BEGIN | PREFIX, + /* rn */ NOT_BEGIN | PREFIX, + /* ro */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* rp */ NOT_BEGIN | PREFIX, + /* rr */ NOT_BEGIN | PREFIX, + /* rs */ NOT_BEGIN | PREFIX, + /* rt */ NOT_BEGIN | PREFIX, + /* ru */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* rv */ NOT_BEGIN | PREFIX, + /* rw */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* rx */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* ry */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* rz */ NOT_BEGIN | PREFIX, + /* rch */ NOT_BEGIN | PREFIX, + /* rgh */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* rph */ NOT_BEGIN | PREFIX, + /* rrh */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* rsh */ NOT_BEGIN | PREFIX, + /* rth */ NOT_BEGIN | PREFIX, + /* rwh */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* rqu */ NOT_BEGIN | PREFIX | NOT_END, + /* rck */ NOT_BEGIN | PREFIX, + /* sa */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* sb */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* sc */ NOT_END, + /* sd */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* se */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* sf */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* sg */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* sh */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* si */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* sj */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* sk */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* sl */ BEGIN | SUFFIX | NOT_END, + /* sm */ SUFFIX | NOT_END, + /* sn */ PREFIX | SUFFIX | NOT_END, + /* so */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* sp */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* sr */ NOT_BEGIN | NOT_END, + /* ss */ NOT_BEGIN | PREFIX, + /* st */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* su */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* sv */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* sw */ BEGIN | SUFFIX | NOT_END, + /* sx */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* sy */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* sz */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* sch */ BEGIN | SUFFIX | NOT_END, + /* sgh */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* sph */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* srh */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* ssh */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* sth */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* swh */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* squ */ SUFFIX | NOT_END, + /* sck */ NOT_BEGIN, + /* ta */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* tb */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* tc */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* td */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* te */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* tf */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* tg */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* th */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* ti */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* tj */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* tk */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* tl */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* tm */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* tn */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* to */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* tp */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* tr */ NOT_END, + /* ts */ NOT_BEGIN | END, + /* tt */ NOT_BEGIN | PREFIX, + /* tu */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* tv */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* tw */ BEGIN | SUFFIX | NOT_END, + /* tx */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* ty */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* tz */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* tch */ NOT_BEGIN, + /* tgh */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* tph */ NOT_BEGIN | END, + /* trh */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* tsh */ NOT_BEGIN | END, + /* tth */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* twh */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* tqu */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* tck */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* ua */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* ub */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* uc */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* ud */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* ue */ NOT_BEGIN, + /* uf */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* ug */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* uh */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* ui */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* uj */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* uk */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* ul */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* um */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* un */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* uo */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK, + /* up */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* ur */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* us */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* ut */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* uu */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* uv */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* uw */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* ux */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* uy */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* uz */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* uch */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* ugh */ NOT_BEGIN | PREFIX, + /* uph */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* urh */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* ush */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* uth */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* uwh */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* uqu */ BREAK | NOT_END, + /* uck */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* va */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* vb */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* vc */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* vd */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* ve */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* vf */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* vg */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* vh */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* vi */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* vj */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* vk */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* vl */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* vm */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* vn */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* vo */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* vp */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* vr */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* vs */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* vt */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* vu */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* vv */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* vw */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* vx */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* vy */ NOT_BEGIN, + /* vz */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* vch */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* vgh */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* vph */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* vrh */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* vsh */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* vth */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* vwh */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* vqu */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* vck */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* wa */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* wb */ NOT_BEGIN | PREFIX, + /* wc */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* wd */ NOT_BEGIN | PREFIX | END, + /* we */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* wf */ NOT_BEGIN | PREFIX, + /* wg */ NOT_BEGIN | PREFIX | END, + /* wh */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* wi */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* wj */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* wk */ NOT_BEGIN | PREFIX, + /* wl */ NOT_BEGIN | PREFIX | SUFFIX, + /* wm */ NOT_BEGIN | PREFIX, + /* wn */ NOT_BEGIN | PREFIX, + /* wo */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* wp */ NOT_BEGIN | PREFIX, + /* wr */ BEGIN | SUFFIX | NOT_END, + /* ws */ NOT_BEGIN | PREFIX, + /* wt */ NOT_BEGIN | PREFIX, + /* wu */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* wv */ NOT_BEGIN | PREFIX, + /* ww */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* wx */ NOT_BEGIN | PREFIX, + /* wy */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* wz */ NOT_BEGIN | PREFIX, + /* wch */ NOT_BEGIN, + /* wgh */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* wph */ NOT_BEGIN, + /* wrh */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* wsh */ NOT_BEGIN, + /* wth */ NOT_BEGIN, + /* wwh */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* wqu */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* wck */ NOT_BEGIN, + /* xa */ NOT_BEGIN, + /* xb */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* xc */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* xd */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* xe */ NOT_BEGIN, + /* xf */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* xg */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* xh */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* xi */ NOT_BEGIN, + /* xj */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* xk */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* xl */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* xm */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* xn */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* xo */ NOT_BEGIN, + /* xp */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* xr */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* xs */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* xt */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* xu */ NOT_BEGIN, + /* xv */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* xw */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* xx */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* xy */ NOT_BEGIN, + /* xz */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* xch */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* xgh */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* xph */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* xrh */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* xsh */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* xth */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* xwh */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* xqu */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* xck */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* ya */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* yb */ NOT_BEGIN, + /* yc */ NOT_BEGIN | NOT_END, + /* yd */ NOT_BEGIN, + /* ye */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* yf */ NOT_BEGIN | NOT_END, + /* yg */ NOT_BEGIN, + /* yh */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* yi */ BEGIN | NOT_END, + /* yj */ NOT_BEGIN | NOT_END, + /* yk */ NOT_BEGIN, + /* yl */ NOT_BEGIN | NOT_END, + /* ym */ NOT_BEGIN, + /* yn */ NOT_BEGIN, + /* yo */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* yp */ NOT_BEGIN, + /* yr */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* ys */ NOT_BEGIN, + /* yt */ NOT_BEGIN, + /* yu */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* yv */ NOT_BEGIN | NOT_END, + /* yw */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* yx */ NOT_BEGIN, + /* yy */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* yz */ NOT_BEGIN, + /* ych */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* ygh */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* yph */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* yrh */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* ysh */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* yth */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* ywh */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* yqu */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* yck */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* za */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* zb */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* zc */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* zd */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* ze */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* zf */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* zg */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* zh */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* zi */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* zj */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* zk */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* zl */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* zm */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* zn */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* zo */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* zp */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* zr */ NOT_BEGIN | NOT_END, + /* zs */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* zt */ NOT_BEGIN, + /* zu */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* zv */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* zw */ SUFFIX | NOT_END, + /* zx */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* zy */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* zz */ NOT_BEGIN, + /* zch */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* zgh */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* zph */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* zrh */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* zsh */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* zth */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* zwh */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* zqu */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* zck */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* cha */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* chb */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* chc */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* chd */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* che */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* chf */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* chg */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* chh */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* chi */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* chj */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* chk */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* chl */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* chm */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* chn */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* cho */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* chp */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* chr */ NOT_END, + /* chs */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* cht */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* chu */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* chv */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* chw */ NOT_BEGIN | NOT_END, + /* chx */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* chy */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* chz */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* chch */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* chgh */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* chph */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* chrh */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* chsh */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* chth */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* chwh */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* chqu */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* chck */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* gha */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* ghb */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | PREFIX | NOT_END, + /* ghc */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | PREFIX | NOT_END, + /* ghd */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | PREFIX | NOT_END, + /* ghe */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* ghf */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | PREFIX | NOT_END, + /* ghg */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | PREFIX | NOT_END, + /* ghh */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | PREFIX | NOT_END, + /* ghi */ BEGIN | NOT_END, + /* ghj */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | PREFIX | NOT_END, + /* ghk */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | PREFIX | NOT_END, + /* ghl */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | PREFIX | NOT_END, + /* ghm */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | PREFIX | NOT_END, + /* ghn */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | PREFIX | NOT_END, + /* gho */ BEGIN | NOT_END, + /* ghp */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* ghr */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | PREFIX | NOT_END, + /* ghs */ NOT_BEGIN | PREFIX, + /* ght */ NOT_BEGIN | PREFIX, + /* ghu */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | PREFIX | NOT_END, + /* ghv */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | PREFIX | NOT_END, + /* ghw */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | PREFIX | NOT_END, + /* ghx */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* ghy */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | PREFIX | NOT_END, + /* ghz */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | PREFIX | NOT_END, + /* ghch */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | PREFIX | NOT_END, + /* ghgh */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* ghph */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | PREFIX | NOT_END, + /* ghrh */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* ghsh */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | PREFIX | NOT_END, + /* ghth */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | PREFIX | NOT_END, + /* ghwh */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* ghqu */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | PREFIX | NOT_END, + /* ghck */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* pha */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* phb */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* phc */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* phd */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* phe */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* phf */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* phg */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* phh */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* phi */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* phj */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* phk */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* phl */ BEGIN | SUFFIX | NOT_END, + /* phm */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* phn */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* pho */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* php */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* phr */ NOT_END, + /* phs */ NOT_BEGIN, + /* pht */ NOT_BEGIN, + /* phu */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* phv */ NOT_BEGIN | NOT_END, + /* phw */ NOT_BEGIN | NOT_END, + /* phx */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* phy */ NOT_BEGIN, + /* phz */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* phch */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* phgh */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* phph */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* phrh */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* phsh */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* phth */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* phwh */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* phqu */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* phck */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* rha */ BEGIN | NOT_END, + /* rhb */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* rhc */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* rhd */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* rhe */ BEGIN | NOT_END, + /* rhf */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* rhg */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* rhh */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* rhi */ BEGIN | NOT_END, + /* rhj */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* rhk */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* rhl */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* rhm */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* rhn */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* rho */ BEGIN | NOT_END, + /* rhp */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* rhr */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* rhs */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* rht */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* rhu */ BEGIN | NOT_END, + /* rhv */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* rhw */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* rhx */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* rhy */ BEGIN | NOT_END, + /* rhz */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* rhch */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* rhgh */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* rhph */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* rhrh */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* rhsh */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* rhth */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* rhwh */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* rhqu */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* rhck */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* sha */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* shb */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* shc */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* shd */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* she */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* shf */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* shg */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* shh */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* shi */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* shj */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* shk */ NOT_BEGIN, + /* shl */ BEGIN | SUFFIX | NOT_END, + /* shm */ BEGIN | SUFFIX | NOT_END, + /* shn */ BEGIN | SUFFIX | NOT_END, + /* sho */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* shp */ NOT_BEGIN, + /* shr */ BEGIN | SUFFIX | NOT_END, + /* shs */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* sht */ SUFFIX, + /* shu */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* shv */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* shw */ SUFFIX | NOT_END, + /* shx */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* shy */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* shz */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* shch */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* shgh */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* shph */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* shrh */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* shsh */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* shth */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* shwh */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* shqu */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* shck */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* tha */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* thb */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* thc */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* thd */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* the */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* thf */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* thg */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* thh */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* thi */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* thj */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* thk */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* thl */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* thm */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* thn */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* tho */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* thp */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* thr */ NOT_END, + /* ths */ NOT_BEGIN | END, + /* tht */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* thu */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* thv */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* thw */ SUFFIX | NOT_END, + /* thx */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* thy */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* thz */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* thch */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* thgh */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* thph */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* thrh */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* thsh */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* thth */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* thwh */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* thqu */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* thck */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* wha */ BEGIN | NOT_END, + /* whb */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* whc */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* whd */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* whe */ BEGIN | NOT_END, + /* whf */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* whg */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* whh */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* whi */ BEGIN | NOT_END, + /* whj */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* whk */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* whl */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* whm */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* whn */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* who */ BEGIN | NOT_END, + /* whp */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* whr */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* whs */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* wht */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* whu */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* whv */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* whw */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* whx */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* why */ BEGIN | NOT_END, + /* whz */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* whch */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* whgh */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* whph */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* whrh */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* whsh */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* whth */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* whwh */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* whqu */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* whck */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* qua */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* qub */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* quc */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* qud */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* que */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* quf */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* qug */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* quh */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* qui */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* quj */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* quk */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* qul */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* qum */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* qun */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* quo */ ANY_COMBINATION, + /* qup */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* qur */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* qus */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* qut */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* quu */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* quv */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* quw */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* qux */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* quy */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* quz */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* quch */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* qugh */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* quph */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* qurh */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* qush */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* quth */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* quwh */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* ququ */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* quck */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* cka */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* ckb */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* ckc */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* ckd */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* cke */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* ckf */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* ckg */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* ckh */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* cki */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* ckj */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* ckk */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* ckl */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* ckm */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* ckn */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* cko */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* ckp */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* ckr */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* cks */ NOT_BEGIN, + /* ckt */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* cku */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* ckv */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* ckw */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* ckx */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* cky */ NOT_BEGIN, + /* ckz */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* ckch */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* ckgh */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* ckph */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* ckrh */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* cksh */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* ckth */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* ckwh */ ILLEGAL_PAIR, + /* ckqu */ NOT_BEGIN | BREAK | NOT_END, + /* ckck */ ILLEGAL_PAIR +}; + +/* +** gen_pron_pass will generate a Random word and place it in the +** buffer word. Also, the hyphenated word will be placed into +** the buffer hyphenated_word. Both word and hyphenated_word must +** be pre-allocated. The words generated will have sizes between +** minlen and maxlen. If restrict is TRUE, words will not be generated that +** appear as login names or as entries in the on-line dictionary. +** This algorithm was initially worded out by Morrie Gasser in 1975. +** Any changes here are minimal so that as many word combinations +** can be produced as possible (and thus keep the words Random). +** The seed is used on first use of the routine. +** The length of the unhyphenated word is returned, or -1 if there +** were an error (length settings are wrong or dictionary checking +** could not be done. +*/ +int +gen_pron_pass (char *word, char *hyphenated_word, USHORT minlen, + USHORT maxlen, unsigned int pass_mode) +{ + + int pwlen; + + /* + * Check for minlen>maxlen. This is an error. + * and a length of 0. + */ + if (minlen > maxlen || minlen > 255 || maxlen > 255) + return (-1); + /* + * Check for zero length words. This is technically not an error, + * so we take the short cut and return a null word and a length of 0. + */ + if (maxlen == 0) + { + word[0] = '\0'; + hyphenated_word[0] = '\0'; + return (0); + } + + /* + * Find password. + */ + pwlen = gen_word (word, hyphenated_word, get_random (minlen, maxlen), pass_mode); + return (pwlen); +} + + +/* + * This is the routine that returns a Random word -- as + * yet unchecked against the passwd file or the dictionary. + * It collects Random syllables until a predetermined + * word length is found. If a retry threshold is reached, + * another word is tried. Given that the Random number + * generator is uniformly distributed, eventually a word + * will be found if the retry limit is adequately large enough. + */ +int +gen_word (char *word, char *hyphenated_word, USHORT pwlen, unsigned int pass_mode) +{ + USHORT word_length; + USHORT syllable_length; + char *new_syllable; + USHORT *syllable_units; + USHORT word_size; + USHORT word_place; + USHORT *word_units; + USHORT syllable_size; + UINT tries; + int ch_flag = FALSE; + + /* + * Keep count of retries. + */ + tries = 0; + + /* + * The length of the word in characters. + */ + word_length = 0; + + /* + * The length of the word in character units (each of which is one or + * two characters long. + */ + word_size = 0; + + /* + * Initialize the array storing the word units. Since we know the + * length of the word, we only need one of that length. This method is + * preferable to a static array, since it allows us flexibility in + * choosing arbitrarily long word lengths. Since a word can contain one + * syllable, we should make syllable_units, the array holding the + * analogous units for an individual syllable, the same length. No + * explicit rule limits the length of syllables, but digram rules and + * heuristics do so indirectly. + */ + if ( (word_units = (USHORT *) calloc (sizeof (USHORT), pwlen+1))==NULL || + (syllable_units = (USHORT *) calloc (sizeof (USHORT), pwlen+1))==NULL || + (new_syllable = (char *) calloc (sizeof (USHORT), pwlen+1)) ==NULL) + return(-1); + + /* + * Find syllables until the entire word is constructed. + */ + while (word_length < pwlen) + { + /* + * Get the syllable and find its length. + */ + (void) gen_syllable (new_syllable, pwlen - word_length, syllable_units, &syllable_size); + syllable_length = strlen (new_syllable); + + /* + * Append the syllable units to the word units. + */ + for (word_place = 0; word_place <= syllable_size; word_place++) + word_units[word_size + word_place] = syllable_units[word_place]; + word_size += syllable_size + 1; + + /* + * If the word has been improperly formed, throw out + * the syllable. The checks performed here are those + * that must be formed on a word basis. The other + * tests are performed entirely within the syllable. + * Otherwise, append the syllable to the word and + * append the syllable to the hyphenated version of + * the word. + */ + if (improper_word (word_units, word_size) || + ((word_length == 0) && have_initial_y (syllable_units, syllable_size)) || + ((word_length + syllable_length == pwlen) && have_final_split (syllable_units, syllable_size))) + word_size -= syllable_size + 1; + else + { + if (word_length == 0) + { + /* + ** Modify syllable for numeric or capital symbols required + ** Should be done after word quality check. + */ + if ( ((pass_mode & S_NB) > 0) && (syllable_length == 1)) + { + numerize(new_syllable); + ch_flag = TRUE; + } + if ( ( (pass_mode & S_CL) > 0) && (ch_flag != TRUE)) + capitalize(new_syllable); + ch_flag = FALSE; + /**/ + (void) strcpy (word, new_syllable); + (void) strcpy (hyphenated_word, new_syllable); + bzero ( (void *)new_syllable, (size_t)(pwlen * sizeof(USHORT)+1)); + } + else + { + /* + ** Modify syllable for numeric or capital symbols required + ** Should be done after word quality check. + */ + if ( ((pass_mode & S_NB) > 0) && (syllable_length == 1)) + { + numerize(new_syllable); + ch_flag = TRUE; + } + if ( ( (pass_mode & S_CL) > 0) && (ch_flag != TRUE)) + capitalize(new_syllable); + ch_flag = FALSE; + /**/ + (void) strcat (word, new_syllable); + (void) strcat (hyphenated_word, "-"); + (void) strcat (hyphenated_word, new_syllable); + bzero ( (void *)new_syllable, (size_t)(pwlen * sizeof(USHORT)+1)); + } + word_length += syllable_length; + } + + /* + * Keep track of the times we have tried to get + * syllables. If we have exceeded the threshold, + * reinitialize the pwlen and word_size variables, clear + * out the word arrays, and start from scratch. + */ + tries++; + if (tries > MAX_RETRIES) + { + word_length = 0; + word_size = 0; + tries = 0; + (void) strcpy (word, ""); + (void) strcpy (hyphenated_word, ""); + } + } + + /* + * The units arrays and syllable storage are internal to this + * routine. Since the caller has no need for them, we + * release the space. + */ + free ((char *) new_syllable); + free ((char *) syllable_units); + free ((char *) word_units); + + return ((int) word_length); +} + + + +/* + * Check that the word does not contain illegal combinations + * that may span syllables. Specifically, these are: + * 1. An illegal pair of units between syllables. + * 2. Three consecutive vowel units. + * 3. Three consecutive consonant units. + * The checks are made against units (1 or 2 letters), not against + * the individual letters, so three consecutive units can have + * the length of 6 at most. + */ +boolean +improper_word (USHORT *units, USHORT word_size) +{ + USHORT unit_count; + boolean failure; + + failure = FALSE; + + for (unit_count = 0; !failure && (unit_count < word_size); + unit_count++) + { + /* + * Check for ILLEGAL_PAIR. This should have been caught + * for units within a syllable, but in some cases it + * would have gone unnoticed for units between syllables + * (e.g., when saved_unit's in gen_syllable() were not + * used). + */ + if ((unit_count != 0) && + (digram[units[unit_count - 1]][units[unit_count]] & + ILLEGAL_PAIR)) + failure = TRUE; + + /* + * Check for consecutive vowels or consonants. Because + * the initial y of a syllable is treated as a consonant + * rather than as a vowel, we exclude y from the first + * vowel in the vowel test. The only problem comes when + * y ends a syllable and two other vowels start the next, + * like fly-oint. Since such words are still + * pronounceable, we accept this. + */ + if (!failure && (unit_count >= 2)) + { + /* + * Vowel check. + */ + if ((((rules[units[unit_count - 2]].flags & VOWEL) && + !(rules[units[unit_count - 2]].flags & + ALTERNATE_VOWEL)) && + (rules[units[unit_count - 1]].flags & VOWEL) && + (rules[units[unit_count]].flags & VOWEL)) || + /* + * Consonant check. + */ + (!(rules[units[unit_count - 2]].flags & VOWEL) && + !(rules[units[unit_count - 1]].flags & VOWEL) && + !(rules[units[unit_count]].flags & VOWEL))) + failure = TRUE; + } + } + + return (failure); +} + + +/* + * Treating y as a vowel is sometimes a problem. Some words + * get formed that look irregular. One special group is when + * y starts a word and is the only vowel in the first syllable. + * The word ycl is one example. We discard words like these. + */ +boolean +have_initial_y (USHORT *units, USHORT unit_size) +{ + USHORT unit_count; + USHORT vowel_count; + USHORT normal_vowel_count; + + vowel_count = 0; + normal_vowel_count = 0; + + for (unit_count = 0; unit_count <= unit_size; unit_count++) + /* + * Count vowels. + */ + if (rules[units[unit_count]].flags & VOWEL) + { + vowel_count++; + + /* + * Count the vowels that are not: 1. y, 2. at the start of + * the word. + */ + if (!(rules[units[unit_count]].flags & ALTERNATE_VOWEL) || + (unit_count != 0)) + normal_vowel_count++; + } + + return ((vowel_count <= 1) && (normal_vowel_count == 0)); +} + + +/* + * Besides the problem with the letter y, there is one with + * a silent e at the end of words, like face or nice. We + * allow this silent e, but we do not allow it as the only + * vowel at the end of the word or syllables like ble will + * be generated. + */ +boolean +have_final_split (USHORT *units, USHORT unit_size) +{ + USHORT unit_count; + USHORT vowel_count; + + vowel_count = 0; + + /* + * Count all the vowels in the word. + */ + for (unit_count = 0; unit_count <= unit_size; unit_count++) + if (rules[units[unit_count]].flags & VOWEL) + vowel_count++; + + /* + * Return TRUE iff the only vowel was e, found at the end if the + * word. + */ + return ((vowel_count == 1) && + (rules[units[unit_size]].flags & NO_FINAL_SPLIT)); +} + + +/* + * Generate next unit to password, making sure that it follows + * these rules: + * 1. Each syllable must contain exactly 1 or 2 consecutive + * vowels, where y is considered a vowel. + * 2. Syllable end is determined as follows: + * a. Vowel is generated and previous unit is a + * consonant and syllable already has a vowel. In + * this case, new syllable is started and already + * contains a vowel. + * b. A pair determined to be a "break" pair is encountered. + * In this case new syllable is started with second unit + * of this pair. + * c. End of password is encountered. + * d. "begin" pair is encountered legally. New syllable is + * started with this pair. + * e. "end" pair is legally encountered. New syllable has + * nothing yet. + * 3. Try generating another unit if: + * a. third consecutive vowel and not y. + * b. "break" pair generated but no vowel yet in current + * or previous 2 units are "not_end". + * c. "begin" pair generated but no vowel in syllable + * preceding begin pair, or both previous 2 pairs are + * designated "not_end". + * d. "end" pair generated but no vowel in current syllable + * or in "end" pair. + * e. "not_begin" pair generated but new syllable must + * begin (because previous syllable ended as defined in + * 2 above). + * f. vowel is generated and 2a is satisfied, but no syllable + * break is possible in previous 3 pairs. + * g. Second and third units of syllable must begin, and + * first unit is "alternate_vowel". + */ +char * +gen_syllable (char *syllable, USHORT pwlen, USHORT *units_in_syllable, + USHORT *syllable_length) +{ + USHORT unit = 0; + SHORT current_unit = 0; + USHORT vowel_count = 0; + boolean rule_broken; + boolean want_vowel; + boolean want_another_unit; + UINT tries = 0; + USHORT last_unit = 0; + SHORT length_left = 0; + USHORT hold_saved_unit = 0; + static USHORT saved_unit; + static USHORT saved_pair[2]; + + /* + * This is needed if the saved_unit is tries and the syllable then + * discarded because of the retry limit. Since the saved_unit is OK and + * fits in nicely with the preceding syllable, we will always use it. + */ + hold_saved_unit = saved_unit; + + /* + * Loop until valid syllable is found. + */ + do + { + /* + * Try for a new syllable. Initialize all pertinent + * syllable variables. + */ + tries = 0; + saved_unit = hold_saved_unit; + (void) strcpy (syllable, ""); + vowel_count = 0; + current_unit = 0; + length_left = (short int) pwlen; + want_another_unit = TRUE; + + /* + * This loop finds all the units for the syllable. + */ + do + { + want_vowel = FALSE; + + /* + * This loop continues until a valid unit is found for the + * current position within the syllable. + */ + do + { + /* + * If there are saved_unit's from the previous + * syllable, use them up first. + */ + if (saved_unit != 0) + { + /* + * If there were two saved units, the first is + * guaranteed (by checks performed in the previous + * syllable) to be valid. We ignore the checks + * and place it in this syllable manually. + */ + if (saved_unit == 2) + { + units_in_syllable[0] = saved_pair[1]; + if (rules[saved_pair[1]].flags & VOWEL) + vowel_count++; + current_unit++; + (void) strcpy (syllable, rules[saved_pair[1]].unit_code); + length_left -= strlen (syllable); + } + + /* + * The unit becomes the last unit checked in the + * previous syllable. + */ + unit = saved_pair[0]; + + /* + * The saved units have been used. Do not try to + * reuse them in this syllable (unless this particular + * syllable is rejected at which point we start to rebuild + * it with these same saved units. + */ + saved_unit = 0; + } + else + /* + * If we don't have to scoff the saved units, + * we generate a Random one. If we know it has + * to be a vowel, we get one rather than looping + * through until one shows up. + */ + if (want_vowel) + unit = random_unit (VOWEL); + else + unit = random_unit (NO_SPECIAL_RULE); + length_left -= (short int) strlen (rules[unit].unit_code); + + /* + * Prevent having a word longer than expected. + */ + if (length_left < 0) + rule_broken = TRUE; + else + rule_broken = FALSE; + + /* + * First unit of syllable. This is special because the + * digram tests require 2 units and we don't have that yet. + * Nevertheless, we can perform some checks. + */ + if (current_unit == 0) + { + /* + * If the shouldn't begin a syllable, don't + * use it. + */ + if (rules[unit].flags & NOT_BEGIN_SYLLABLE) + rule_broken = TRUE; + else + /* + * If this is the last unit of a word, + * we have a one unit syllable. Since each + * syllable must have a vowel, we make sure + * the unit is a vowel. Otherwise, we + * discard it. + */ + if (length_left == 0) + { + if (rules[unit].flags & VOWEL) + want_another_unit = FALSE; + else + rule_broken = TRUE; + } + } + else + { + /* + * There are some digram tests that are + * universally true. We test them out. + */ + + /* + * Reject ILLEGAL_PAIRS of units. + */ + if ((ALLOWED (ILLEGAL_PAIR)) || + + /* + * Reject units that will be split between syllables + * when the syllable has no vowels in it. + */ + (ALLOWED (BREAK) && (vowel_count == 0)) || + + /* + * Reject a unit that will end a syllable when no + * previous unit was a vowel and neither is this one. + */ + (ALLOWED (END) && (vowel_count == 0) && + !(rules[unit].flags & VOWEL))) + rule_broken = TRUE; + + if (current_unit == 1) + { + /* + * Reject the unit if we are at te starting digram of + * a syllable and it does not fit. + */ + if (ALLOWED (NOT_BEGIN)) + rule_broken = TRUE; + } + else + { + /* + * We are not at the start of a syllable. + * Save the previous unit for later tests. + */ + last_unit = units_in_syllable[current_unit - 1]; + + /* + * Do not allow syllables where the first letter is y + * and the next pair can begin a syllable. This may + * lead to splits where y is left alone in a syllable. + * Also, the combination does not sound to good even + * if not split. + */ + if (((current_unit == 2) && + (ALLOWED (BEGIN)) && + (rules[units_in_syllable[0]].flags & + ALTERNATE_VOWEL)) || + + /* + * If this is the last unit of a word, we should + * reject any digram that cannot end a syllable. + */ + (ALLOWED (NOT_END) && + (length_left == 0)) || + + /* + * Reject the unit if the digram it forms wants + * to break the syllable, but the resulting + * digram that would end the syllable is not + * allowed to end a syllable. + */ + (ALLOWED (BREAK) && + (digram[units_in_syllable + [current_unit - 2]] + [last_unit] & + NOT_END)) || + + /* + * Reject the unit if the digram it forms + * expects a vowel preceding it and there is + * none. + */ + (ALLOWED (PREFIX) && + !(rules[units_in_syllable + [current_unit - 2]].flags & + VOWEL))) + rule_broken = TRUE; + + /* + * The following checks occur when the current unit + * is a vowel and we are not looking at a word ending + * with an e. + */ + if (!rule_broken && + (rules[unit].flags & VOWEL) && + ((length_left > 0) || + !(rules[last_unit].flags & + NO_FINAL_SPLIT))) + { + /* + * Don't allow 3 consecutive vowels in a + * syllable. Although some words formed like this + * are OK, like beau, most are not. + */ + if ((vowel_count > 1) && + (rules[last_unit].flags & VOWEL)) + rule_broken = TRUE; + else + /* + * Check for the case of + * vowels-consonants-vowel, which is only + * legal if the last vowel is an e and we are + * the end of the word (wich is not + * happening here due to a previous check. + */ + if ((vowel_count != 0) && + !(rules[last_unit].flags & VOWEL)) + { + /* + * Try to save the vowel for the next + * syllable, but if the syllable left here + * is not proper (i.e., the resulting last + * digram cannot legally end it), just + * discard it and try for another. + */ + if (digram[units_in_syllable + [current_unit - 2]] + [last_unit] & + NOT_END) + rule_broken = TRUE; + else + { + saved_unit = 1; + saved_pair[0] = unit; + want_another_unit = FALSE; + } + } + } + } + + /* + * The unit picked and the digram formed are legal. + * We now determine if we can end the syllable. It may, + * in some cases, mean the last unit(s) may be deferred to + * the next syllable. We also check here to see if the + * digram formed expects a vowel to follow. + */ + if (!rule_broken && want_another_unit) + { + /* + * This word ends in a silent e. + */ +/******/ if (((vowel_count != 0) && + (rules[unit].flags & NO_FINAL_SPLIT) && + (length_left == 0) && + !(rules[last_unit].flags & VOWEL)) || + + /* + * This syllable ends either because the digram + * is an END pair or we would otherwise exceed + * the length of the word. + */ + (ALLOWED (END) || (length_left == 0))) + { + want_another_unit = FALSE; + } + else + /* + * Since we have a vowel in the syllable + * already, if the digram calls for the end of the + * syllable, we can legally split it off. We also + * make sure that we are not at the end of the + * dangerous because that syllable may not have + * vowels, or it may not be a legal syllable end, + * and the retrying mechanism will loop infinitely + * with the same digram. + */ + if ((vowel_count != 0) && (length_left > 0)) + { + /* + * If we must begin a syllable, we do so if + * the only vowel in THIS syllable is not part + * of the digram we are pushing to the next + * syllable. + */ + if (ALLOWED (BEGIN) && + (current_unit > 1) && + !((vowel_count == 1) && + (rules[last_unit].flags & VOWEL))) + { + saved_unit = 2; + saved_pair[0] = unit; + saved_pair[1] = last_unit; + want_another_unit = FALSE; + } + else + if (ALLOWED (BREAK)) + { + saved_unit = 1; + saved_pair[0] = unit; + want_another_unit = FALSE; + } + } + else + if (ALLOWED (SUFFIX)) + { + want_vowel = TRUE; + } + } + } +/********/ + tries++; + + /* + * If this unit was illegal, redetermine the amount of + * letters left to go in the word. + */ + if (rule_broken) + length_left += (short int) strlen (rules[unit].unit_code); + } + while (rule_broken && (tries <= MAX_RETRIES)); + + /* + * The unit fit OK. + */ + if (tries <= MAX_RETRIES) + { + /* + * If the unit were a vowel, count it in. + * However, if the unit were a y and appear + * at the start of the syllable, treat it + * like a constant (so that words like year can + * appear and not conflict with the 3 consecutive + * vowel rule. + */ + if ((rules[unit].flags & VOWEL) && + ((current_unit > 0) || + !(rules[unit].flags & ALTERNATE_VOWEL))) + vowel_count++; + + /* + * If a unit or units were to be saved, we must + * adjust the syllable formed. Otherwise, we + * append the current unit to the syllable. + */ + switch (saved_unit) + { + case 0: + units_in_syllable[current_unit] = unit; + (void) strcat (syllable, rules[unit].unit_code); + break; + case 1: + current_unit--; + break; + case 2: + (void) strcpy (&syllable[strlen (syllable) - + strlen (rules[last_unit].unit_code)],""); + length_left += (short int) strlen (rules[last_unit].unit_code); + current_unit -= 2; + break; + } + } + else + /* + * Whoops! Too many tries. We set rule_broken so we can + * loop in the outer loop and try another syllable. + */ + rule_broken = TRUE; + + /* + * ...and the syllable length grows. + */ + *syllable_length = current_unit; + + current_unit++; + } + while ((tries <= MAX_RETRIES) && want_another_unit); + } + while (rule_broken || + illegal_placement (units_in_syllable, *syllable_length)); + + return (syllable); +} + + +/* + * This routine goes through an individual syllable and checks + * for illegal combinations of letters that go beyond looking + * at digrams. We look at things like 3 consecutive vowels or + * consonants, or syllables with consonants between vowels (unless + * one of them is the final silent e). + */ +boolean +illegal_placement (USHORT *units, USHORT pwlen) +{ + USHORT vowel_count; + USHORT unit_count; + boolean failure; + + vowel_count = 0; + failure = FALSE; + + for (unit_count = 0; !failure && (unit_count <= pwlen); + unit_count++) + { + if (unit_count >= 1) + { + /* + * Don't allow vowels to be split with consonants in + * a single syllable. If we find such a combination + * (except for the silent e) we have to discard the + * syllable). + */ + if ((!(rules[units[unit_count - 1]].flags & VOWEL) && + (rules[units[unit_count]].flags & VOWEL) && + !((rules[units[unit_count]].flags & NO_FINAL_SPLIT) && + (unit_count == pwlen)) && (vowel_count != 0)) || + /* + * Perform these checks when we have at least 3 units. + */ + ((unit_count >= 2) && + + /* + * Disallow 3 consecutive consonants. + */ + ((!(rules[units[unit_count - 2]].flags & VOWEL) && + !(rules[units[unit_count - 1]].flags & + VOWEL) && + !(rules[units[unit_count]].flags & + VOWEL)) || + + /* + * Disallow 3 consecutive vowels, where the first is + * not a y. + */ + (((rules[units[unit_count - 2]].flags & + VOWEL) && + !((rules[units[0]].flags & + ALTERNATE_VOWEL) && + (unit_count == 2))) && + (rules[units[unit_count - 1]].flags & + VOWEL) && + (rules[units[unit_count]].flags & + VOWEL))))) + failure = TRUE; + } + + /* + * Count the vowels in the syllable. As mentioned somewhere + * above, exclude the initial y of a syllable. Instead, + * treat it as a consonant. + */ + if ((rules[units[unit_count]].flags & VOWEL) && + !((rules[units[0]].flags & ALTERNATE_VOWEL) && + (unit_count == 0) && (pwlen != 0))) + vowel_count++; + } + + return (failure); +} + + + +/* + * This is the standard Random unit generating routine for + * gen_syllable(). It does not reference the digrams, but + * assumes that it contains 34 units in a particular order. + * This routine attempts to return unit indexes with a distribution + * approaching that of the distribution of the 34 units in + * English. In order to do this, a Random number (supposedly + * uniformly distributed) is used to do a table lookup into an + * array containing unit indices. There are 211 entries in + * the array for the random_unit entry point. The probability + * of a particular unit being generated is equal to the + * fraction of those 211 entries that contain that unit index. + * For example, the letter `a' is unit number 1. Since unit + * index 1 appears 10 times in the array, the probability of + * selecting an `a' is 10/211. + * + * Changes may be made to the digram table without affect to this + * procedure providing the letter-to-number correspondence of + * the units does not change. Likewise, the distribution of the + * 34 units may be altered (and the array size may be changed) + * in this procedure without affecting the digram table or any other + * programs using the Random_word subroutine. + */ +static USHORT numbers[] = +{ + 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, + 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, + 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, + 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, + 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, + 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, + 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, + 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, + 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, + 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9, + 10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10, + 11, 11, 11, 11, 11, 11, + 12, 12, 12, 12, 12, 12, + 13, 13, 13, 13, 13, 13, 13, 13, 13, 13, + 14, 14, 14, 14, 14, 14, 14, 14, 14, 14, + 15, 15, 15, 15, 15, 15, + 16, 16, 16, 16, 16, 16, 16, 16, 16, 16, + 17, 17, 17, 17, 17, 17, 17, 17, + 18, 18, 18, 18, 18, 18, 18, 18, 18, 18, + 19, 19, 19, 19, 19, 19, + 20, 20, 20, 20, 20, 20, 20, 20, + 21, 21, 21, 21, 21, 21, 21, 21, + 22, + 23, 23, 23, 23, 23, 23, 23, 23, + 24, + 25, + 26, + 27, + 28, + 29, 29, + 30, + 31, + 32, + 33 +}; + + +/* + * This structure has a typical English frequency of vowels. + * The value of an entry is the vowel position (a=0, e=4, i=8, + * o=14, u=19, y=23) in the rules array. The number of times + * the value appears is the frequency. Thus, the letter "a" + * is assumed to appear 2/12 = 1/6 of the time. This array + * may be altered if better data is obtained. The routines that + * use vowel_numbers will adjust to the size difference +automatically. + */ +static USHORT vowel_numbers[] = +{ + 0, 0, 4, 4, 4, 8, 8, 14, 14, 19, 19, 23 +}; + + +/* + * Select a unit (a letter or a consonant group). If a vowel is + * expected, use the vowel_numbers array rather than looping through + * the numbers array until a vowel is found. + */ +USHORT +random_unit (USHORT type) +{ + USHORT number; + + /* + * Sometimes, we are asked to explicitly get a vowel (i.e., if + * a digram pair expects one following it). This is a shortcut + * to do that and avoid looping with rejected consonants. + */ + if (type & VOWEL) + number = vowel_numbers[get_random (0, (sizeof (vowel_numbers) / sizeof (USHORT))-1)]; + else + /* + * Get any letter according to the English distribution. + */ + number = numbers[get_random (0, (sizeof (numbers) / sizeof (USHORT))-1)]; + return (number); +} + + +/* + * This routine should return a uniformly distributed Random number between + * minlen and maxlen inclusive. The Electronic Code Book form of CAST is + * used to produce the Random number. The inputs to CAST are the old pass- + * word and a pseudoRandom key generated according to the procedure out- + * lined in Appendix C of ANSI X9.17. +*/ + +USHORT +get_random (USHORT minlen, USHORT maxlen) +{ + USHORT ret = 0; + ret = minlen + (USHORT) randint ((int) (maxlen - minlen + 1)); + return (ret); +} + +/* +** This routine designed to modify sullable like this: +** adel ----> Adel +** dot ----> Dot +** etc. +*/ +void capitalize (char *syllable) +{ + char let[26] = + { + 'a', 'b', 'c', 'd', 'e', 'f', 'g', 'h', 'i', 'j', + 'k', 'l', 'm', 'n', 'o', 'p', 'q', 'r', 's', 't', + 'u', 'v', 'w', 'x', 'w', 'z' + }; + char clet[26] = + { + 'A', 'B', 'C', 'D', 'E', 'F', 'G', 'H', 'I', 'J', + 'K', 'L', 'M', 'N', 'O', 'P', 'Q', 'R', 'S', 'T', + 'U', 'V', 'W', 'X', 'W', 'Z' + }; + char tmp = 0x00; + int i = 0; + if ( randint(2) == TRUE) + { + bcopy ((void *)syllable, (void *)&tmp, sizeof(tmp)); + for(i=0; i < 26; i++) + if ( let[i] == tmp ) bcopy ((void *)&clet[i], (void *)syllable, 1); + } +} + +/* +** This routine designed to modify single-letter syllable like this: +** a ----> 1 or 2 or 3 etc. +** u ----> 1 or 2 or 3 etc. +** etc. +*/ +void numerize (char *syllable) +{ + char *tmp; + if ( (tmp = (char *)calloc(1, 4)) == NULL) + err_sys_fatal("calloc"); + if ( (randint(2) == TRUE) && (strlen (syllable) == 1) ) + { + sprintf(tmp, "%d", randint(10)); + bcopy ((void *)tmp, (void *)syllable, 1); + } + free ((void *)tmp); +} diff --git a/pronpass.h b/pronpass.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d660686 --- /dev/null +++ b/pronpass.h @@ -0,0 +1,86 @@ +/* +** This module uses code from the NIST implementation of FIPS-181, +** but the algorythm is CHANGED and I think that I CAN +** copyright it. See copiright notes below. +*/ + +/* +** Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001 +** Adel I. Mirzazhanov. All rights reserved +** +** Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +** modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +** are met: +** +** 1.Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, +** this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +** 2.Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +** notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +** documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +** 3.The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products +** derived from this software without specific prior written permission. +** +** THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS +** OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED +** WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE +** ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY +** DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL +** DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE +** GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS +** INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, +** WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING +** NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS +** SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. +*/ + + +#ifndef PRONPASS_H +#define PRONPASS_H 1 + +#ifndef OWN_TYPES_H +#include "owntypes.h" +#endif /* OWN_TYPES_H */ + +#ifndef RND_H +#include "rnd.h" +#endif /* RND_H */ + +#define RULE_SIZE (sizeof(rules)/sizeof(struct unit)) +#define ALLOWED(flag) (digram[units_in_syllable[current_unit -1]][unit] & (flag)) + +#define MAX_UNACCEPTABLE 20 +#define MAX_RETRIES (4 * (int) pwlen + RULE_SIZE) + +#define NOT_BEGIN_SYLLABLE 010 +#define NO_FINAL_SPLIT 04 +#define VOWEL 02 +#define ALTERNATE_VOWEL 01 +#define NO_SPECIAL_RULE 0 + +#define BEGIN 0200 +#define NOT_BEGIN 0100 +#define BREAK 040 +#define PREFIX 020 +#define ILLEGAL_PAIR 010 +#define SUFFIX 04 +#define END 02 +#define NOT_END 01 +#define ANY_COMBINATION 0 + +extern int gen_pron_pass (char *word, char *hyphenated_word, USHORT minlen, + USHORT maxlen, unsigned int pass_mode); + +USHORT random_unit (USHORT type); +USHORT get_random (USHORT minlen, USHORT maxlen); +boolean have_initial_y (USHORT *units, USHORT unit_size); +boolean illegal_placement (USHORT *units, USHORT pwlen); +boolean improper_word (USHORT *units, USHORT word_size); +boolean have_final_split (USHORT *units, USHORT unit_size); +int gen_word (char *word, char *hyphenated_word, USHORT pwlen, + unsigned int pass_mode); +char *gen_syllable(char *syllable, USHORT pwlen, USHORT *units_in_syllable, + USHORT *syllable_length); +void capitalize (char *syllable); +void numerize (char *syllable); + +#endif /* PRONPASS_H */ diff --git a/randpass.c b/randpass.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..366ea5a --- /dev/null +++ b/randpass.c @@ -0,0 +1,110 @@ +/* +** Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001 +** Adel I. Mirzazhanov. All rights reserved +** +** Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +** modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +** are met: +** +** 1.Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, +** this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +** 2.Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +** notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +** documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +** 3.The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products +** derived from this software without specific prior written permission. +** +** THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS +** OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED +** WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE +** ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY +** DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL +** DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE +** GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS +** INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, +** WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING +** NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS +** SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. +*/ + +/* +** randpass.c - Random password generation module of PWGEN program +*/ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include "randpass.h" +#include "owntypes.h" +struct sym + { + char ch; + USHORT type; + }; +static struct sym smbl[94] = +{ + {'a', S_SL}, {'b', S_SL}, {'c', S_SL}, {'d', S_SL}, {'e', S_SL}, {'f', S_SL}, + {'g', S_SL}, {'h', S_SL}, {'i', S_SL}, {'j', S_SL}, {'k', S_SL}, {'l', S_SL}, + {'m', S_SL}, {'n', S_SL}, {'o', S_SL}, {'p', S_SL}, {'q', S_SL}, {'r', S_SL}, + {'s', S_SL}, {'t', S_SL}, {'u', S_SL}, {'v', S_SL}, {'w', S_SL}, {'x', S_SL}, + {'y', S_SL}, {'z', S_SL}, {'A', S_CL}, {'B', S_CL}, {'C', S_CL}, {'D', S_CL}, + {'E', S_CL}, {'F', S_CL}, {'G', S_CL}, {'H', S_CL}, {'I', S_CL}, {'I', S_CL}, + {'K', S_CL}, {'K', S_CL}, {'M', S_CL}, {'N', S_CL}, {'O', S_CL}, {'P', S_CL}, + {'Q', S_CL}, {'R', S_CL}, {'S', S_CL}, {'T', S_CL}, {'U', S_CL}, {'V', S_CL}, + {'W', S_CL}, {'X', S_CL}, {'Y', S_CL}, {'Z', S_CL}, {'1', S_NB}, {'2', S_NB}, + {'3', S_NB}, {'4', S_NB}, {'5', S_NB}, {'6', S_NB}, {'7', S_NB}, {'8', S_NB}, + {'9', S_NB}, {'0', S_NB}, {33 , S_SS}, {34 , S_SS|S_RS}, {35 , S_SS}, {36 , S_SS|S_RS}, + {37 , S_SS}, {38 , S_SS}, {39 , S_SS|S_RS}, {40 , S_SS}, {41 , S_SS}, {42 , S_SS}, + {43 , S_SS}, {44 , S_SS}, {45 , S_SS}, {46 , S_SS}, {47 , S_SS}, {58 , S_SS}, + {59 , S_SS}, {60 , S_SS}, {61 , S_SS}, {62 , S_SS}, {63 , S_SS|S_RS}, {64 , S_SS}, + {91 , S_SS}, {92 , S_SS|S_RS}, {93 , S_SS}, {94 , S_SS}, {95 , S_SS}, {96 , S_SS|S_RS}, + {123, S_SS}, {124, S_SS|S_RS}, {125, S_SS}, {126, S_SS} +}; + +/* +** gen_rand_pass - generates random password of specified type +*/ +int +gen_rand_pass (char *password_string, int minl, int maxl, unsigned int pass_mode) +{ + int i = 0; + int j = 0; + int length = 0; + char *str_pointer; + int random_weight[94]; + int max_weight = 0; + int max_weight_element_number = 0; + + if (minl > 256 || maxl > 256 || minl < 1 || maxl < 1 || minl > maxl) + return (-1); + for (i = 0; i <= 93; i++) random_weight[i] = 0; + length = minl + randint(maxl-minl+1); + str_pointer = password_string; + + for (i = 0; i < length; i++) + { +/* Asign random weight in weight array if mode is present*/ + for (j = 0; j <= 93 ; j++) +/*!!!*/ if ( ((pass_mode & smbl[j].type) > 0) && + !((pass_mode & smbl[j].type) == 0x12)) + random_weight[j] = 1 + randint(20000); + j = 0; +/* Find an element with maximum weight */ + for (j = 0; j <= 93; j++) + if (random_weight[j] > max_weight) + { + max_weight = random_weight[j]; + max_weight_element_number = j; + } +/* Get password symbol */ + *str_pointer = smbl[max_weight_element_number].ch; + str_pointer++; + max_weight = 0; + max_weight_element_number = 0; + for (j = 0; j <= 93; j++) random_weight[j] = 0; + } + *str_pointer = 0; + return (length); +} diff --git a/randpass.h b/randpass.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..dcc6564 --- /dev/null +++ b/randpass.h @@ -0,0 +1,49 @@ +/* +** Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001 +** Adel I. Mirzazhanov. All rights reserved +** +** Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +** modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +** are met: +** +** 1.Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, +** this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +** 2.Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +** notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +** documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +** 3.The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products +** derived from this software without specific prior written permission. +** +** THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS +** OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED +** WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE +** ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY +** DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL +** DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE +** GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS +** INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, +** WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING +** NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS +** SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. +*/ + +/* +** randpass.h +*/ +#ifndef RANDPASS_H +#define RANDPASS_H 1 + +#ifndef RND_H +#include "rnd.h" +#endif + +#define S_NB 0x01 /* Numeric */ +#define S_SS 0x02 /* Special */ +#define S_CL 0x04 /* Capital */ +#define S_SL 0x08 /* Small */ +#define S_RS 0x10 /* Restricted Special*/ + +/* char gen_symbol(unsigned short int symbol_class); */ +extern int gen_rand_pass(char* password_string, int minl, + int maxl, unsigned int pass_mode); +#endif /* RANDPASS_H */ diff --git a/restrict.c b/restrict.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a24fba7 --- /dev/null +++ b/restrict.c @@ -0,0 +1,66 @@ +/* +** Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001 +** Adel I. Mirzazhanov. All rights reserved +** +** Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +** modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +** are met: +** +** 1.Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, +** this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +** 2.Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +** notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +** documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +** 3.The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products +** derived from this software without specific prior written permission. +** +** THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS +** OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED +** WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE +** ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY +** DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL +** DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE +** GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS +** INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, +** WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING +** NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS +** SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. +*/ + +/* +** restrict.c +*/ +#include +#include +#include +#include "restrict.h" + +/* +** Routine that checks if password exist in dictionary +** RETURN -1 - error +** 1 - password exist in dictionary +** 0 - password does not exist in dictionary +*/ +int +check_pass(char *pass, char *dict) +{ + FILE *dct; + char *string; + string = (char *) calloc(1,MAX_DICT_STRING_SIZE); + + /* + ** Open dict file an report of error + */ + if ( (dct = fopen(dict,"r")) == NULL) + return(-1); + + while ((fgets(string, MAX_DICT_STRING_SIZE, dct) != NULL)) + { + string = strtok (string," \t\n\0"); + if(strlen(string) != strlen(pass)) continue; + else if (strncmp(string, pass, strlen(pass)) == 0) return (1); + } + free ( (void *)string); + fclose (dct); + return (0); +} diff --git a/restrict.h b/restrict.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..621821e --- /dev/null +++ b/restrict.h @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +/* +** Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001 +** Adel I. Mirzazhanov. All rights reserved +** +** Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +** modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +** are met: +** +** 1.Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, +** this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +** 2.Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +** notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +** documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +** 3.The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products +** derived from this software without specific prior written permission. +** +** THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS +** OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED +** WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE +** ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY +** DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL +** DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE +** GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS +** INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, +** WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING +** NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS +** SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. +*/ + +/* +** restrict.h +*/ +#ifndef RESTRICT_H +#define RESTRICT_H 1 + +#define MAX_DICT_STRING_SIZE 255 +extern int check_pass(char * pass, char *dict); +extern int make_db_dict(char *dict, char *bddict); +extern int construct_db_name(char *plain_filename, char * dbname); + +#endif /* RESTRICT_H */ diff --git a/rnd.c b/rnd.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e86fd58 --- /dev/null +++ b/rnd.c @@ -0,0 +1,117 @@ +/* +** Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001 +** Adel I. Mirzazhanov. All rights reserved +** +** Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +** modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +** are met: +** +** 1.Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, +** this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +** 2.Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +** notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +** documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +** 3.The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products +** derived from this software without specific prior written permission. +** +** THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS +** OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED +** WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE +** ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY +** DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL +** DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE +** GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS +** INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, +** WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING +** NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS +** SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. +*/ + +#include +#include +#include +#include "rnd.h" +#include "./cast/cast.h" + +UINT32 __rnd_seed[2]; /* Random Seed 2*32=64 */ + +/* +** randint(int n) - Produces a Random number from 0 to n-1 . +*/ +UINT +randint(int n) +{ + return ( (UINT)( x917cast_rnd() % (UINT32)n ) ); +} + +/* +** ANSI X9.17 pseudorandom generator that uses CAST algorithm instead of DES +** m = 1 +*/ +UINT32 +x917cast_rnd (void) +{ + struct timeval local_time; + UINT32 I[2] = {0L,0L}; + UINT32 I_plus_s[2] = {0L,0L}; + UINT32 Xi[2] = {0L,0L}; + UINT32 Xi_plus_I[2] = {0L,0L}; + cast_key ky; + +/********************************************************************** +* ENCRYPTION KEY HEX : 0x000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F (128-bit) * +* YOU CAN CHANGE IT IF YOU WANT * +**********************************************************************/ +u8 ro_key[16] = { 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, +0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f}; +/********************************************************************** +* ENCRYPTION KEY HEX : 0x000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F (128-bit) * +* YOU CAN CHANGE IT IF YOU WANT * +**********************************************************************/ + (void) gettimeofday (&local_time, 0); + cast_setkey(&ky, (u8*)&ro_key[0], 16); + cast_encrypt (&ky, (u8 *)&local_time, (u8*)&I[0]); /* I=Ek(D), D-time */ + I_plus_s[0] = I[0] ^ __rnd_seed[0]; /* I0 (+) s0 */ + I_plus_s[1] = I[1] ^ __rnd_seed[1]; /* I1 (+) s1 */ + cast_encrypt (&ky, (u8 *)&I_plus_s[0], (u8*)&Xi[0]); /* Xi=Ek( I (+) s ) */ + Xi_plus_I[0] = Xi[0] ^ I[0]; /* Xi0 (+) I0 */ + Xi_plus_I[1] = Xi[1] ^ I[1]; /* Xi1 (+) I1 */ + cast_encrypt (&ky, (u8 *)&Xi_plus_I[0], (u8*)&__rnd_seed[0]); /* s=Ek( Xi (+) I ) */ + return (Xi[0]); +} + +/* +** x917cast_setseed (UINT32 seed) - Initializes seed +** UINT32 seed - seed value +*/ +void +x917cast_setseed (UINT32 seed) +{ + FILE * dr; + UINT32 drs[2]; + + if ( (dr = fopen(APG_DEVRANDOM, "r")) != NULL) + { + (void) fread( (void *)&drs[0], 8, 1, dr); + __rnd_seed[0] = seed ^ drs[0]; + __rnd_seed[1] = seed ^ drs[1]; + (void) fclose(dr); + } + else if ( (dr = fopen(APG_DEVURANDOM, "r")) != NULL) + { + (void) fread( (void *)&drs[0], 8, 1, dr); + __rnd_seed[0] = seed ^ drs[0]; + __rnd_seed[1] = seed ^ drs[1]; + (void) fclose(dr); + } + else + { +#ifndef CLISERV + fprintf(stderr,"CAN NOT USE /dev/random TO GENERATE RANDOM SEED\n"); + fprintf(stderr,"USEING LOCAL TIME FOR SEED GENERATION !!!\n"); + fflush(stderr); +#endif /* CLISERV */ + __rnd_seed[0] = seed; + __rnd_seed[1] = seed; + } +} diff --git a/rnd.h b/rnd.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..43399cc --- /dev/null +++ b/rnd.h @@ -0,0 +1,47 @@ +/* +** Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001 +** Adel I. Mirzazhanov. All rights reserved +** +** Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +** modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +** are met: +** +** 1.Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, +** this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +** 2.Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +** notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +** documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +** 3.The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products +** derived from this software without specific prior written permission. +** +** THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS +** OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED +** WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE +** ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY +** DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL +** DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE +** GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS +** INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, +** WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING +** NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS +** SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. +*/ + +#ifndef RND_H +#define RND_H 1 + +#ifndef OWN_TYPES_H +#include "owntypes.h" +#endif /* OWN_TYPES_H */ + +extern UINT32 __rnd_seed[2]; + +#define RND_MX 0x7FFFFFFF +#define APG_DEVRANDOM "/dev/random" +#define APG_DEVURANDOM "/dev/urandom" + +extern void x917cast_setseed (UINT32 seed); +extern UINT randint (int n); +UINT32 x917cast_rnd (void); + +#endif /* RND_H */